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1 Introduction
In the new stage of globalization the broad and substantial reorganization of production and
work leads to a geographic decomposition of value chains, a rising importance of personal
relationships, and an increasing flexibility, heterogeneity and versatility of work.1 These devel-
opments lead to changing, often unpredictable, patterns of winners and losers from globalization
and pose a challenge of enormous proportions to the welfare state - in developed as well as in
emerging economies -, which broadly suﬀers from being ineﬃcient and not adjusting to people’s
welfare needs.2 It must protect losers and spread the benefits from globalization to keep new
protectionist tendencies at bay, but it must do it in ways that do least damage to people’s
incentives to work, to educate and train themselves, and to save and invest. What is required,
is not a passive welfare state, but a policy framework that makes people more adaptable and
versatile. The welfare state must provide people with the tools to adjust to changing market
conditions to turn themselves from losers into winners through their own eﬀorts.
This dissertation3 aims at investigating policies that enhance people’s adaptability and seeks
to providing suitable analytical frameworks for this analysis which are rich enough to capture
the necessary heterogeneities and simple enough to generate straight-forward, intuitively trans-
parent policy recommendations.
In doing so, the main focus of this dissertation lies on economic incentives and it provides
various simple analytical frameworks to explicitly model the incentives of labour market agents.
This dissertation does not rely on the workhorse model of the labour market, the search and
matching model by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), which is often applied to analyze the
eﬀects of labour market policies. This literature rests on the assumption of a stable matching
function, which describes the relation between unemployment and vacancies and the number
of matches. It is admissible to use the matching function for macroeconomic analysis and to
investigate the eﬀectiveness of labour market policies provided that neither macroeconomic
variables nor the policies have any significant influence on the matching process itself. It seems
implausible that the matching function is invariant with respect to labour market policies
that are actually designed to improve the matching process. The resulting instability of the
matching function prohibits its use for the analysis of labour market policies or macroeconomic
fluctuations, since it could run afoul of the Lucas critique (see Lucas, 1976).
Instead of assuming a policy-invariant matching function, using purely microfounded models
1This Great Reorganization view of globalization is presented in Brown et al. (2009).
2See Snower and Brown (2009) for a discussion of the dysfunctional welfare state.
3This dissertation has profited immensely from the excellent and highly appreciated guidance by Dennis
Snower. I have also very much enjoyed and valued the work with Chris Merkl. Furthermore, I gained much
from working together with Alfred Boss and Mike Orszag. I thank Gert Pönitzsch, Dennis Wesselbaum, Ellen
Schmieder and Mariana Heinrich for excellent research assistance. I am very grateful for the many discussions
with Ronald Bachmann, Torben Andersen, Giuseppe Bertola, Willem Buiter, Olivier Godart, Laszlo Goerke,
Arye Hillman, Wolfgang Lechthaler, Thomas Lontzek, Ruud de Mooij, Ulrich Schmidt, Martin Weale, Alan
Winters and Stephen Yeo. For valuable comments I wish to thank the participants of the IfW Macro Reading
Group, the IfW staﬀ seminar, the RWI staﬀ seminar, the CEPR Public Policy Symposium in Kiel, the IAB
workshops, the Annual Meeting of the EEA in Vienna and Budapest and the VfS in Bayreuth and Munich, and
the workshops at the Federal Ministry of Economic Aﬀairs and of Finance. Family and friends strongly deserve
my gratitude for their continuous support. Above all I thank Irene for her endless support, patience and trust.
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the dynamics of the labour market are described as the outcome of optimizing behaviour by
economic agents. These analytical frameworks are behavioural Markov models of the labour
market in which the dynamics of employment and unemployment are determined by transition
probabilities among various labour market states. These transition rates between employment
and unemployment are a function of the employment incentives of economic agents and are
derived from optimization principles. Furthermore, these models explicitly incorporate diﬀerent
heterogeneities and frictions, and take a variety of common labor market imperfections into
account (insider wage bargaining, hiring and firing costs, and imperfections related to the tax
and transfer system, etc.).
This dissertation exploits these attractive features of the models to analyze the economic
incentives generated by welfare policies, derive the behavioral implications and quantify the
resulting responses.
In line with policymakers’ actual concerns budgetary constraints of the government are
explicitly taken into account and the eﬀectiveness of the policies under consideration is often
measured not just in terms of employment, but also in terms of inequality or welfare.
In what follows, three policies to respond to the challenges for the welfare state from the
new stage of globalization are analyzed with diﬀerently focussed incentive-based models; in
addition a new modelling framework for policy analysis is proposed.
The following Chapter 2 proposes to replace the current unemployment benefit system with
unemployment accounts, which promote adaptability by giving people property rights in welfare
services. A simple household model is used to analyze how switching from the existing system
to a system of unemployment accounts would aﬀect people’s employment incentives. Then this
model is calibrated for the high-unemployment countries of Europe and the unemployment and
welfare implications of the switch are then examined.
Chapter 3 investigates the eﬀectiveness of diﬀerently targeted employment subsidies in sup-
porting the losers from globalization by considering various groups of workers with heterogenous
and partly endogenous skills. A firm side model is calibrated exemplarily to the German labour
market and the implications for the targetting scheme as well as for the magnitude of interven-
tion are derived.
The household side model from Chapter 2 and the firm side model from Chapter 3 are
then brought together in Chapter 4 to enable a more holistic analysis of the interactions of
a set of policies and their eﬀects. Specifically, this chapter performs the policy experiment
of introducing the Danish flexicurity policies in Germany. This flexicurity concept aims at
providing employment security by creating flexible and adaptable labour markets.
In Chapter 5 the usefulness of the matching function for policy analysis is examined and a
new modelling strategy with heterogenous workers and jobs is proposed for moving beyond the
matching function in future policy evaluation. Furthermore, the new framework’s performance
in accounting for important empirical regularities of the US economy is examined in a business
cycle analysis.
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2 Unemployment Accounts and Employment Incentives
2.1 Introduction
This chapter4 explores the implications of reforming labour market policy to replace the un-
employment benefit (UB) system, in which the unemployed receive benefits that are financed
through taxes on the employed, with an unemployment accounts (UAs) system. Under un-
employment accounts, people have individual unemployment accounts, to which they make
ongoing contributions when they are employed. The balances in these accounts are then drawn
upon during periods of unemployment. These withdrawals from UAs substitute for unemploy-
ment benefits. UAs are hence compulsory saving to provide security against the income loss of
unemployment. An UAs system need not, and in our view should not, remove redistribution
and equity as design considerations. To achieve its equity objectives in a UAs system, the gov-
ernment can make balanced-budget interpersonal redistributions among the UAs, taxing the
accounts of higher-income people and subsidizing those of lower-income people. At the end of
their working lives, people could transfer the remaining balances on their UAs into the pension
accounts.
The same principle can equally well be applied to incapacity benefits: Current incapacity
benefits could be transformed into incapacity accounts. People could draw on these accounts
while they are incapacitated and, when they retire, use the remaining balances to top up their
pensions.
This chapter presents a simple model of how switching from the UB to the UAs systemwould
aﬀect people’s incentives to work and search for jobs. We then calibrate this model for the high-
unemployment countries of Europe and examine the employment and welfare implications of
the switch.
In practice, the UAs system would run along the following general lines.5 Each employed
worker contributes a fixed mandatory minimum amount to his or her account each month.
Voluntary contributions in excess of the minimum amount are allowed. Upon becoming un-
employed an individual is entitled to withdraw a predetermined maximum amount per month.
Smaller withdrawals are also allowed.
When a person’s account balance is zero, the person is entitled to unemployment assistance,
on the same terms and conditions as under the current UB system. In addition, as noted, the
government can subsidize the contributions of low-income people. Both these expenditures are
financed by taxing contributions of other unemployment account holders. When people’s UAs
balances are suﬃciently high, they can use the surplus funds for other purposes; and, as noted,
when they retire, their remaining UAs balances can be used to top up their pensions.6
The UAs system can be run on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) or fully funded basis.7 If the UAs
4For a diﬀerent version of this chapter see Brown et al. (2008).
5In the model below, we simplify several aspects of this account for the sake of analytical simplicity and
transparency.
6An unemployed person could also be permitted to use a portion of his UAs balance to provide employment
vouchers to employers who employ him. See Orszag and Snower (2000) and Brown et al. (2007a).
7This aspect is potentially important, for a standard criticism of personalized accounts in other areas of
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system is fully funded, then the contribution rates can be set in an actuarially fair manner
so that, for all the UAs of a particular age cohort in the economy, the discounted value of
aggregate minimum benefits is equal to the discounted value of aggregate contributions.8 If
the UAs system is run on a PAYG basis, cross-subsidization of accounts would also extend
across generations. In particular, a part of the UAs balances of young people then finances the
withdrawals of older people.
Since the UAs system is compatible with both PAYG and fully funded schemes, the transi-
tion from the former to the latter can proceed at any pace desirable. The closer the system is
to being fully funded, the more discretion people can be given in determining who is to manage
their UAs, the government or private sector financial institutions. The investment activity of
the latter institutions would of course have to be regulated so as to protect individuals.9
While UAs are in principle savings accounts, they involve two main advantages over the
laissez-faire stance of simply letting people save whatever they want to protect themselves from
the income loss of unemployment. First, UAs with mandatory contributions mitigate the moral
hazard problem, namely, that individuals - knowing that the government will support them in
unemployment regardless of how much they have saved - will have insuﬃcient incentive to save
enough.10 And second, the UAs system also fulfills a redistributive function, whereby people
who are unable to support themselves out of their savings receive support from others.11
Intuitively, the case for switching from the UB to the UAs system is straightforward. Current
UB systems, broadly speaking, provide unemployment benefits under the condition that the
recipients are unemployed and benefits are financed through taxes falling primarily on the
employed. When unemployed people find jobs, their benefits generally are withdrawn (in whole
or in part) and taxes are imposed. In eﬀect, under an UB system, people are rewarded for
being unemployed (through unemployment benefits) and penalized for being employed (through
taxes). The UB system thereby creates an externality, distorting the incentives to work and
save, since the unemployed impose costs on the employed.
The unemployed do not take the full social costs of their unemployment into account when
seeking jobs. In this way, the UB system depresses job search and thereby stimulates unem-
the welfare state (such as pensions, health care, or education) is that they are typically viewed as fully funded
systems, and most OECD countries appear to lack the political will to embark on a quick transition to such
systems from the current PAYG systems.
8This method could ensure that generational accounts are in balance. But since some of the UAs balances
of higher-income individuals would be used to subsidize the contributions of low-income individuals and finance
unemployment assistance, the contribution rates would not be actuarially fair for each individual.
9Implementing a fully funded system poses many choices on how to invest the funds. Whether these yield
additional gains is subject to dispute, e.g. Shiller (2005) criticises the specific life-cycle portfolio plan of the
personal accounts proposal for social security in the US. We focus on diﬀerent implications: our accounts cover
unemployment (instead of pensions) and we focus on the resulting employment incentives.
10Along the same line, maximum withdrawal rates avoid excessive withdrawals.
11Barro (2005) argues that, for pension accounts, there is no good reason to go beyond the minimum standard
of living, as voluntary saving should be suﬃcient above this minimum payout. Our proposal, by contrast, deals
with unemployment accounts and provides support up to the level of existing unemployment benefits, which
presumably often exceed Barro’s "minimum standard of living." It is worth noting that in a stochastic world,
guaranteeing a minimum standard of living naturally has adverse employment incentives on people whose income
lies above the minimum since, ex ante, they are not certain whether their income will exceed or fall short of the
minimum level. We show that such disincentives are substantially smaller under UAsthan under a UB system.
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ployment. Furthermore, the employed do not receive full compensation for the social benefits
from their employment and thus, if the relevant substitution eﬀect dominates the income eﬀect,
they will work less hard than they otherwise would have. Thereby, the UB system may depress
productivity and thereby reduce employment.
Not all of the unemployment benefits and taxes under the UB system are interpersonal
redistributions. On the contrary, most of the people who are unemployed at one point in time
are employed at other times, and thus part of the taxes they pay when they are employed serve
to pay the benefits when they are unemployed, i.e. they are in eﬀect paying themselves. This is
an "intrapersonal" redistribution in the form of intertemporal income smoothing, rather than
an interpersonal redistribution. These intrapersonal redistributions are handled ineﬃciently
under the UB system, since both the taxes and the benefits create externalities that promote
unemployment.12
The UAs system alleviates these externality problems. For when an unemployed person
makes withdrawals from his UAs, he is thereby diminishing the amount of funds that are
available to him later on. Thus, in comparison to the UB system, the unemployed internalize
more of the social costs of their unemployment and thus have greater incentives to search for
jobs. When an employed person makes contributions to her UAs, she is thereby increasing the
account balance that she can draw on in the future. Hence, employed people internalize more
of the social benefit of their employment than under the UB system and thus have greater
incentives to work.
Of course the interpersonal redistributions in the UAs system do create externalities that
generate disincentives for job search and for work. But these disincentives are lower in the
UAs system than in the UB system. The reason is that the UAs system redistributes income
more eﬃciently: Since intrapersonal redistributions are conducted through the UAs rather than
through taxes, the costs and benefits of these redistributions are internalized by the account
holder, whereas under the UB system an employed person whose taxes pay for her subsequent
unemployment benefits does not internalize the costs and benefits. These taxes discourage
work eﬀort and these unemployment benefits discourage job search under UBs, whereas the
corresponding intrapersonal redistributions under UAs do not. Hence, UAs generates less
unemployment and thus there is less need for interpersonal redistributions.
In short, under the UAs system the intrapersonal redistributions lead to lower interpersonal
redistributions and thereby to higher employment, lower unemployment and higher productivity
without making the unemployed worse oﬀ. We will take a first step towards quantifying these
eﬀects below.
This chapter provides an analytical framework for assessing the labour market implications
of switching from the UB to the UAs system. The chapter is organized as follows. Section
12Several empirical studies have illustrated that intrapersonal redistributions play a dominant role in total
social expenditures. Among others, Björklund (1993) reports, that lifetime incomes are distributed more equally
than annual incomes. Estimates on which portion of total social expenditure actually is redistributed between
individuals’ lifetime incomes (i.e. interpersonal redistribution) have been provided for a number of countries:
for Sweden 24%, Fölster (1997); for Denmark 26%, Sørensen et al.; for Australia 48-62% and for Great Britain
29-38%, Falkingham and Harding (1996).
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2.2 surveys the related literature. Section 2.3 depicts the UB and the UAs system systems in
the context of a simple overlapping-generations model and derives the incentives for job search
and work. Section 2.4 specifies functional forms for this model and calibrates it for European
high-unemployment countries. The calibration is used to derive how the switch from the UB
to the UAs system aﬀects unemployment and welfare. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
Individual welfare accounts are widely discussed in the public debate on welfare reform and
have also been put into practice in several countries.13 Practical proposals for unemployment
accounts (individual accounts to cover income loss from unemployment) have been made by
various authors,14 but have been only implemented recently in Chile. The UAs system in
Chile includes a so-called Solidarity Fund to provide minimum unemployment benefits if the
account balances are insuﬃcient to provide the benefit payment.15 Unemployment accounts in
a diﬀerent sense - essentially severance savings accounts - have been implemented several Latin
American countries and in Austria.16 In contrast to our proposal, these are not a substitute
for the unemployment benefit system.17
Our theoretical analysis of UAs must be distinguished from the literature on optimal un-
employment insurance18. While the latter is concerned with the eﬃcient design of the UB
system (support levels, duration, eligibility, etc.), we take the design of the existing unemploy-
ment benefit systems as given and focus on how employment incentives would be aﬀected by
replacing the existing systems by personalized unemployment accounts. As is well known, the
existing unemployment benefit systems pursue two potentially conflicting goals: insurance and
redistribution. Optimal insurance under adverse selection implies that insurance premia must
be positively related to employment risk; redistribution dictates the opposite. The aim of this
chapter is not to analyze the roles of insurance and redistribution in current benefit systems,
13The most comprehensive accounts system is that of the Singaporean Central Provident Fund. See Choon
and Tsui (2003) and Asher (1994), (1995) for a description.
14For early discussions see Topel (1990), Coloma (1996) and Cortázar (1996). For further proposals for UAs
and integrated systems encompassing UAs and pensions see Brunner and Colarelli (2004), Feldstein and Altman
(2007), Graetz and Mashaw (1999), Fernandez (2000), Guasch (2000), Kock and Butter (2001), Esguerra et al.
(2001) and (2002), Fölster et al. (2003a), (2003b), Sørensen (2003), Bovenberg and Sørensen (2004), Stiglitz
and Yun (2005) and Kling (2006). For porposals of explicitly more comprehensive system of welfare accounts -
also covering health, education, etc. - see Orszag and Snower (1997), Fölster (1997) and (1999), Fölster and
Tromimov (1999), Fölster et al. (2003a), (2003b), Sørensen et al. (2006) and Snower and Brown (2009). For an
overview of diﬀerent forms of UAs see Vodopivec (2006).
15For the mechanics of the system in Chile see Acevedo et al. (forthcoming), Sehnbruch (2006), Conerly
(2002) and ILO (2001).
16For Latin America see Mazza (2000), Jaramillo and Saavedra (2005), Ferrer and Riddell (forthcoming),
specifically for the Colombian reform see Kugler (1999) and (2005) and for the Austrian reform see Koman et
al. (forthcoming). For a proposal for Korea see Hur (forthcoming).
17While severance and seniority payments are similar to unemployment benefits in that they provide cash
compensation in the case of unemployment, they diﬀer as well in objectives as in creating externalities and
in crucial design features. For a general discussion see Parsons (2004), Holzmann (2005), Vodopivec (2006)
and Holzman et al. (forthcoming). Furthermore, in these countries severance payment accounts exist parallel
to unemployment benefit systems, thereby, our proposal applies also to these countries. Both types of these
accounts could well be integrated, but this goes beyond the scope of this paper.
18See for a survey Karni (1999) and for a recent paper e.g. Shimer and Werning (2005).
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but rather to ask whether the support provisions of the existing systems (who gets how much
under which conditions) can be fulfilled more eﬃciently through UAs. In particular, we ask
whether UAs can create more favourable employment incentives without sacrificing the support
provisions of the existing systems.
These eﬀects are largely ignored in the existing applied literature on mandatory savings ac-
counts in general and UAs specifically. Specifically, much of this literature has two undesirable
features: (i) the analysis is static and thereby ignores the intertemporal eﬀects that are inher-
ently important in an account system and (ii) only mechanical impact eﬀects (based on existing
behaviour patterns) are investigated, rather than changes in employment behaviour as result of
the institutional switch to UAs. Various authors examine empirically the feasibility of establish-
ing an accounts system, as well as its distributional and government budget impacts: Feldstein
and Altmann (2007) examine UAs for the US, Vodopivec (2008) for Slovenia, Vodopivec and
Rejec (forthcoming) for Estonia, Fölster (1999), (2001) and Fölster et al. (2003a) investigate
comprehensive welfare accounts for Sweden, Yun (forthcoming) simulates a specific integrated
proposal for Korea and Kling (2006) simulates his specific reform proposal for the US. While
these studies claim that UAs would improve employment incentives substantially, they do not
take people’s response to these incentives into account.19 While Sørensen et al. (2006), who
estimate a specific proposal for reform for the Danish welfare state, take people’s responses into
account, their analysis is static and thereby ignores intertemporal eﬀects.
We explicitly derive the resulting incentive eﬀects within an intertemporal behavioural
model and quantify the resulting responses. Similiar models have been used to assess the wel-
fare and government budget eﬀects of integrated account systems encompassing unemployment
insurance and pensions. These analyzes, however, do not address the incentive and employ-
ment eﬀects resulting from a shift from an unemployment benefit system to UAs, which are of
concern here. For example, Hopenhayn and Hatchondo (2002) provide a cost-benefit analysis
in terms of welfare and government cost savings for alternative specifications of UAs for Es-
tonia.20 Bovenberg and Sørensen (2004) and Sørensen (2003) examine a specific proposal for
comprehensive welfare accounts for Denmark and show that it could be self-financing and lead
to a welfare gain.
Moreover, Stiglitz and Yun (2005) examine the optimal degree of integration of tax-financed
unemployment benefits with government provision of pension-funded borrowing. The authors
show improved job search incentives and the resulting welfare gains, which though are mainly a
result of their assumption of capital market imperfections. In contrast, we examine the incentive
eﬀects for search and work eﬀort under the assumptions that agents can freely borrow and lend
at the prevailing interest rates and that borrowing contracts are enforced. Thereby, we explicitly
disregard any eﬀects resulting from creating a channel for consumption smoothing. Our eﬀects
result from a higher eﬃciency in the redistribution of income. Goerke (2007) investigates in a
trade union model the employment and welfare consequences of integrated UAs which operate
19For example, Feldstein and Altmann (2007) merely present results for the assumption that as a result of
possible behavioral responses unemployment duration is reduced by 10% or 30%.
20This analysis complements the accounting analysis by Vodopivec and Rejec (forthcoming)
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solely via the wage, he thereby fully ignores individual work and search eﬀort decisions. We
explicitly shed light on the channels whereby the shift from an UB to an UAs system raises
the search and work incentives and show that a more eﬃcient redistribution of income via UAs
would improve welfare and significantly reduce unemployment.
2.3 The General Model
entrant
(e)
young,  em ployed 
(y,n)
young,  unem ployed 
(y,u)
insider                     
(i)
o ld ,  short-term  em ployed 
(o ,sn)
old ,  short-term  unem ployed 
(o ,su)
h e
1-h e
1-fy
fy
1-h y
h y
o ld ,  long-term  unem ployed 
(o ,lu)
Figure 2.1: The structure of the model.
Workers in our model live for two periods: in the first period the worker is "young", in the
second period she is "old". The worker’s possible labour market states are illustrated in Figure
2.1. Upon entering the workforce, each worker faces a predetermined probability he of becoming
employed and a probability (1− he) of remaining unemployed. Let V (y, n) and V (y, u) be the
discounted lifetime utilities of an employed and unemployed young worker, respectively. Then
the discounted lifetime utility of an entrant (e) to the workforce is:
V (e) = heV (y, n) + (1− he)V (y, u) (2.1)
A young, employed worker (y, n) faces a probability fy of being fired at beginning of the
second period, in which case he turns into an old, short-term unemployed (o, su) worker. With
probability (1 − fy) he is retained in the second period, in which case he and turns into an
insider (i), i.e. an employed incumbent worker.
Finally, a young, unemployed worker (y, u) faces a probability hy of being hired at the
beginning of the second period, whereupon he becomes an old, short-term employed worker
(o, sn). With probability (1 − hy) the young, unemployed (y, u) does not find a job in the
second period and becomes an old, long-term unemployed worker (o, lu).
Thus, the unemployment rate of young workers is
uy = (1− he) (2.2)
and the unemployment rate of old workers is
uo = (1− he) (1− hy) + hefy. (2.3)
For simplicity, we define the categories "young" and "old" so that both generations are of
equal size and the overall unemployment rate is u = 1
2
(uy + uo).
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Unemployed workers divide their time between leisure and job search; employed workers
divide their time between on-the-job leisure (e.g. shirking) and work. The hiring rates in our
model depend on search intensity (i.e. the length of time unemployed workers spent searching),
and the firing rates depend on work eﬀort (i.e. the length of time spent working), which
determines the worker’s productivity. Workers make their leisure and consumption decisions so
as to maximize their discounted lifetime utilities, taking into account the eﬀects of their leisure
choices on the hiring and firing rates.21
For simplicity, entrants are assumed to devote all their time to job search, and thus the
entrants’ hiring rate he may be taken as an exogenously given constant. All old workers are
assumed to exert a given, fixed level of eﬀort, since they maintain their current (un)employment
state and die in the following period. Thus search and work incentives in our model can be
assessed simply by examining the leisure and consumption decisions of young workers.
Workers are assumed to have access to capital markets, so that they are able to save their
current income or borrow against their future incomes at the market interest rate. This as-
sumption is of particular interest in our context, since it allows us to explore the degree to which
savings are a substitute for unemployment accounts. By assuming perfect capital markets, we
bias our model against unemployment accounts. With imperfect capital markets, unemploy-
ment accounts would increase economic eﬃciency, at least with voluntary contribution levels,
by providing households with a channel for transferring purchasing power through time.
2.3.1 Job Search and Work Eﬀort Decisions
As noted, the hiring rate hy for young unemployed workers (y, u) depends inversely on their
leisure ly,u: the more leisure they consume, the less time they spend on job search and thus
the fewer jobs they are likely to find. The firing rate fy for young, employed workers (y, n)
depends positively on their leisure ly,n: workers who shirk (indulge in more leisure) when young
are less likely to be productive when old because of "learning by doing", and thus, more likely
to be fired by the firm. (The microfoundations of the hiring and firing functions are presented
in appendix 2.A.1.)
A young, employed worker (y, n) has the period utility υ(cy,n, ly,n), where cy,n is con-
sumption and ly,n is the worker’s leisure. In the second time period, he receives an old, short-term
unemployed worker’s utility V (o, su) with probability fy(ly,n), and an insider’s utility V (i) with
probability (1− fy(ly,n)). Since the leisure of the old worker is fixed and the young worker
transfers unconsumed income into the second period, V (i) and V (o, su) are determined by the
young worker’s consumption decision.
The young, employed worker maximizes the present value of utility over leisure ly,n and
consumption cy,n:
V (y, n) = max
ly,n,cy,n
[υ (cy,n, ly,n) + β (fy(ly,n)V (o, su) + (1− fy(ly,n))V (i))] (2.4)
21The model is a simple two-period variant of the labour market model developed by Phelps (1994a). Our
innovations include the incorporation of job search and the analysis of unemployment accounts in this setting.
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where β is the discount factor. The first-order conditions for this decision problem are:
υly,n = βfly,n [V (i)− V (o, su)] (2.5)
υcy,n = −β
∙
fy(ly,n)
dV (o, su)
dcy,n
+ (1− fy(ly,n))
dV (i)
dcy,n
¸
(2.6)
In other words, the marginal utility of leisure must be set equal to the discounted marginal firing
propensity (βfly,n) times the reward for keeping a job ([V (i)− V (o, su)]). Given diminishing
marginal utility of leisure, the optimal leisure depends inversely on the reward for keeping a
job.22 Furthermore, the marginal utility of consumption when young (υcy,n) must be equal to
the discounted marginal disutility of not consuming when old, which is a weighted average of
the consumption sacrificed when being an old, short-term unemployed worker (dV (o,su)dcy,n ) and
when being an insider (dV (i)dcy,n ). The weights are given by the respective probabilities of being
fired (fy(ly,n)) and being retained ((1− fy(ly,n))).
Along similar lines, a young, unemployed worker has a period utility υ(cy,u, ly,u), where
cy,u is the worker’s consumption and ly,u his leisure. In the second time period, she receives the
utility of an old, short-term employed worker V (o, sn) with probability hy(ly,u), and the utility
of an old, long-term unemployed worker V (o, lu) with probability (1− hy(ly,u)). As above,
V (o, sn) and V (o, lu) are fixed by the young worker’s consumption decision.
Thus, the young, unemployed worker’s decision problem is to find the level of leisure ly,u
and consumption cy,u that maximizes the present value of utility:
V (y, u) = max
ly,u,cy,u
[υ (cy,u, ly,u) + β (hy(ly,u)V (o, sn) + (1− hy(ly,u))V (o, lu))] (2.7)
The first-order conditions for this problem are:
υly,u = −βhly,u [V (o, sn)− V (o, lu)] (2.8)
υcy,u = −β
∙
hy(ly,u)
dV (o, sn)
dcy,u
+ (1− hy(ly,u))
dV (o, lu)
dcy,u
¸
(2.9)
Here, the marginal utility of leisure must be set equal to the discounted marginal hiring propen-
sity (−βhly,u) times the reward for seeking a job ([V (o, sn)− V (o, lu)]). As above, diminishing
marginal utility of leisure implies that the optimal level of leisure depends inversely on the re-
ward for seeking a job.23 Accordingly, the marginal utility of consumption when young (υcy,u)
must be equal to the discounted marginal disutility of not consuming when old, which is a
weighted average of the consumption sacrificed when being an old, short-term employed worker
22This is true if (as assumed below) leisure and consumption are complements or weak substitutes. If they
were suﬃciently strong substitutes, then the decrease in period one consumption might lead to a suﬃcient
increase in the marginal utility of leisure to counterbalance the eﬀect on leisure from the reward for remaining
employed.
23As in the previous footnote, this is true if (as assumed below) leisure and consumption are complements or
weak substitutes.
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(dV (o,sn)dcy,u ) and when being an old, long-term unemployed worker (
dV (o,lu)
dcy,u
). Here the weights
are given by the respective probabilities of being hired (hy(ly,u)) and remaining unemployed
((1− hy(ly,u)))
An attractive feature of this model is that both job search and work eﬀort are determined
by the diﬀerence between the value of being employed and that of being unemployed (by the
first-order conditions for leisure, eqs. 2.5 and 2.8). Below, we will show how the UB and UAs
systems have diﬀerent eﬀects on this diﬀerence, which will help explain why the two systems
have diﬀerent unemployment and welfare outcomes.
2.3.2 The Unemployment Benefit (UB) System
In an unemployment benefit system each unemployed worker receives an exogenously given real
unemployment benefit b, and unemployment benefits are financed through a payroll tax, where
τ is the payroll tax rate. For simplicity, all employed workers are assumed to receive the same,
exogenously given wage w, normalized to unity.24
The government is in balance in each time period, i.e. the government’s expenditures on
unemployment benefits are equal to its tax receipts. Specifically, the value of unemployment
benefits received by the unemployed workers (young, unemployed workers (y, u), old, long-term
unemployed workers (o, lu), and old, short-term unemployed workers (o, su)) must be equal to
the value of taxes paid by the employed workers (young, employed workers (y, n), insiders (i),
and old, short-term employed workers (o, sn)) in each period:25
b ((1− he) + (1− he) (1− hy(ly,u)) + hefy(ly,n)) (2.10)
= wτ (he + he (1− fy(ly,n)) + (1− he)hy(ly,u))
which can be rewritten as
νu = τ (1− u) (2.11)
with the unemployment rate u determined by eq. 2.2 and 2.3 and with the replacement ratio26
24By implication, we do not investigate the general equilibrium eﬀects of the shift from the UB to the UAs
system that operate via the wage. A switch from UB to UAs will aﬀect not only the households’ work incentives
and thus shift the labour supply curve outwards; it will also aﬀect the firms’ incentives (via their hiring and
firing rates) and thus shift the labour demand curve outwards. For this reason alone the eﬀect on the wage is
ambiguous. Which way the wage will move will depend on the relative size of the labour demand and supply
curve shifts. Since this part of the story is well-understood and we wish to concentrate on our novel contribution,
the direct incentive eﬀects resulting from switching to UAs, we let wages be constant for our analysis. The
resulting reduction in wage eﬀects illustrated by Goerke (2007) is a result of the specific institutional assumption
of collective wage determination.
25Since our analysis focuses on the stationary steady state, this is of course equivalent to the condition that
the present value of government expenditures is equal to the present value of government tax receipts. An
equivalent formulation is that the deficit (surplus) generated by the young generation must be equal to the
surplus (deficit) generated by the old generation.
26Naturally, since we have normalized the wage to unity, the replacement ratio ν is equal to the unemployment
benefit b in our analysis. We nevertheless distinguish between these parameters to aid the reader’s intuition.
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ν = bw . Thus, the payroll tax rate under the UB system is:
τ =
νu
(1− u) =
ν ((1− he) + (1− he) (1− hy(ly,u)) + hefy(ly,n))
(he + he (1− fy(ly,n)) + (1− he)hy(ly,u))
(2.12)
By eq. 2.12, the payroll tax level is increasing in both the leisure of the employed and unem-
ployed.
2.3.3 The Unemployment Accounts (UAs) System
Under the UAs system unemployed workers are assumed to receive a payment equal to the
unemployment benefit b out of their UAs.27 This enables us to compare the incentives under
both systems when the unemployed receive identical support. Thus, for a real interest rate r,
the contribution of a young, employed worker to her UAs must be b
1+r .
The payroll tax rate κ must be set so that total tax receipts by young and old employed
workers are equal total expenditures on unemployment benefits. In contrast to the UB sys-
tem old, short-term unemployed workers (o, su) finance their own unemployment using their
accounts.28 Thus, payments of b must be financed via taxes only for young, unemployed work-
ers (y, u) and the old, long-term unemployed workers (o, lu), who have no balances on their
accounts. The balanced budget constraint is:
b ((1− he) + (1− he) (1− hy(ly,u))) (2.13)
= κw (he + he (1− fy(ly,n)) + (1− he)hy(ly,u)) (2.14)
which can be rewritten as
ν
µ
u− 1
2
hefy(ly,n)
¶
= κ (1− u) (2.15)
with the unemployment rate u determined by eq. 2.2 and 2.3 and with the replacement ratio
ν = bw . Hence the tax rate is
κ = ν
¡
u− 1
2
hefy(ly,n)
¢
(1− u) = ν
(1− he) + (1− he) (1− hy(ly,u))
he + he (1− fy(ly,n)) + (1− he)hy(ly,u)
(2.16)
Comparing the tax rates under the UB system (eq. 2.12) and UAs system (eq. 2.16), it is
clear that, for any given unemployment rate, the tax rate is lower under the UAs system than
under the UB system.
We now proceed to analyze how the job search and work eﬀort decisions are aﬀected by
these UB and UAs systems.
27This payment is financed either (a) by past forced savings or (if the account balances are insuﬃcient to
provide the payment (b) by government transfers.
28To achieve better comparability to the UB system instead of taxing the contributions to the accounts, we
simply tax the wage. Levying taxes just in the first period - on the contributions to the accounts - leads to the
same qualitative results.
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2.3.4 Comparison of Employment Incentives
As we have seen in the first-order conditions for leisure (eq. 2.5 and 2.8), the leisure decisions
depend negatively on the reward for keeping a job, which is the reward for work eﬀort, and
the reward for seeking a job, namely the reward for search eﬀort. Thus, to understand why the
UB and UAs systems generate diﬀerent employment incentives, it is useful to consider what
workers stand to lose from being unemployed under the two systems.
The Unemployment Benefit (UB) System
Employed, when old Unemployed, when old Reward ΔB
Employed, when young w1 −   snB1  r b  snB1  r ΔnB  w1 −  − b
Unemployed, when young w1 −   suB1  r b  suB1  r ΔuB  w1 −  − b
The Unemployment Accounts (UAs) System
Employed, when old Unemployed, when old Reward ΔA
Employed, when young w1 −   b  snA 1  r b  snA1  r ΔnA  w1 − 
Unemployed, when young w1 −   suA1  r b  suA1  r ΔuA  w1 −  − b
Table 2.1: Old workers’ consumption and the associated rewards for keeping a job and seeking
a job as a function of their past and current employment states.
Table 2.1 compares the two systems by describing old workers’ consumption as a function
of the worker’s labour market history and also presents the associated rewards for keeping a job
(∆n) and seeking a job (∆u). In what follows, the superscript "B" stands for the unemployment
"benefit" system and the superscript "A" for the unemployment "accounts" system.
As noted above, workers are assumed to have access to capital markets and s is the pur-
chasing power transfered through saving into the second period by young workers, which earns
interest at the interest rate r.29 This saving may be described as "voluntary", in the sense that
it is the outcome of the the workers’ optimization decisions under the prevailing institutional
setting (UB or UAs); it may be contrasted with the "forced saving" in the form of contributions
to the UAs. As our workers live only two periods, in the second period they withdraw their
total savings.
Under the UB system old workers receive w (1− τ) plus their savings when employed and
b plus their savings when unemployed; thus they stand to loose ∆B = w (1− τ)− b from being
unemployed, regardless of whether they were employed or unemployed when they were young.
Thus, in the UB system the reward for keeping a job (∆Bn ) is equal to the reward for seeking a
job (∆Bu ).
Under the UAs system, by contrast, the respective rewards (∆An and ∆Au ) are not equal, and
hence, the incentives are diﬀerent - especially for young, employed workers. If they continue to
be employed, they receive w(1− κ) and the sum of their savings, namely their interest-bearing
voluntary savings sAn (1 + r) and forced savings b from the UAs. If they become unemployed,
they still receive in addition to their voluntary savings sAn (1+r), their forced savings b from the
29As above, the subscript "n" refers to the employment state and "u" to the unemployment state.
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accounts. Hence, in contrast to the UB system, the reward for keeping a job is ∆An = w(1−κ).
As for old, short-term employed workers, they receive w(1 − κ) plus their interest-bearing
savings sAu (1 + r) and old, long-term unemployed workers receive b plus their interest-bearing
savings sAu (1+r). Now the resulting diﬀerence, the reward for seeking a job, is∆Au = w(1−κ)−b.
In sum, in the UAs system workers stand to lose more from being unemployed: the rewards
for keeping and seeking a job in consumption terms are higher, particularly the former, which is
the reward for work eﬀort to young, employed workers. Under an UAs system, these workers will
not benefit from becoming unemployed (through the payment of unemployment benefits), in
contrast to the UB system. The reason is, that under the UAs system these workers are forced
to redistribute their income intrapersonally via their UAs. By financing their own possible
future unemployment fully themselves via their accounts, these workers completely internalize
the cost of their own unemployment and hence stand to loose more from being unemployed
than under the UB system.30 We call this the internalization eﬀect.
As the leisure decision depends negatively on the reward for keeping a job, the higher reward
for keeping a job with UAs induces young, employed workers to increase their work eﬀort (take
less leisure at work). Consequently firing rates will fall and unemployment of old workers will
be lower.
Additionally, under the UAs system young, employed workers stand to loose more from
being unemployed when old (∆An = w(1− κ)) than workers who were unemployed when young
under the UAs system and thus did not contribute to their UAs (∆Au = w(1− κ)− b). Due to
the internalization eﬀect under the UAs system, the employment incentives depend on workers’
labour market history.
Since young, employed workers under the UAs system save for their own unemployment,
taxes are only required to finance unemployment assistance for young, unemployed workers
and long-term unemployed workers. The cost of unemployment of old, short-term unemployed
workers is not imposed on others. Consequently the tax rate is lower under the UAs system
than under the UB system (as indicated by eqs. 2.12 and 2.16). Lower taxes mean that workers
receive higher rewards for keeping a job and seeking a job. We call this the tax reduction eﬀect.
Hence, the tax reduction eﬀect not only raises the reward for keeping a job under the UAs
system relative to the UB system, it also generates a higher reward for seeking a job. Thus,
young, unemployed workers have an incentive to search harder for jobs (take less leisure while
unemployed)31 and, since hiring rates depend positively on search intensity, hiring rates will
rise.
To be precise, there are in fact two tax reduction eﬀects in our model. In addition to the
direct tax reduction eﬀect above (whereby young, employed workers finance their own unem-
30In utility terms for any concave utility function this result depends on the respective size of the "volun-
tary" savings in both systems. For any concave utility function this result holds under the reasonable pa-
rameter values in our calibration and under the assumption that sAn (1 + r) + b > sBn (1 + r) > sAn (1 + r).
Then the reward for keeping a job in utility terms Λn is greater under the UAs than the UB system:
ΛAn = υ
¡
w (1− κ) + sAn (1 + r) + b
¢
− υ
¡
sAn (1 + r) + b
¢
> ΛBn = υ
¡
w (1− τ) + sBn (1 + r)
¢
− υ
¡
b+ sBn (1 + r)
¢
.
31Again, the result in utility terms for any concave utility function depends on the size of the sav-
ings in the two systems. Under reasonable parameter values in our calibration this result holds: ΛAu =
υ
¡
w (1− κ) + sAu (1 + r)
¢
− υ
¡
b+ sAu (1 + r)
¢
> ΛBu = υ
¡
w (1− τ) + sBu (1 + r)
¢
− υ
¡
b+ sBu (1 + r)
¢
.
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ployment support rather than receiving unemployment benefits financed through taxes), there
is also an indirect tax reduction eﬀect: The increased employment broadens the tax base and
the lower unemployment implies that there are fewer unemployed workers with insuﬃcient UAs
balances to support themselves. Accordingly, the tax rate that is required in the UAs system
to finance the unemployment support is even lower. (This in turn improves the incentives for
job search and work eﬀort even further, leading to another round of unemployment reductions,
and so on.)
Summing up, firing rates are lower and hiring rates are higher under the UAs system than
under the UB system and thus (by eqs. 2.2 and 2.3) unemployment is lower under the UAs
system.
2.4 Evaluation of Employment Incentives
In this Section we explore whether the incentive eﬀects identified above could be potentially im-
portant in practice. For this purpose, we specify particular functional forms for the behavioural
relations above and derive the optimal search and work eﬀort decisions for the UB and UAs
systems. We then proceed to calibrate the resulting model, and evaluate the unemployment
and welfare implications of moving from the UB to the UA system. Our analysis shows that, for
reasonable parameter values, the unemployment reductions can be substantial in Europe’s high-
unemployment countries, namely France, Germany, Italy and Spain. Naturally, these results
need to be interpreted with extreme caution since the underlying model is extremely simple;
but the potential eﬀectiveness of UAs in reducing unemployment is nevertheless highlighted
through this exercise.
2.4.1 Specification
We start by specifying the functional forms.: Let the workers’ utility function be Cobb-Douglas:
υ(c, l) =
¡
cαl(1−α)
¢γ
γ
(2.17)
and let hiring and firing rates be linear (where θ, a and φ are parameters whose microfoundations
are derived in appendix 2.A.1):
hy(ly,u) = θ(1− aly,u) (2.18)
fy(ly,n) = φly,n (2.19)
For these functional forms we now proceed to examine incentives under the UB and UAs
systems and derive the optimal search and work eﬀort decisions for the UB and UAs systems.
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The Unemployment Benefit System
Under the UB system, the optimization problem of a young, employed worker is:32
V B(y, n) = max
ly,n,sn
1
γ
¡¡
(w (1− τ)− sn)α l1−αy,n
¢γ¢
(2.20)
+β
Ã
fy(ly,n) 1γ (b+ sn (1 + r))
αγ
+(1− fy(ly,n)) 1γ ((w (1− τ) + sn (1 + r))
αγ )
!
subject to 33
0 ≤ ly,n ≤
1
φ
(2.21)
The resulting optimal leisure decision is:34
lBy,n =
µ
βφ
γ(1− α) ((w(1− τ) + sn (1 + r))
αγ − (b+ sn (1 + r))α γ)
¶ 1
(1−α)γ−1
(2.22)
(w(1− τ)− sn)−
αγ
(1−α)γ−1
The optimal saving decision is given by the following implicit function:35
0 = (w (1− τ)− sn)αγ−1 l(1−α)γy,n (2.23)
− (1 + r)β
Ã
fy(ly,n) (b+ sn (1 + r))
αγ−1
+(1− fy(ly,n)) (w (1− τ) + sn (1 + r))αγ−1
!
The optimization problem of a young, unemployed worker is:
V B(y, u) = max
ly,u,su
1
γ
¡
(b− su)α l1−αy,u
¢γ
(2.24)
+β
Ã
hy(ly,u) 1γ ((w (1− τ) + su (1 + r))
αγ)
+(1− hy(ly,u)) 1γ ((b+ su (1 + r))
αγ)
!
subject to36
max
∙
0,
1
a
µ
1− 1
θ
¶¸
≤ ly,u ≤
1
a
(2.25)
32The superscript "B" stands for the Unemployment “Benefit” System.
33This condition ensures that the firing rate fy is non-negative and not greater than 1.
34We substitute the firing rate, eq. 2.19, into the optimization problem, eq. 2.20. We focus on interior
solutions.
35We express consumption as income minus saving and optimize with respect to saving.
36This condition ensures that the hiring rate hy is non-negative and not greater than 1.
20
The resulting optimal leisure decision is:37
lBy,u =
µ
βθa
γ(1− α) ((w(1− τ) + su (1 + r))
αγ − (b+ su (1 + r))αγ)
¶ 1
(1−α)γ−1
(2.26)¡
b− sBu
¢− αγ
(1−α)γ−1
and the following implicit function yields the optimal saving decision:
0 = (b− su)αγ−1 l(1−α)γy,u (2.27)
− (1 + r)β
Ã
hy(ly,u) (w (1− τ) + su (1 + r))αγ−1
+(1− hy(ly,u)) (b+ su (1 + r))αγ−1
!
The system of equations 2.22, 2.23, 2.26, 2.27 and the government budget constraint, eq.
2.11, describe the equilibrium levels of job search and work eﬀort under the UB system, to be
calibrated in Section 2.4.2.
The Unemployment Accounts (UAs) System
Under the accounts system, the young, employed worker’s decision problem is to solve the
problem38
V A(y, n) = max
ly,n,sn
1
γ
µµ
w (1− κ)− b
1 + r
− sn
¶α
l1−αy,n
¶γ
(2.28)
+β
Ã
fy(ly,n) 1γ (b+ sn (1 + r))
αγ
+(1− fy(ly,n)) 1γ ((w (1− κ) + b+ sn (1 + r))
αγ)
!
subject to the leisure constraint, eq. 2.21. The resulting optimal leisure decision is:39
lAy,n =
µ
βφ
γ(1− α) ((w(1− κ) + b+ sn (1 + r))
αγ − (b+ sn (1 + r))α γ)
¶ 1
(1−α)γ−1
(2.29)µ
w(1− κ)− 1
1 + r
b− sn
¶− αγ
(1−α)γ−1
and the optimal saving decision is given by the following implicit function:
0 =
µ
w (1− κ)− 1
1 + r
b− sn
¶αγ−1
l(1−α)γy,n (2.30)
− (1 + r)β
Ã
fy(ly,n) (b+ sn (1 + r))
αγ−1
+(1− fy(ly,n)) (w (1− κ) + b+ sn (1 + r))αγ−1
!
37We substitute the hiring rate, eq. 2.18, into the optimization problem, eq. 2.24.
38The superscript "A" stands for the Unemployment "Accounts" System.
39We substitute the firing rate, eq. 2.19, into the optimization problem, eq. 2.28.
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The young unemployed worker’s optimization problem is:
V A(y, u) = max
ly,u,su
1
γ
¡
(b− su)α l1−αy,u
¢γ
(2.31)
+β
Ã
hy(ly,u) 1γ ((w (1− κ) + su (1 + r))
αγ)
+(1− hy(ly,u)) 1γ ((b+ su (1 + r))
αγ )
!
subject to the leisure constraint, eq. 2.25. In this case, the resulting optimal leisure decision
is:40
lAy,u =
µ
βφ
γ(1− α) ((w(1− κ) + su (1 + r))
αγ − (b+ su (1 + r))α γ)
¶ 1
(1−α)γ−1
(2.32)
(b− su)−
αγ
(1−α)γ−1
and the first-order condition for saving:
0 = (b− su)αγ−1 l(1−α)γy,u (2.33)
− (1 + r)β
Ã
hy(ly,u) (w (1− κ) + su (1 + r))αγ−1
+(1− hy(ly,u)) (b+ su (1 + r))αγ−1
!
Under the UAs system the equilibrium levels of job search and work eﬀort are described by
the system of Eq. 2.29, 2.30, 2.32, 2.33 and the government budget constraint, Eq. 2.15, also
to be calibrated in the next Section.
2.4.2 Calibration
The period of analysis is one year. The interest rate r is set at 4 % per year, which corresponds
to the average real interest rate in the OECD over the last four decades, and we set β = 1
1+r . We
let the utility coeﬃcient α be 0.85. In our 2-period model an unemployment spell lasts for half
the workers’ lifetime, thereby it creates an unrealistically high amount of risk for households.
In order order to compensate for this, we use of a correspondigly low parameter of risk aversion
(1− γ) of 0.25.
The parameters of the hiring function a, θ, of the firing function φ and the hiring rate
he for each country are assigned the values necessary for the model to reproduce the net
replacement ratio, the average duration of job tenure, and the unemployment rate of the four
high-unemployment countries, as shown in Table 2.2. These variables are defined as follows:
(i) The net replacement ratio (νnet, for the current UB systems) is taken to be the after-tax
replacement ratio for 2002 (OECD, 2004a),41 so that the unemployment benefit b in our model
is given by b = wνnet(1 − τ), where νnet = ν
(1−τ) .(ii) The average job tenure (in years) is that
40We substitute the hiring rate, eq. 2.18, into the optimization problem, eq. 2.31.
41The net replacement ratio is the average of net replacement rates for six family types and diﬀerent earning
levels for the initial phase of unemployment (i.e. upon entering unemployment following any benefit waiting
period) for somebody who was previously employed on a full-time basis, 2002.
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for 2002 in Auer et al. (2005), and it is computed as as the inverse of the rate of outflow
from employment 1/fy (see appendix 2.A.2). (iii) The unemployment rate is the standardized
unemployment rate for 2002 (OECD, 2005b).
vnet 1/f y u
France 78. 4 11. 2 8. 9
Germany 76. 5 10. 7 8. 2
Italy 60. 2 12. 1 8. 6
Spain 72. 4 9. 9 11. 3
Table 2.2: Net replacement ratio in percent, average job tenure in years and standardized
unemployment rate in percent for 2002.
2.4.3 Results
As noted (in Section 2.3.4), the incentive improvement from switching from an UB to an UAs
system is generated by an internalization eﬀect (the internalization of the cost of unemployment
increases the reward for keeping a job) and the resulting tax reduction eﬀects (the resulting
reductions in the tax rate increase the reward for keeping and seeking a job). For the calibrated
model above, the plots in Figure 2.2 shed light on the relative importance of these two eﬀects, by
comparing the rewards for keeping and seeking a job under both systems for varying replacement
ratios.
We have seen in Section 2.3.4 that the employment incentives under the UB system are
independent of a worker’s employment history, i.e. the reward for seeking a job is equal to the
reward for keeping a job (∆Bn = ∆Bu = w (1− τ) − b), as shown in Figure 2.2. When moving
from the UB to the UAs system, the reward for keeping a job rises substantially, as indicated
in Figure 2.2, where this reward is measured in consumption terms (compare ∆An = w(1 − κ)
and ∆Bn = w (1− τ)− b). The increased reward - implying increased incentives for work eﬀort
- is due to both the internalization and the tax reduction eﬀects. The reward for seeking a
job also rises, as shown, but by substantially less, since this change - implying increased job
search incentives - is driven only by the tax reduction eﬀects (compare ∆Au = w(1− κ)− b and
∆Bu = w (1− τ)− b).
Figure 2.2 also shows that the replacement ratio has a weaker influence on the reward for
keeping a job under UAs (∆An = w(1 − κ)) than under UBs (∆Bn = w (1− τ)− b). Naturally,
the replacement ratio does have an indirect eﬀect under UAs, since the higher replacement
ratio implies more interpersonal redistribution to those unemployed workers who are unable to
support themselves and thus a correspondingly higher tax rate (κ) on the employed workers.
But under the UAs system, workers internalize more of the cost of their own unemployment
(specifically, unemployed workers who were previously employed pay for themselves), and thus
the tax rate rises less with the replacement ratio and work incentives are reduced by corre-
spondingly less as well. This is the reason for the weak reaction of the reward for keeping a job
under UAs to a rise in the replacement rate.
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UAs system: reward for keeping a job
UAs system: reward for seeking a job
UB system: reward for keeping a job = reward for seeking a job
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Figure 2.2: The relation between the net replacement ratio and the reward for keeping and
seeking a job, in consumption terms, under the UB and the UAs system for France, Germany,
Italy and Spain.
Table 2.3 summarizes the implications of these incentive eﬀects from switching to the UAs
system for unemployment (u) and welfare, which is quantified by the consumption equivalent
measure42 (CE) for our calibrated model. (The eﬀects are given in terms of percentage
changes.)43
It is worth emphasising that these substantial reductions in unemployment are achieved even
though unemployed people receive the same amount of unemployment support in both systems.
Furthermore, as Tables 2.4 and 2.5 show, these results appear to be reasonably robust, in the
sense that they are not very sensitive to changes in the utility parameters α and RRA = (1−γ).
42We quantify the welfare change from the switch from an UB to an UAs system for an entrant to the labour
market by asking by how much in percent this individual’s consumption has to be increased in all periods and
labour market states (keeping leisure constant) in the UB system so that his present value of utility equals that
under the UAs system. Thus, it can be easily calculated as: CE =
³
V A(e)
V B(e)
´ 1αγ
− 1.
43The cross-country rankings of changes in unemployment and welfare do not coincide with those of the net
replacement ratio since these countries diﬀer in terms of variables other than the replacement ratio as well, viz.,
they also diﬀer in terms of average job tenure and average unemployment rates, implying diﬀerences in hiring
rates for entrants. Consequently, there are cross-country diﬀerences in the hiring and firing functions.
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%Δu %CE
France −46. 3 2. 8
Germany −50. 9 2. 6
Italy −34. 4 1. 2
Spain −37. 7 2. 6
Table 2.3: The percentage change in unemployment rates and welfare (calculated as consump-
tion equivalents) resulting from a shift from the UB to the UAs system.
 %Δu %CE  %Δu %CE
France 0. 90 −43. 5 2. 5 Italy 0. 90 −32. 1 1. 1
0. 95 −40. 0 2. 2 0. 95 −30. 6 1. 0
Germany 0. 90 −48. 2 2. 4 Spain 0. 90 −35. 2 2. 3
0. 95 −45. 4 2. 2 0. 95 −32. 9 2. 1
Table 2.4: The percentage change in unemployment rates and consumption equivalents resulting
from a shift from the UB to the UAs system for alternative values for the parameter a of the
utility function for a RRA value of 0.25.
RRA %Δu %CE RRA %Δu %CE
France 0. 50 −40. 7 1. 7 Italy 0. 50 −32. 4 0. 4
0. 75 −42. 2 1. 4 0. 75 −34. 5 0. 1
Germany 0. 50 −46. 4 1. 7 Spain 0. 50 −33. 9 1. 5
0. 75 −48. 1 1. 2 0. 75 −35. 4 1. 0
Table 2.5: The percentage change in unemployment rates and consumption equivalents resulting
from a shift to the UAs system for alternative values for RRA for an a value of 0.98 for France
and Germany, 0.96 for Italy and 0.97 for Spain.
The improved employment incentives depicted in Figure 2.2 imply unemployment reductions
that are depicted in Figure 2.3, which specifically shows how the unemployment reductions are
related to the net replacement ratio.
Figure 2.4 depicts the tax reductions associated with a switch to the UAs system for varying
replacement ratios. (The greater is the replacement ratio, the greater is the tax rate necessary to
finance this replacement ratio under the UAs and UB systems.) The greater is the replacement
ratio, the greater is the diﬀerence between the externalities generated by the UBs and those
generated by the UAs. The reason is that a higher replacement ratio under the UAs system
means that more support for the unemployed is paid out of the UAs and the greater is the
associated internalization eﬀects and the resulting tax reduction eﬀects. It is for this reason
that, as the replacement ratio rises, the switch from the UB to the UAs system leads to
progressively larger reductions in unemployment and taxes.
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Figure 2.3: The relation between the net replacement ratio and the percentage reduction of the
unemployment rate.
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Figure 2.4: The relation between the net replacement ratio and the percentage reduction in tax
rates resulting from a shift to the UAs system.
Figure 2.5 shows the diﬀerence in saving, in the UAs and UB systems, associated with a
range of replacement ratios. We compare the total saving of an young, employed worker under
the two systems, namely, the sum of "voluntary" and "forced" saving under the UAs system
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with saving under the UB system. The vertical axis depicts the percentage diﬀerence of young
worker’s saving between the UAs and UB systems.
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Figure 2.5: The relation between the net replacement ratio and the percentage diﬀerence in
saving of young workers between the UAs and the UB system.
The positive diﬀerences show that the mandatory contributions to the UAs are not fully
crowded out by less voluntary savings.44 The reason is that under the UB system an employed
worker has less incentive to save. First, his incentive to save to support himself is lower, as the
government will provide benefit payments in the case of unemployment, i.e. he does not fully
internalize the cost of unemployment. Second, higher interpersonal reditributions reduce his
incentive to save. This explains why forcing individuals to save can raise welfare, even though
they are already optimizing.
Clearly, the greater is the replacement ratio, the greater are the diﬀerences in saving, for the
UAs and UB systems, since the higher replacement ratio implies more interpersonal redistrib-
ution to those unemployed workers who are unable to support themselves and thereby, more
strongly distorted incentives to save.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter has analyzed the implications of moving from the UB to the UAs system. To pro-
mote understanding of major incentive eﬀects, we have focused on some central characteristics
of these systems, assuming that unemployment benefits are financed by payroll taxes. Our sim-
ple models are meant to clarify important channels whereby the policy change aﬀects job search
44Topel (1990) and Cortázar (1996) argued that forced savings would be simply oﬀset accordingly by voluntary
savings. We show that this is not the case.
27
and work eﬀort. They also show how the redistribution of income, performed through the UB
system, can be accomplished more eﬃciently through the UAs system, permitting significant
declines in unemployment rates and improvements in welfare.
In particular, we have shown how UAs permit people to internalize a portion of a signif-
icant policy-induced externality: the support of unemployed workers imposes a tax cost on
the employed workers. Under the UAs system people finance more of their own unemployment
support than under the UB system and thus the externality is reduced. The reason is that every
system of unemployment support involves both interpersonal and intrapersonal redistribution.
The switch to the UAs system reduces the need for the latter through taxes and transfers, since
employed people can use their UAs to support themselves should they become unemployed in
the future. Lower taxes (uncompensated costs on the employed) and lower transfers (uncom-
pensated benefits to the unemployed) means greater incentives for job search and work eﬀort.
The resulting rise in hiring rates and reduction in firing rates leads to a fall in unemployment.
This in turn broadens the tax base and shrinks the number of people requiring support, leading
to further reductions in tax rates and unemployment benefit expenditures, and so on.
Our calibration exercises suggest that these unemployment reductions could be measurable
in Europe’s high-unemployment countries. It is important to emphasize that these reductions
are achieved without reducing the level of support to the unemployed. Our analysis also shows
that switching to the UAs system makes unemployment less sensitive to the replacement ratio
and that, the higher is this replacement ratio, the greater is the achievable reduction in unem-
ployment. Naturally, in providing a transparent way of describing how the policy change can
aﬀect labour market behaviour, our models of course make strong simplifying assumptions and
thus our results must be interpreted with caution, indicating only general orders of magnitude.
2.A Appendix
2.A.1 Hiring and Firing Rates
Having assumed that the only way workers perceive they can influence hiring and firing is
through the choice of leisure, we provide some microfoundations for such hire and fire rates
with a particularily simple model.
There is a large number M of firms, each of which has workers and maximizes its present
value of profits. In a steady state this is equivalent to maximizing one-period profit Π(L, 1):
Π(L, 1) = [Γ(0, ly,n)− wy − dfy]L+ (Γ(ψ, ly,n)− wi) (1− fy)L (2.34)
+(Γ(0, lo,n)− wo −')ωN
Uy
M
(2.35)
Here, ψ captures learning by doing in production, Γ is productivity which depends on
experience and eﬀort, wy is the wage in period 1, wo is the wage of those unemployed when
young and then become hired, wi is the insider wage, d is the cost of firing a worker, ' is the
cost of hiring a worker, ly,n is the leisure of the young employed and lo,n of the old employed, N
is the number of interviews conducted with each of the young, unemployed workers (Uy) and
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ω is the hiring rate at each interview.
Since the purpose of this section is to derive the microfoundations of hire and fire rates, we
treat the wages wy, wo and wi in the model as predetermined. We introduce these wages as
separate parameters here because they separately influence the hire and fire decisions.
The first order condition for hiring is that, if the firm is hiring, the shadow value of a worker
exceeds the marginal hiring c ost:
λ = Γ(0, lo,n)− wo > ' (2.36)
When a worker comes for interviews, the firm’s hiring decision is based on comparing the
estimated shadow values λ−ε (where ε is a random variable) from hiring the additional employee
with marginal training costs '. At the interview time, the firm does not know how active the
worker has been searching so that its estimates of the shadow value are independent of the
amount of search of the employee. The hire rate ω of the profit-maximising firm then is:
ω = H (λ−') , (2.37)
where H is the cumulative distribution function of ε.
Workers know the hire rate and have a time endowment of 1 when unemployed and obtaining
an interview takes g units of time. Workers who do one interview are hired with a probability
ω; if they are not hired (with probability (1−ω)), they may proceed to a second interview and
be hired with a probability ω . Thus each worker’s hiring rate (the total probability of being
hired) is:
hy = ω
N−1P
j=0
(1− ω)j = 1− (1− ω)N (2.38)
The hiring rate may now be expressed in terms of the unemployed worker’s leisure. Given that
the total time endowment (to be split into search and leisure) is 1, then N interviews take gN
units of time. Thus, leisure when unemployed is (1− gN) so that N = (1− ly,u)/g. Hence
hy(ly,u) = 1− (1− ω)
(1−ly,u)
g (2.39)
which is decreasing in leisure when unemployed. A linear approximation of eq. 2.39 is
hy(ly,u) = log(1− ω)((ly,u − 1)/g) (2.40)
which can be rewritten as eq. 2.18, with hiring propensity θ and search cost parameter a. The
hiring rate function formulation implicitly assumes that workers take the wage as given.
The first order condition of the profit maximisation problem eq. 2.34 for firing is that a
worker will be fired if
Γ (ψ, ly,n)− wi < −d (2.41)
so that a worker is fired when her discounted future contribution to profits falls below minus
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marginal firing costs d. Because the worker is working on projects which may take more than
one period, her first period eﬀort will influence her second period productivity. This eﬀect is
captured through the random parameter ψ which measures "learning by doing".
Since the learning by doing parameter is random, firing is stochastic and the probability of
firing a worker is given by the probability that the following equation is negative:
Γ (ψ, ly,n)− wi − d < 0 (2.42)
To simplify analysis, we assume that Γ (ψ, ly,n) is linear:
Γ (ψ, ly,n) = (ζ − ly,n)ψ (2.43)
Hence, the probability of firing the worker is:
f = G
µ
χ
ζ − ly,n
¶
, (2.44)
where G is the cumulative density function of ψ and χ = βw−dβ . Here, the firing rate is
increasing in the level of leisure on the job as well as in the wage w. The cumulative density
function G can take a variety of forms but we can construct a first order approximation in
terms of ly,n about ly,n = l¯ :
fy(ly,n) = ϕ+ φly,n, (2.45)
with firm firing propensity φ.
Someone who exhibits full eﬀort and does not shirk at all should not be fired which can be
achieved by setting ϕ = 0, as in eq. 2.19. The parameters will depend on a number of other
parameters including the wage.45
2.A.2 Mean Duration of Job Tenure
Assume duration independent transition and a steady state. The probability of being fired each
period is fy. Then the probability of being fired after t periods is
fy(1− fy)t−1 (2.46)
Thus the mean duration of employment is
fy
∞P
t=1
t (1− fy)t−1 (2.47)
which can be rewritten as
fy
∞P
t=i
∞P
i=1
(1− fy)i−1 =
1
fy
(2.48)
Hence, if the rate of outflow from employment is fy, the mean duration of job tenure is 1/fy.
45Another way of justifying this functional form for the firing function is in terms of a shirking model (see
Phelps, 1994a).
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3 Comparing the Eﬀectiveness of Employment Subsidies
3.1 Introduction
This chapter46 compares the eﬀectiveness of alternative employment subsidy policies. These
policies have been popular since they are often meant to reduce both unemployment and earn-
ings inequality together. The quest for such measures has been a prime objective of employment
policy throughout the OECD and continues to be central to the policy debate in the large con-
tinental European countries.47
We make a number of contributions. First, we examine the policy eﬀects in the context of a
model that takes a variety of common labour market imperfections into account: insider wage
bargaining, hiring and firing costs, and imperfections related to the tax and transfer system.
These imperfections are important because (a) they are responsible for unemployment that is
ineﬃciently high, (b) the institutions underlying these imperfections can be changed only grad-
ually and with considerable delay, so that it is useful to examine the relative eﬀectiveness of
diﬀerent employment policies while these institutions are in place. Since unemployment is inef-
ficiently high in our analysis, this analysis is appropriate to policy design in high-unemployment
OECD countries.
Second, our analysis allows us to compare the eﬀects of diﬀerent targeting schemes for em-
ployment subsidies. Alternative employment subsidy policies diﬀer primarily in terms of these
targeting schemes. To capture them, our model allows skills to depend both on heterogeneous
abilities and heterogeneous durations of employment and unemployment.48
Third, in accord with policy makers’ actual concerns, we measure policy eﬀectiveness in
terms of employment and welfare, and also give explicit consideration to earnings inequality
and government budgetary outlays.
Fourth, we derive the policy eﬀects of employment subsidies with a purely microfounded
model, without assuming a policy-invariant matching function. The reason for this approach is
that the matching process can itself be influenced through employment subsidies, so that the
use of an exogenously given matching function could run afoul of the Lucas critique.49
Finally, since Pareto welfare-improving policies often insuperably diﬃcult to identify in
practice, we introduce a new criterion for evaluating policies: "approximate welfare eﬃciency"
(AWE). A policy is approximately welfare eﬃcient when it
1. improves aggregate employment and welfare (defined in terms of the utility functions of
the households),
46For a diﬀerent version of this chapter see Brown et al. (2007a).
47For a detailed discussion of currently applied employment subsidy programmes in Germany and recent
reform proposals see Boss (2006).
48We have sought a model that is rich enough to capture the various groups of workers relevant to the
alternative targeting approaches, while at the same time being simple enough to generate straightforward
policy guidelines.
49This comes at the cost of focusing on the firm side of the labor market, which we believe is appropriate for
high unemployment countries, where labour demand is the short side of the market and thus may be expected
to have a dominant influence on employment.
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2. does not increase earnings inequality (measured in terms of the Gini coeﬃcient), and
3. is self-financing (i.e. it does not require an additional government budgetary allocation).50
We argue that approximate welfare eﬃciency is a useful concept for policy making, since
policies that are approximately welfare eﬃcient are not only desirable for Benthamite reasons
(the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people), but are unlikely to be blocked through
the political process.51
This chapter addresses two important questions: (i) How should employment policies be
targeted? (ii) What should the magnitude of the policy intervention be? There is much
disagreement on these issues among policy makers.
In practice, there are two broad policy approaches to targeting employment subsidies: The
first favours targeting workers with low incomes and low abilities; and the second focuses on
targeting the unemployed. This chapter compares the eﬀectiveness of the following employment
subsidy policies: wage subsidies targeted at workers with low abilities and hiring vouchers
targeted at long-term unemployed workers or at workers with low abilities or at both.
We evaluate the eﬀectiveness of alternative employment subsidy policies by calibrating the
model for the German labour market and deriving the corresponding policy implications. This
exercise is meant to be understood as illustrative of our novel approach, which is relevant
to other high-unemployment OECD countries. We show that, for the calibrated model, hiring
vouchers targeted at the duration of unemployment, specifically at the long-term unemployed, is
particularly eﬀective in raising employment and welfare, without increasing earnings inequality
or requiring an additional government budget outlay. Moreover, while low wage subsidies can
also reduce earnings inequality, they are a relatively expensive and ineﬀective instrument for
reducing unemployment and are not AWE at all.
We also investigate the employment and equity eﬀects of implementing employment sub-
sidies in excess of the magnitudes that are self-financing. Specifically, we examine how much
employment could be created by each of the policy measures under consideration if the govern-
ment’s net bugetary allocation for this measures were increased by a specified amount. Here,
too, we find that hiring vouchers targeted at the long-term unemployed have relatively strong
employment creating eﬀects, without increasing inequality.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 relates our work to the existing literature.
Section 3 presents the theoretical labour market model. Section 4 calibrates the model for
Germany, shows the driving forces to make a policy eﬀective and derives the policy implications.
In Section 5, we provide some intuition on the robustness of our results. Finally, Section 6
concludes.
50Clearly, approximate welfare eﬃciency is not equivalent to Pareto welfare eﬃciency, because an employment
policy can obviously satisfy the three conditions above and still generate uncompensated losers.
51The reason is that the fear of rising earnings equality is the most common reason for blocking eﬃciency-
improving employment reforms. See also Orszag and Snower (1998), Saint Paul (1995, 1996 and 1998).
32
3.2 Relation to the Literature
There is a large theoretical and empirical literature on the impact and optimal design of em-
ployment subsidies, originating with the work by Pigou (1933) and Kaldor (1936).52 The
search and matching framework of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) is frequently used to ana-
lyze the eﬀect of employment subsidies (see e.g. Boone and van Ours, 2004, Bovenberg et al.,
2000, Cardullo and van der Linden, 2006, Mortensen and Pissarides, 2003, Pierrard, 2005, and
Vereshchagina, 2002). The matching technology - describing the relation between the inputs
and output of the matching process - is assumed to be stable through time. This assumption
is admissible provided that the matching technology (described by the functional form of the
matching function) can be considered independent of the inputs and output of the matching
process. However, very often a negative time trend is found when estimating the search and
matching function, thus casting doubt on the stability through time (Blanchard and Diamond,
1989, for the United States, and Fahr and Sunde, 2001, 2004, for Germany).53 It is admissible
to use the matching function to analyze labour market policies, provided that these policies
have no significant influence on the matching process itself. However, it seems implausible that
active labour market policies should have no eﬀect on the matching process and we know of no
rationale why this should be the case.
To avoid running afoul of the Lucas Critique, we do not take the short-cut of assuming a
policy-invariant matching function.54 Instead, we derive the policy eﬀects in a microfounded
way from the intertemporal maximization of economic agents and model their incentives ex-
plicitly. We give special emphasis to the firm side in our model since labour demand is the
short side of the market in economies with high unemployment. The household side comes into
play through the wage formation.
Many theoretical analyzes of employment policies are static and thus suﬀer from the serious
drawback that they do not take into account the dynamic feedback eﬀects of employment
policies.55 There are various significant dynamic interconnections. For example, hiring in
response to employment policy takes time and may have persistent eﬀects since incumbent
employees’ probability of being retained generally exceeds the unemployed people’s probability
of being hired. We explicitly capture the dynamic eﬀects of subsidies by specifying the transition
rates between employment and unemployment as a function of the employment incentives of
the firm.
52For a survey of the empirical literature, see for example Katz (1998). For US evidence, see Woodbury and
Spiegelman (1987) and O’Leary et al. (2006). For international evidence, see for example N.E.R.A. (1995), and
for British evidence, see Bell et al. (1999). As follows, we will focus on theoretical papers and the calibration
thereof.
53Furthermore, many empirical studies reject the hypothesis of constant returns to scale (e.g. Warren, 1996,
for the United States, Fahr and Sunde, 2001 for Germany). The number of matches (M) is a function of
unemployment and vacancies (M = f (U, V )), typically specified in Cobb Douglas form (M = UαV β). If α+ β
do not sum up to 1, the results are input dependent.
54Furthermore, in contrast to a big part of the search and matching literature, we use an endogenous job
destruction rate. It can for example be expected that a wage subsidy reduces the firing rate, while a hiring
subsidy does not do so. Omitting this feature would bias the results.
55See, e.g., Layard et al. (1991), pp. 490-492, and Snower (1994). Orszag and Snower (2000) have shown that
the dynamic, long-run eﬀects of employment subsidies, once the associated lagged adjustment processes have
worked themselves out, diﬀer from what may be expected in the short run.
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We contribute to the existing literature by considering skills depending unemployment du-
ration as well as on diﬀerent levels of ability. This detailed grid allows us to analyze and
contrast the eﬀects of employment subsidies targeted at diﬀerent skill classes under the cri-
teria approximative welfare eﬃciency - explicitly taking the complete budgetary eﬀects into
account.56
This is in stark contrast to the existing literature which only considers a small subset of
possible targets for employment subsidies. A large part examines the rationale and economic
eﬀects of subsidies for the low skilled (e.g., Phelps, 1994b, 1997a, 1997b, Drèze and Snessens,
1997, and Oskamp and Snower, 2006)57, while less attention has been given to subsidies to
long-term unemployed workers (Hui and Trivedi, 1986, Snower, 1994, Vereshchagina, 2002).
There is a significant body of literature which proposes the introduction of a low-wage
subsidy, either in order to stimulate employment (e.g. SVR, 2006, Sinn et al., 2006) or on
grounds of equity considerations (e.g. Phelps, 1994b, 2003). In the search and matching
framework with endogenous job destruction, a low wage subsidy would always show positive
employment eﬀects, while the eﬀects are amibiguous for hiring vouchers (as they increase job
creation and job destruction at the same time, see Pissarides, 2000, p. 217 f.). In this chapter,
we develop a new framework which does not run afoul of the Lucas Critique and comes to
striking new results which diﬀer from this existing literature.
We now proceed to present how these heterogeneities are modelled in our analytical frame-
work.
3.3 The Model
We construct a Markov model of the labour market in which the dynamics of employment and
unemployment are determined by transition probabilities among various labour market states.
We derive these transition probabilities from optimization principles.
Workers’ productivities are ability-dependent and duration-dependent. This distinction is
important for policy purposes. Whereas the duration of employment and unemployment is
readily aﬀected through the standard employment policy instruments, ability can be aﬀected
primarily though education and training policy and this latter influence generally takes much
longer to manifest itself. Since our focus is on employment policy, we let the duration-dependent
productivity diﬀerences be endogenous in our model (influenceable by the employment subsi-
dies), whereas the ability-dependent productivity diﬀerences are defined as exogenous (not
influenceable by the subsidies).58
Our model contains workers in three ability classes, the exogenous component of skill dif-
56Orszag and Snower (2003a and 2003b) pointed out the fact that the literature disregarded the complete
impact of employment subsidies on the government budget constraint by requiring that aggregate payroll taxes
finance aggregate employment subsidies and thereby ignoring the reduction of unemployment benefit payments,
which result from reduced employment. In this paper we follow their line of reasoning.
57Mortensen and Pissarides (2003) analyze low wage and hiring subsidies, but do not take diﬀerent unem-
ployment durations into account.
58Our analysis can be extended to education and training policy, then these ability classes would become
endogenous; see, for example, Oskamp and Snower (2006).
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ferences: low-ability, medium-ability and high-ability workers, denoted by α = l,m, h, respec-
tively. Within each ability class, workers’ productivity depends on whether they are employed
or unemployed and for how long. Specifically, there are five labour market states, two for the
unemployed:
(i) the long-term unemployed UL, who have been unemployed for more than a year (the
period of analysis),
(ii) the short-term unemployed US, who have been unemployed up to one year,
and three for the employed:
(iii) the primary entrants NE1, who are short-term employed workers (employed up to one
year) that were previously short-term unemployed,
(iv) the secondary entrants NE2, who are short-term employed workers that were previously
long-term unemployed, and
(v) the insiders N I , who are long-term employed, i.e. employed for more than a year.
The short-term unemployed workers are more productive than the long-term unemployed.
Insiders are more productive than primary entrants who, in turn, are more productive than
secondary entrants.
We assume constant returns to labour. Let adnα be the labour productivity of an employee
in duration class dn and ability class α,59 where dn = I,E1, E2 for employed workers du = S, L
for unemployed workers. The firm faces a random cost εα,t, which is iid across workers and
time within the ability class α. This cost may be interpreted as an operating cost or a negative
productivity shock. The expected operating cost conditional on being retained or hired is
normalized to zero and its cumulative distribution Γα (εα) is time-invariant.
Agents in our model pursue the following sequence of decisions. First the government sets
the income tax rate to ensure that its tax receipts are equal to its net budgetary allocation
on employment subsidies. Second, the random operating costs are revealed. Third, wages are
determined through bargaining and then employment decisions are made.
3.3.1 The Government Budget Constraint
For simplicity, our model considers only four instruments of government policy: (i) a propor-
tional payroll tax, with a tax rate τ , (ii) an unemployment benefit bα, (iii) an employment
subsidy, specifically a hiring voucher σduα,t targeted at workers of duration-dependend groups
and ability-dependent groups or a wage subsidy σα,t for employees of certain abilities α, and
(iv) the net allocation of government expenditures Gt to employment subsidies.
The government budget is given by60
Gt +
X
α
nα,tlαwα,tτ =
X
α
X
du
uduα,tlαbα +
X
α
X
du
σduα,tu
du
α,tlαη
du
α,t +
X
α
σα,tlαnα,t. (3.1)
59We follow the notational convention that only those variables have time subscripts that actually vary through
time in our model.
60As we calculate the long-run eﬀects of diﬀerent policies (i.e. the new steady states), the static budget
constraint is relevant.
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i.e. the net government allocation Gt plus tax receipts is equal to government spending on
unemployment benefits and the employment subsidies. For simplicity, we assume that the
payroll tax is set so as to finance the unemployment benefits in the absence of subsidies and of
a net government allocation (i.e., σα,t = σduα,t = 0 and Gt = 0).
3.3.2 Wage Bargaining
Let the wage wα,t for each ability class α in period t be the outcome of a Nash bargain between
the median insider of that ability class and her firm. Our wage bargaining model is analoguous
to the median voter model, where the utility of the median voter is maximized. The firm
bargains with a union which maximizes the utility of the median insider.61 When the bargaining
decision takes place, nobody has been fired yet. The median insider is the worker who is situated
exactly in the middle of the distribution and who is assumed to face no risk of dismissal at the
negotiated wage. The wage is renegotiated in each period t. Thus, the present value in period
t is independent of the present value in period t+ 1.
Each worker has the following utility function:
υt(c) = c
ξ
t , (3.2)
which depends positively on consumption ct, where (1−ξ) is the relative risk aversion parameter
of the workers’ utility function.62
Under bargaining agreement, the insider receives the wage wα,t(1−τ), where τ is the payroll
tax rate, and the firm receives the expected profit
¡
aIα − εMIα − wα,t + σα,t
¢
in each period t,
where εMIα is the operating cost of the median insider, σα is a wage subsidy for workers of class
α and aIα is the productivity of an insider of ability class α. Thus the expected present value
of the insider’s utility V Iα,t under bargaining agreement is
V Iα,t = (wα,t(1− τ))
ξ + δ
¡¡
1− φα,t+1
¢
V Iα,t+1 + φα,t+1V
S
α,t+1
¢
, (3.3)
where φα,t+1 is the firing rate, the time discount factor is δ, and V Sα,t+1 the expected present
value of a short-term unemployed workers’ returns. The expected present value of firm’s returns
under bargaining agreement are
ΠIα,t =
¡
aIα − εMIα − wα,t + σα,t
¢
+ δ
¡¡
1− φα,t+1
¢
ΠIα,t+1 − φα,t+1fα,t+1
¢
, (3.4)
where fα,t+1 are firing costs.
Under disagreement, the insider’s fallback income is bα,t, assumed for simplicity to be equal
to the unemployment benefit. The firm’s fallback profit is −fα,t, i.e. during disagreement the
insider imposes the maximal cost on the firm (e.g. through strike, work-to-rule, sabotage) short
61Collective bargaining coverage in central European countries such as Austria, Belgium, France, Germany
or the Netherlands lies within the range of 68% to 97.5 % (see OECD, 2004b). Furthermore collective wage
agreements anchor wage settings also for firms that are not covered by collective agreements (for Germany see
Schnabel, 2005, and Kohaut and Schnabel, 2004).
62In our model, for simplicity, workers consume all their income.
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of inducing dismissal. Assuming that disagreement in the current period does not aﬀect future
returns, the present values of utility under disagreement for the insider are
V 0Iα,t = (bα,t)
ξ + δ
¡¡
1− φα,t+1
¢
V Iα,t+1 + φα,t+1V
S
α,t+1
¢
(3.5)
and for the firm are
Π0Iα,t = −fα,t + δ
¡¡
1− φα,t+1
¢
ΠIα,t+1 − φα,t+1fα,t+1
¢
. (3.6)
The insider’s bargaining surplus is
V Iα,t − V 0Iα,t = (wα,t(1− τ))
ξ + δ
¡¡
1− φα,t+1
¢
V Iα,t+1 + φα,t+1V
S
α,t+1
¢
− (bα,t)ξ − δ
¡¡
1− φα,t+1
¢
V Iα,t+1 + φα,t+1V
S
α,t+1
¢
= (wα,t(1− τ))ξ − (bα,t)ξ , (3.7)
and the firm’s surplus is
ΠIα,t −Π0Iα,t =
¡
aIα − εMIα − wα,t + σα,t
¢
+ δ
¡¡
1− φα,t+1
¢
ΠIα,t+1 − φα,t+1fα,t+1
¢
−¡
−fα,t + δ
¡¡
1− φα,t+1
¢
ΠIα,t+1 − φα,t+1fα,t+1
¢¢
= aIα − εMIα − wα,t + σα + fα,t. (3.8)
The negotiated wage maximizes the Nash product (Λ):
Λ =
³
(wα,t(1− τ))ξ − (bα,t)ξ
´γ ¡
aIα − εMIα − wα,t + σα + fα,t
¢1−γ
, (3.9)
where γ represents the bargaining strength of the insider relative to the firm. For the bargained
wage, the following relationship holds:
(1− γ)
³
[wα,t (1− τ)]
ξ − bξα,t
´
= γξ
£
wα,t (1− τ)
¤ξ−1 ¡
aIα − εMIα − wα,t + σα + fα,t
¢
(1− τ).
(3.10)
In the labour market equilibrium, let firing costs be proportional to the wage, fα,t = ρwα,t,
and the unemployment benefit be proportional to the wage as well, bα,t = βα(1− τ)wα,t, where
βα is the net replacement ratio. Then the negotiated wage is
wα,t =
γξ£
(1− γ)
¡
1− βξα
¢
+ γξ (1− ρ)
¤ ¡aIα − εMIα + σα,t¢ . (3.11)
In words, the wage depends positively on the median insider’s productivity, the magnitude of
the subsidy the insider receives, the replacement rate and the magnitude of firing costs relative
to the wage.63
63In the analysis above, the profit functions were interpreted as those pertaining to a fixed number of firms.
However, since there are constant returns to labor and since labor is heterogeneous in terms of the random cost
ε, these profit functions can also be interpreted as the outcome under a free firm entry condition. In this latter
interpretation, each firm oﬀers a job to a single worker and firms enter the economy until the marginal firm’s
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3.3.3 Transitions Among Labour Market States
The transitions among the labour market states are summarized in Figure 3.1.64 The short-
term unemployed US are hired with probability ηS and then become primary entrants NE1;
with probability
¡
1− ηS
¢
they remain unemployed and then join the long-term unemployed
UL, thereby losing productivity. The long-term unemployed are hired with probability ηL
and then become secondary entrants NE2; with probability
¡
1− ηL
¢
they remain long-term
unemployed.65
Human capital not only depreciates with the duration of unemployment, but also appreciates
with the duration of employment. At the end of a period, the primary entrants turn into insiders
N I , and thereby gain productivity. As insiders, they lose their jobs with probability φ and then
become short-term unemployed; with probability (1− φ) they are retrained.66 The same holds
for the secondary entrants: they, too, turn into insiders, who have a φ chance of losing their
jobs and a (1− φ) chance of retaining them.67
ηS 
1 -  ηL 
1 -  ηS 
φ  η
L 
1 -  φ  
1 -  φ 1 -  φ  
φ  
φ  
 
NE1 
 
NE2 
 
US 
 
UL 
 
NI 
Figure 3.1: Transitions among labor market states
profit is driven to zero and firms exit the economy until the marginal exiting firm’s loss is driven to zero.
64For analytical simplicity, we choose to describe these transitions in terms of a small number of transition
variables. To simplify notation in Figure 3.1, we suppress the subscripts refering to ability (α) and time (t) in
this figure, e.g. short-term unemployment (du = S) is written as US rather than USα,t.
65Since we treat the ability classes as exogenous with respect to employment policy, we assume that there are
no transitions among these ability classes.
66Entrants turn into insiders at the end of a period. In case they are fired at the beginning of the next period
these entrants have been insiders just for an instant. That is the reason why for expositional convenience in
Figure 3.1 we let entrants become insiders only if retained.
67Since all employed workers have the same productivity once they have been employed for a period (and
thus, if they are retained, will become insiders in the next period), they all face the same firing probability φ.
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The labour market system for each ability group a in period t may be described as follows:
Sα,t = Tα,tSα,t−1, (3.12)
where St is a vector of the labour market states:
Sα,t =
¡
N Iα,t, N
E1
α,t , N
E2
α,t , U
S
α,t, U
L
α,t
¢0
, (3.13)
and Tα,t is a Markov matrix of transition probabilities:
Tα,t =
(1− φα,t) (1− φα,t) (1− φα,t) 0 0
0 0 0 ηSα,t 0
0 0 0 0 ηLα,t
φα,t φα,t φα,t 0 0
0 0 0 (1− ηSα,t) (1− ηLα,t)
(3.14)
We now proceed to derive these transition probabilities between the labour market states
from microeconomic foundations.
3.3.4 Hiring and Firing
The Firing Rate for Insiders
The expected present value of profit generated by an insider, after the random cost εα,t at
time t is observed, is68
πIα,t =
¡
aIα − wα − εα,t + σα
¢
+
∞X
i=1
δi
h
(1− φα)i
¡
aIα − wα + σα
¢
− φαfα(1− φα)i−1
i
, (3.15)
so that
πIα,t =
aIα − wα + σα − δφαfα
1− δ (1− φα)
− εα,t, (3.16)
where σα is the wage subsidy.
The expected incentive of retaining the insider
¡
νIα
¢
is defined as the diﬀerence between the
expected gross profit from a retained insider69
³
E
¡
πIα,t
¢
= a
I
α−wα+σα−δφαfα
1−δ(1−φα)
´
and the expected
profit from firing an insider (−fα). Thus this insider retention incentive is
νIα =
aIα − wα + σα − δφαfα
1− δ (1− φα)
+ fα. (3.17)
An insider is fired in period t when the realized value of the random cost εα,t is greater than the
68In the first period, profit is
¡
aIα − wα − εα,t + σα
¢
; in the second period, the insider is retained with proba-
bility (1− φα) and then generates an expected profit of aIα−wα+σα, and the insider is fired with a probability
of φα and then generates a firing cost of fα; and so on. Recall that εI is normalised by E
¡
ε|ε ≤ νIα
¢
= 0.
69This "gross" profit is the expected profit generated by retaining a worker, without taking the operating cost
into account.
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insider employment incentive:70 εα,t > νIα. Since the cumulative distribution of the operating
cost is Γα (εα,t), the insider’s firing rate is
φα = 1− Γα
¡
νIα
¢
. (3.18)
The Hiring Rate for Short-Term Unemployed Workers
The expected present value of profit generated by a primary entrant (a worker who has been
hired after being short-term unemployed), after the random cost εα,t at time t is observed, is71
πE1α,t =
¡
aE1α − wα − εα,t − hα + σα + σSα
¢
+
∞X
i=1
δi
³
(1− φα)i
¡
aIα − wα + σα
¢
− φαfα(1− φα)i−1
´
,
(3.19)
where σSα is a hiring voucher for a short-term unemployed worker with ability α.72
The expected incentive to hire a short-term unemployed worker
¡
νSα
¢
is defined as the
diﬀerence between the expected gross profit from an employed primary entrant (E
¡
πE1α,t
¢
=
aE1α −wα−hα+σα+σSα+
δ(1−φα)(aIα−wα+σα)−φαfαδ
1−δ(1−φα)
)73 and the expected profit from not employing
a short-term unemployed (i.e. zero). Thus, the short-term unemployed hiring incentive is
νSα = a
E1
α − wα − hα + σα + σSα +
δ (1− φα)
¡
aIα − wα + σα
¢
− φαfαδ
1− δ (1− φα)
. (3.20)
A primary entrant is hired in period t when the realized value of the random cost εα,t is
less than the primary entrant hiring incentive:74 εα,t < νSα. Thus the hiring rate for short-term
unemployed is
ηSα = Γα
¡
νSα
¢
. (3.21)
The Hiring Rate for Long-Term Unemployed
The expected present value of profit generated by a secondary entrant (a worker who has
been hired after being long-term unemployed),75 after the random cost εα,t at time t is observed,
is
70Equivalently, the insider is fired when the profit from retaining the insider is less than the firing
cost: a
I
α−wα+σα−δφαfα
1−δ(1−φα)
− εα,t < −fα.
71For simplicity we assume that E
¡
ε|ε ≤ νSα
¢
= 0.
72Clearly, a wage subsidy raises current and expected future expected profits of all employees of the respective
ability and thus, raises the hiring rates as well as lowers the firing rate. A hiring voucher, however, aﬀects only
the current period profit of the respectively subsidised entrant and thereby her respective hiring rate. For the
influence of the subsidies in the linearized model see Appendix 3.A.2.
73This "gross" profit is the expected profit generated by hiring a worker, without taking the operating cost
into account.
74Equivalently, the primary entrant is hired when the profit from employing this worker is greater than the
hiring cost: aE1α − wα − εα,t + σα + σSα +
δ(1−φα)(aIα−wα+σα)−δφαfα
1−δ(1−φα)
> hα.
75For simplicity we assume that E
¡
ε|ε ≤ νLα
¢
= 0.
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πE2α,t = a
E2
α − wα − εα,t − hα + σα + σLα +
δ (1− φα)
¡
aIα − wα + σα
¢
− φαfαδ
1− δ (1− φα)
, (3.22)
where σLα is a hiring voucher for a long-term unemployed worker with ability α. The expected
incentive to hire a long-term unemployed
¡
νLα
¢
is defined as the diﬀerence between the expected
gross profit from an employed secondary entrant (E
¡
πE2α,t
¢
) and the expected profit from not
employing a long-term unemployed (i.e. zero). The long-term unemployed hiring incentive is
νLα = a
E2
α − wα − hα + σα + σLα +
δ (1− φα)
¡
aIα − wα + σα
¢
− φαfαδ
1− δ (1− φα)
. (3.23)
A secondary entrant is hired in period t when the realized value of the random cost εα,t is
less than the secondary entrant hiring incentive:76 εα,t < νLα. Thus the hiring rate for long-term
unemployed workers is
ηLα = Γα
¡
νLα
¢
.77 (3.24)
3.3.5 Employment, Unemployment and the Labour Market Equilibrium
The change in employment in each ability group (∆Nα,t) is the diﬀerence between the outflow
from the unemployment pool
¡
ηSα,tUSα,t−1 + ηLα,tULα,t−1
¢
and the outflow from the employment
pool
¡
φα,tNα,t−1
¢
of that ability group: ∆Nα,t = ηSα,tUSα,t−1 + ηLα,tULα,t−1 − φα,tNα,t−1. Assuming
a constant labour force Lα in each ability class and defining the employment rate to be nα,t =
Nα,t/Lα,t, we obtain the following employment dynamics equation:78
nα,t = ηSα,tu
S
α,t−1 + η
L
α,tu
L
α,t−1 +
¡
1− φα,t
¢
nα,t−1. (3.25)
The long-term unemployed comprise those workers who were either short- or long-term unem-
ployed in the previous period and who have not been hired in the current period. Thus the
long-run unemployment dynamics equation is
uLα,t =
¡
1− ηSα,t
¢
uSα,t−1 +
¡
1− ηLα,t
¢
uLα,t−1. (3.26)
The short-term unemployment rate is the diﬀerence between the aggregate unemployment rate
and the long-term unemployment rate:
uSα,t = 1− nα,t − uLα,t. (3.27)
The labour market equilibrium is the solution of the system comprising
• the employment and unemployment dynamics, eqs. 3.25, 3.26 and 3.27,
• the government budget constraint, eq. 3.1,
76Equivalently, the secondary entrant is hired when the profit from employing this worker is greater than
than the hiring cost: aE2α − wα − εα,t + σα + σLα
δ(1−φα)(aE2α −wα+σα)−δφαfα
1−δ(1−φα)
> hα
78Note that ∆nα,t = ηSα,t
¡
1− nSα,t−1
¢
+ ηLα,t
¡
1− nLα,t−1
¢
− φα,tnα,t−1.
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• the firing and hiring rates, eqs. 3.18, 3.21, 3.24, and
• the negotiated wage, eq. 3.11.
3.4 Evaluation Of Employment Subsidies
We now proceed to calibrate the model above for German data and compare the eﬀectiveness
of alternatively targeted employment subsidies. First we describe the calibration; second we
provide an intuitive account of what determines policy eﬀectiveness. Third, we turn to the
numerical results when the subsidies are self-financing. Finally, we relax the self-financing
constraint.
3.4.1 Calibration
Naturally, in calibrating our model, we take data commonly used in the literature. Although
we performed numerous robustness checks which did not aﬀect the qualitative ranking of hiring
vouchers vs low-wage subsidies,79 our quantitative results should nevertheless be interpreted
with caution. The model is, after all, very simple.
The period of analysis is one year. The real interest rate r is set at 4% per year, which
corresponds to the average real interest rate in the OECD over the last four decades, and we
set δ = 1
1+r . For simplicity, we choose ξ = 1.
Firing costs and hiring costs are set proportional to 60% (fα = ρwα with ρ = 0.6) and
10% (hα = μwα with μ = 0.1) of the the labour costs respectively (Chen and Funke, 2003).80
The net replacement rates βα are set to 78.25% for low-ability, 68.25% for medium-ability, and
64.67% for high-ability workers (OECD, 2006), respectively.81 The tax-rate τ that balances
the government’s budget in the absence of subsidies amounts to 6.9%.
Keane and Wolpin (1997) estimated rates of skill depreciation during unemployment: white
collar workers lose about 30% of their skills after being unemployed for one year, whereas
the number is about 10% for blue collar workers (see Keane and Wolpin, 1997, p. 500). In
Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998, p. 527) the rate of depreciation of skills during unemployment
is twice the rate of accumulation. In line with these studies we assume an insider productivity
advantage is 10% and a skill depreciation of 20% of the respective productivity due to long-term
unemployment.
Table 3.182 shows the percentage values for Germany for the three ability classes of the
relevant variables of the employment dynamics equations. The percentage share of the labour
force lα for each ability class for Germany (2002) is taken from the OECD (2005a), the respective
79In other words, we varied the parameters below within sensible parameter ranges. Results are available on
request.
80See Appendix 3.A.1 for the calculation of the ability specific labour costs and wages.
81The replacement rates of a 67% average productivity worker (APW), a 100% APW and a 150% APW were
chosen to represent the respective replacement rates of low, medium and high-ability group. For simplicity, we
took the unweighted average across six family types as well as over the initial period of unemployment and
long-term unemployment.
82Note that variables with subscript "0" denote the value at the "old" steady state, i.e. before any policy
exercise.
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low-ability medium-ability high-ability aggregate
l 16. 6 59. 4 24 100
u ,0 18 10. 2 5. 2 10. 3
u ,0
S 7. 7 5. 1 2. 8 5
u ,0L 10. 3 5 2. 4 5. 3
u ,0
L /u ,0 57 49 46 50
,0S 49 59 55 56. 4
,0L 38 42 51 43. 5
 ,0 9. 4 5. 7 2. 9 5. 6
Table 3.1: Steady state values of the labor share, unemployment, hiring and firing rates for
each skill class and in aggregate in percentage for Germany.
aggregate unemployment rates for Germany (2002) uα,0 from the OECD (2005b, 2005c). The
actual hiring rates for 1996 of each ability and duration group ηSα,0 and ηLα,0 are taken from
Wilke’s (2005) Kaplan-Meier functions for Germany. According to the OECD (2005b, 2005d)
the average share of long-term unemployment (uLα,0/uα,0) is around 50 percent and similar
across all ability classes. The firing rates φα,0 are assigned the values necessary for the model
to reproduce the unemployment rates of the respective ability classes83. We interpret these
numbers as steady state values.
We linearize the model around the old steady state84 and calculate the long-run eﬀects
of the policy exercises (new steady state) as permanent deviations from the old steady state.
Thus, we have to choose the first derivative of the cumulative density functions in our model
(Γ0α,0), which determines the hiring and firing elasticities. For this purpose, we use empirical
estimates, as summarized in Orszag and Snower (1999, p. 208). The first derivative of the
cumulative function for the hiring rate (ηΓ0α,0) (denoted with subscript η) is set in such a way
that the hiring elasticity with respect to a hiring voucher is equal to 0.5.85 Also in line with
the aforementioned empirical literature, we set the first derivative of the cumulative function
(φΓ0α,0) for the firing rate (denoted with subscript φ) in such a way that a one-period reduction
of the wage has an elasticity of 0.125.
To double check that we have chosen appropriate hiring and firing elasticities, we compare
the endogenous reactions of our model to the empirical labour demand literature. A permanent
10 percent wage cut (ceteris paribus) for low-ability workers generates for example an increase
in the employment rate of 8.7 percent in the long-run, which yields an long-term labour demand
83The firing rate of 9% for low-ability employees is close to what can be found in the literature (e.g. Brussig
and Erlinghagen, 2005, Fitzenberger et al., 2003, and Wilke, 2005). The firing rate for high-ability is somewhat
lower than in reality since many high-ability workers rotate back into work quickly. This phenomenon cannot
be captured by our model since it is calibrated on a yearly basis and workers stay unemployment for at least a
year. However, this property does not aﬀect the model dynamics for the performed exercises.
84See Appendix 3.A.2.
85The hiring elasticity is defined as the reaction of the hiring rate to a hiring voucher for short-term unem-
ployed, which is permanently paid during the first year of the employment spell (χα =
∂ηSα
ηSα
/∂σ
S
α
wα
). For simplicity,
we choose the same ηΓ00,α for short-term and long-term unemployed in each ability group.
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elasticity of -0.87.86
Empirical labour demand elasticities for Germany are generally estimated in a range from
-0.3 to -0.9 (see Riphan et al., 1999). Sinn et al. (2006, p. 10) point out that these estimation
results rather reflect short-term than long-term elasticities, refer to studies where considerable
higher estimates have been found for the low-wage sector and consider an elasticity of -1 as
realistic. Thus, we see ourselves well in line with the empirical labour demand literature for
Germany.
3.4.2 Determinants of Policy Eﬀectiveness
In our analysis, the policies under consideration exhibit diminishing returns, in the sense that
equal incremental increases in each employment subsidy leads to progressively smaller incremen-
tal increases in employment and social welfare. We show that, for each employment subsidy,
once a critical level is exceeded, it ceases to be self-financing. Recalling that our notion of
approximate welfare eﬃciency involves the satisfaction of three constraints - an employment
and welfare constraint, an earnings inequality constraint, and a self-financing constraint - we
find, in our calibration exercises, that as each subsidy is increased, the self-financing constraint
is reached first. Thus the self-financing constraint determines the magnitude of each policy
intervention that is compatible with approximate welfare eﬃciency.
We begin by examining the potential of alternative policies to be self-financing.
Wage Subsidies versus Hiring Vouchers
Let us start with comparing the two most general types of subsidies:
• a wage subsidy σα paid to the firm for each employed worker of a specific ability class,
• 1-period hiring voucher σduα,t paid to the firm for hiring a worker of a specific target group
(duration and ability).
Our quantitative analysis below shows that hiring vouchers are more likely to be self-
financing than wage subsidies, for the following reasons:87
Deadweight Eﬀect
The deadweight eﬀect - defined as the amount of subsidy payments which are paid to workers
who would have been employed in absence of the subsidy - is much larger for wage subsidies
than for hiring vouchers. For any particular ability group, the proportion of unemployed workers
who would have been hired without the subsidy is clearly smaller than the proportion of all
employed workers who would have been retained without the subsidy.88
86Note that the endogenous labour demand elasticity in our model varies with the size of the wage movement.
The bigger the change in the wage, the smaller is the labour demand elasticity (in absolute terms).
87Since the following eﬀects are strongly interrelated, we will not try to disentangle them in the numerical
excercise below.
88For example, 82% of the low-skilled workers in Germany are already employed in absence of a low-wage
subsidy, while this groups contains 16.6% of all workers. Thus, 13.6% of the workforce would receive a low wage
subsidy, although these people would be employed without a subsidy. For hiring vouchers deadweight subsidy
payments cover only about 5% of the workforce.
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Wage Eﬀect
The wage-eﬀect is defined as the proportion of the subsidy that goes into wage increases and
thus does not encourage employment creation. In the context of our model, wage subsidies raise
insider wages, since these subsidies are paid to all employed workers of a specific ability class,
including the median insiders. By contrast, hiring subsidies to the unemployed do not aﬀect
negotiated wages, since these subsidies do not aﬀect the position of the median insiders.
The assumption that wages are negotiated by the median insider is of course extreme, in
that it makes this diﬀerence in subsidy eﬀectiveness particularly stark. At the opposite extreme,
insider wages could be negotiated individualistically, so that both the wage subsidies and the
hiring subsidies aﬀect the negotiated wage. But even in the latter case, wage subsidies may
be expected to have a larger wage eﬀect than hiring subsidies. The reason is that, in practice,
the positions of newly hired workers are less protected by labour turnover costs than are the
positions of the established insiders. Thus the established insiders will be able to capture more
of the bargaining surplus than the newly hired workers.
In short, both the deadweight and wage eﬀects imply that hiring vouchers are more likely
to be self-financing than wage subsidies.
Targeting Hiring Vouchers at Duration versus Ability
We now proceed to analyze whether hiring vouchers should be targeted at specific duration
or ability groups. What targeting schemes are most likely to be self-financing? The answer
depends on the following eﬀects:
Deadweight Eﬀect
The greater is the hiring rate, the larger will be the deadweight implied by a hiring voucher.
Empirically, as can be seen in Table 3.1, hiring rates increase with productivity. Thus hiring
vouchers should be targeted at workers with the lowest productivity, namely low-ability workers
as well as long-term unemployed workers.
Replacement Rate Eﬀect
As shown in Section 3.4.1, the lower the income and ability, the higher is the replacement
rate. Thus, increased employment in the group with the lowest income will generate the largest
reduction in government expenditure in terms of the respective wage. Thus the higher is the
replacement rate, the more likely is the subsidy to be self-financing. Since unemployed, low-
ability workers have the highest replacement rates, hiring vouchers for these groups are more
likely to be self-financing than other subsidies, including wage subsidies.
Transition Eﬀect
When hiring vouchers bring workers back to work, their human capital appreciates. In
our model, the human capital appreciation implies that the formerly short- and long-term
unemployed have the same productivity as insiders after one period of employment. As a
consequence, their low hiring probability ηduα,t is exchanged for a considerably higher retention
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probability (1− φα,t). This eﬀect is strongest for long-term unemployed since they have been
most aﬀected by human capital loss. Thus, the bigger the likelihood that workers’ human
capital appreciates, the bigger are the long-run eﬀect on the government budget. Clearly, this
eﬀect favours hiring vouchers for long-term unemployed workers.
3.4.3 Numerical Results: AWE Subsidies
We simulate our above model for Germany, and compare the eﬀectiveness of the following
employment subsidy policies:
(i) A low-wage subsidy (σl) which is paid (each period) for each low-wage/ability employee.
It will reduce the firing rate, by making employees more profitable for the firm. Thus, it raises
the insider retention incentive, whereby the firm retains more workers with high operating costs
(low productivity).
At the same time the hiring rate will increase since the subsidy provides the incentive to
hire more low productivity workers, who would not have been hired otherwise.
(ii) A hiring voucher targeted at low-ability workers (σdul ), which is paid for hiring unem-
ployed, low-ability workers. Following the same rationale as above, the firm will hire more
workers than without a voucher. In contrast to the first policy, the firing rate will not be
aﬀected since the voucher is only paid for new hires and not for the entire employment stock.89
(iii) A hiring voucher targeted at long-term unemployed workers (σLα), which is paid if a
long-term unemployed worker is hired.
(iv) A hiring voucher targeted at the low-ability, long-term unemployed workers (σLl ).
Our simulation reveals that a low-wage subsidy is not an AWE (approximately welfare eﬃ-
cient) policy for Germany. While a low-wage subsidy creates employment and reduces inequity,
it is not self-financing. This result is driven by the deadweight eﬀect and the wage eﬀect above.
(Thus low wage subsidies can only be implemented if the government is willing to provide extra
resources permanently.) Furthermore, our results show that hiring vouchers for Germany can
be self-financing and thereby AWE, depending on the target group.
To determine the most eﬀective employment subsidy, we examine the approximately wel-
fare eﬃciency of hiring vouchers targeted at the low-productivity groups, namely at long-term
unemployed as well as at the low-ability unemployed, and compare their employment, welfare
and equity eﬀects.
For both groups there are two possible options for hiring vouchers (HV):
Option 1: a same lump sum voucher is paid for hiring a long-term unemployed worker
(low- ability worker) irrespectively of his ability class (unemployment duration),
Option 2: a diﬀerent voucher is paid for hiring a long-term unemployed worker (low- ability
worker) depending on his ability class (unemployment duration).
While option 1 implies a voucher which is self-financing across ability classes (unemployment
duration), option 2 is determined to be self-financing within each ability class (unemployment
89This holds for constant returns to labour; we will discuss the eﬀect of decreasing returns and displacement
eﬀect in section 3.4.4.
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duration), thereby, preventing cross-subsidization across ability classes (unemployment dura-
tion).
Targeting Long-Term Unemployed:
Vouchers targeted at long-term unemployed (LTU) workers are AWE for Germany. Table
3.2 compares the eﬀectiveness of the two design options by describing their unemployment,
welfare90 and equity implications, the latter given by the Gini coeﬃcient.91
If a same lump sum hiring voucher is paid for all long-term unemployed compared to an
ability specific payment, the self-financing restriction is hit much earlier. While only 947 €
per worker are AWE in the former case, up to 4390 € (2503 €) can be paid for low-ability
(medium-ability) workers in the latter. The intuition is straightforward: option 2 fully exploits
the larger self-financing areas for long-term unemployed workers in the low-ability and medium-
ability class, thereby, it prevents costly cross-subsidization. The self-financing AWE subsidy
decreases with productivity due to a smaller deadweight eﬀect and the bigger replacement rate
eﬀect.
The more an approximately welfare eﬃcient policy raises employment and welfare, the
more "eﬀective" we denote the policy to be. By comparing the results of these two exercises,
we can clearly infer that hiring vouchers of diﬀerent magnitudes for each ability group are
most eﬀective. They perform better in terms of unemployment reduction, welfare improvement
and earnings inequality reduction. For example, according to our calibration the long-term
unemployment among low-ability workers can be reduced by 9% for free (i.e. self-financing).
HV for LTU Option 1 HV for LTU Option 2
1 Subsidy 947 4390 / 2503 / 0
2 Subsidy in % of respective wage 3.7 / 3.1 / 2.2 16.9 / 8.4 / 0
3 % Change of Low-Ability Long-Term Unemployment -2.1 -8.9
4 % Change of Low-Ability Unemployment -0.8 -4.4
5 % Change of Long-Term Unemployment -2.0 -5.9
6 % Change of Overall Unemployment -0.9 -2.8
7 Change of Welfare + +
8 Gini coefficient (old steady state 11.47) 11.45 11.41
Table 3.2: Approximately welfare eﬃcient hiring vouchers (HV) for long-term unemployed
(LTU) workers in design options 1 and 2 diﬀerentiated in those for low-, medium- and high-
ability and the resulting unemployment, welfare and equity implications.
90The welfare of the workforce is calculated as the sum of the utility of the workers over the various labour
market states.
Ωt =
X
α
υ(wα,t(1− τ))lαnα +
X
α
X
du
υ (bα)uduα lα. (3.28)
A "+" for welfare changes indicates an increase in welfare. The cross-policy ranking of changes in welfare
corresponds to the ranking of changes in overall unemployment. The utility parameter ξ does not aﬀect the
cross-policy rankings.
91Note that the Gini coeﬃcient generated by our model is lower than in reality, as our model does not generate
income diﬀerentials within ability groups and it does not take non-wage related inequalities into account (e.g.,
due to the wealth distribution).
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Targeting Low-Ability Unemployed:
If a lump sum hiring voucher is targeted at all low-ability unemployed (LAU) (option 1),
there is no self-financing area at all. But as shown in Table 3.3 diﬀerentiating the vouchers for
short-term and long-term unemployed workers reveals an approximately welfare eﬃcient hiring
voucher for low-ability workers (4390€), which though is present only for long-term unemployed
workers. The reason is that short-term unemployed workers have a higher productivity than the
long-term unemployed, thereby a higher hiring rate, which implies a higher deadweight eﬀect
and a smaller transition eﬀect. Both impede a self-financing areas for these workers.
So, for the German calibration above, targeting vouchers at long-term unemployed workers
(targeted at the low- and medium-ability workers) is more eﬀective than targeting low-ability
workers.92
HV for LAU Option 2
1 Subsidy 4390 / 0
2 Subsidy in % of respective wage 16.9
3 % Change of Low-Ability Long-Term Unemployment -8.9
4 % Change of Low-Ability Unemployment -4.4
5 % Change of Long-Term Unemployment -2.9
6 % Change of Overall Unemployment -1.4
7 Change of Welfare +
8 Gini coefficient (old steady state 11.47) 11.45
Table 3.3: Approximately welfare eﬃcient hiring vouchers (HV) for low-ability unemployed
(LAU) workers in design option 2 diﬀerentiated in those for long-term and short-term unem-
ployed and the resulting unemployment, welfare and equity implications.
Employment-Equity Trade-Oﬀ:
Interestingly, the self-financing hiring voucher reduces unemployment and inequality at the
same time. In other words, a hiring voucher does not move the economy along an employment-
equity trade-oﬀ, but rather shifts this trade-oﬀ in a favourable direction. By contrast, a re-
duction of the replacement rate for low-ability workers (which are the most unemployment
prone) would buy more employment at the cost of a higher Gini coeﬃcient; thus facing an
employment-equity trade-oﬀ.
3.4.4 Numerical Results: Relaxing the Self-Financing Constraint
We now examine the eﬀectiveness of these policies when we relax the self-financing condition,
by allowing a small increase in government spending.93 We say that a policy "outperforms"
92Overall, it has to be mentioned that the size of the approximately welfare eﬃcient subsidy depends crucially
on the hiring elasticities. We claim that they can be influenced substantially by policy makers. Designing a suc-
cessful subsidy system should include complementary measures, such as improving job placement or increasing
the pressure to accept job oﬀers, to ensure the aforementioned simulated or even better long run eﬀects (such
complementarities are discussed, for example, in Coe and Snower, 1997, and Orszag and Snower, 1998; see also
Chapter 4 for complementary policies).
93Since the government outlay is small, we could reinterpret "approximately welfare eﬃcient" policies to be
ones that increase employment and welfare, do not increase earnings inequality, and are "approximately" self-
financing. We do not calculate a welfare measure for this exercise since the government either has to cut other
spending positions (which may reduce the agents’ utility) or create government debt (which has to be paid by
future taxes).
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other policies if it delivers the largest reduction in unemployment94 and in inequality.
Specifically, we assume that in the long-run the government allocates a net expenditure of
€ 50 in real terms (G = 50, per year and per person of the workforce) to active labour market
policies. This expenditure is allocated to the targeted groups by increasing the subsidy (in equal
€ steps for all targeted groups) until the (new steady state’s) budget constraint is reached.
Table 3.4 compares the eﬀects of hiring vouchers for long-term unemployed (LTU) and for
low-ability (LAU) workers and low-wage subsidies, with regard to unemployment and inequal-
ity. The "marginal unemployment reduction" refers to the changes beyond the self-financing
subsidy, whereas the "total reduction" is calculated relative to the pre policy steady state.95
HV for LTU (Option 2) HV for LAU  (Option 2) Low-Wage Subsidy
1 Total Subsidy (% of respective wage) 51.7 / 38.5 / 20.5 64.6 / 47.7 1.5
2 Additional Subsidy 9033 12363 403
3 % Marginal Reduction of Low-Ability Unemployment -7.8 -18.7 -1.5
4 % Marginal Reduction of Long-Term Unemployment -15.1 -11.4 -0.8
5 % Marignal Reduction of Overall Unemployment -7.1 -5.3 -0.4
6 % Total Reduction of Low-Ability Unemployment -11.8 -22.3 -1.5
7 % Total Reduction of Long-Term Unemployment -20.1 -14 -0.8
8 % Total Reduction of Overall Unemployment -9.7 -6.6 -0.4
9 Gini coefficient 11.29 11.38 11.32
Table 3.4: The eﬀects on increased government spending on hiring vouchers (HV) for long-term
unemployed (LTU) and low-ability unemployed (LAU) workers.
Employment Eﬀects
Low wage subsidies perform worse in reducing unemployment. The first reason is the dead-
weight: while hiring vouchers targeted at the long-term unemployed are paid to roughly 2.2% of
the overall workforce, it is almost 13.6% for low-wage subsidies. The deadweight is substantial
for wage subsidies as 99.7% of the recipients would also have been employed in the absence
of a subsidy. This number is considerably smaller for hiring vouchers targeted at long-term
unemployed (68.5%). In addition, there is the wage eﬀect (see Section 4.2 for details). Thus,
in contrast to low-wage subsidies, higher hiring vouchers (targeted at long-term unemployed,
see column one of Table 3.4, or the low-ability unemployed, see column two) can be allocated
for a given net government expenditure and thus, deliver a bigger employment eﬀect.
Hiring vouchers targeted at long-term unemployed, instead of low-ability unemployed work-
ers, deliver a bigger unemployment eﬀect.96 The net expenditure for subsidies should be spent
for hiring vouchers targeted at long-term unemployed workers in diﬀerent ability classes and
could cut long-term unemployment by 20% and overall unemployment by 10%.
94The largest reduction in unemployment can be shown to be associated with the largest increase in welfare.
95Naturally, as low-wage subsidies are not approximately eﬃcient, the marginal reduction is equal to the
overall reduction.
96Besides the transition eﬀect, another reason can be found in the employment dynamics equation (4.31).
In our model it is much easier to obtain small employment eﬀects for a given ability group compared to a
large eﬀect, i.e. labour demand elasticities are bigger, the smaller the marginal expenses are. This is most
easy to see under homogenous labour where the long-run employment is equal to n = ηη+φ (see Snower and
Merkl, 2006). The marginal employment eﬀect of an increasing hiring rate obviously is posive, but decreasing
(∂n∂η > 0,
∂2n
∂η2 < 0).
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Displacement Eﬀects
Thus far, we have ignored the displacement eﬀect - viz., hiring vouchers induce firms to
substitute the subsidized workers for existing employees - due to our assumption of constant
returns to labour. We now extend our model to include this displacement eﬀect, which weakens
the employment-creating influence of the hiring vouchers. The simplest way to do so is to assume
decreasing returns to labour in the short run, under a constant stock of physical capital.97 We
assume a Cobb-Douglas function Y = AN1−αK¯α, where capital is a constant K¯.
When we assume that the capital share for Germany is 33% (i.e. α = 1/3, see Statistisches
Bundesamt, 2006), we find that the size of AWE hiring vouchers for low-ability, long-term
unemployed workers is reduced from 17 to 14% of the wage. In short, the displacement eﬀect
is rather weak. The reason is the transition eﬀect: if the hiring voucher pushes a long-term
unemployed worker back to work, her human capital appreciates. Thus when the voucher
expires, former long-term unemployed workers face a retention probability which is considerably
higher than their initial hiring probability. Furthermore, even if workers are displaced or the
worker is fired once the voucher expires, a long-term unemployed worker is exchanged for a
short-term unemployed worker with higher human capital and thereby a higher reemployment
probability. This transition eﬀect has been shown to be both statistically and economically
significant in diﬀerent German labour market programs. See, for example, the evaluation of the
"Hamburger Modell", a lump-sum hiring voucher adopted in a model experiment in Hamburg
(Jirjahn et al., 2009), and the evaluation of the so-called "Eingliederungszuschuss", which is a
limited hiring subsidy (Bernhard et al., 2008).
Finally, displacement is of course a short-run phenomenon. In the long run, the capital ad-
justs to the larger workforce with higher human capital, and this adjustment naturally reduces,
and possibly eliminates, displacement.98 Thus we conclude that displacement eﬀects have no
substantial eﬀect on our results.
Equity Eﬀects
Our model shows that hiring vouchers are a more eﬀective in reducing unemployment than
low wage subsidies, the relative eﬀectiveness is less straightforward with respect to equity.
Both, wage subsidies and hiring vouchers, improve the Gini coeﬃcient, but through diﬀerent
mechanisms. Whereas low-wage subsidies improve equity by raising the wages of low-ability
workers, hiring subsidies improve equity by bringing the long-term unemployed back to work.
Our calibration shows that the hiring subsidies have a stronger equity-reduction eﬀect.99
97Clearly, the more sharply decreasing the returns to labour are, the more the employment of subsidized
workers will reduce the marginal product of the existing workers, and thus, the greater the incentive to dismiss
these existing workers.
98Although our quantitative analysis above omits displacement eﬀects, we consider our calibration to be
rather conservative (regarding the size of the approximately eﬃcient subsidy). While we used a tax rate (6.9
percent) to finance unemployment related expenses, in reality other tax revenues would also increase with the
employment rate. This would raise the self-financing, and thereby, the approximately eﬃcient subsidy and thus,
lead to a higher eﬀectiveness (in terms of employment, welfare and inequality).
99To gain some perspective on our analysis in the appendix 3.A.3 we discuss some important eﬀects - lying
beyond the scope of our model (namely, substitution eﬀects, asymmetric information, skill acquisition eﬀects,
households’ job acceptance incentives) - some of which may be expected to weaken or even reverse our qualitative
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3.5 Concluding Thoughts
In the context of a new labour market model, which is illustratively calibrated for Germany,
we have shown that low-wage subsidies (targeted at low-income/ability workers) are not ap-
proximately welfare eﬃcient (AWE), i.e. no positive low-wage subsidies are self-financing. By
contrast, hiring vouchers can be AWE. Our calibrated model suggests that hiring subsidies
for the long-term unemployed are more eﬀective than hiring vouchers for low-income/ability
workers. The same ranking, in terms of employment, holds for employment subsidies financed
through government expenditures extending beyond the AWE limit.
3.A Appendix
3.A.1 Labour Costs
The diﬀerent abilities’ labour costs and wages are calculated as follows: the aggregate producer
wage and gross value added per worker can be obtained from Statistische Ämter des Bundes
und der Länder (2006). The aggregate producer wage is defined as the average real gross wage
per employee plus social security payments. We took the 2003 values for gross value added100
(50334 Euros) and real labour costs (32672 Euros) since the OECD numbers which we used for
further calculations were only available until this point in time.
Using the wage equation (3.11), we calculated the average bargaining power in the economy,
where the variables denote aggregate values:
w = (1− γ)βw + γ
¡¡
a− εMI
¢
+ ρw
¢
, (3.29)
γ =
w − βw
(a− εMI) + ρw − wβ . (3.30)
We obtain γ = 0.2134.
Ability group specific relative labour costs for Germany are calculated as follows (OECD,
2005c): high-ability workers earn 148% of their medium-ability counter-parts’ wage and low-
ability 87%, respectively.101 Low-ability workers’ highest education level is lower secondary
education, whereas it is upper secondary education or post-secondary non-tertiary education
for medium-ability and tertiary education for high-ability. Assuming that the bargaining power
is the same in all ability groups and using the respective replacement rates102 we get for each
ability group α ¡
aIα − εMI
¢
=
wα − (1− γα)βαwα − γαρwα
γα
. (3.31)
results.
100We interpret this as the productivity of the median insider (aI − εMI).
101Similar relations can be found in Wienert (2006).
102Furthermore, we assumed that the firing costs are 60% of the labour costs, see Chen and Funke (2003).
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low-ability medium-ability high-ability aggregate
lα 16.6 59.4 24 100
wα 25948 29940 44100 32672
(aIα − εMI) 31179 47012 75069 51109
Table 3.5: Relevant labour cost values.
Table 3.5 summarizes the relevant values.103 Starting from this steady state we perform
policy exercises and compare the resulting new steady states.104
3.A.2 Linearisation
Firing Rate
Non-linear equation:
φα = 1− Γα
µ
aIα − wα + σα − φαfαδ
1− δ (1− φα)
+ fα
¶
, (3.32)
where σα ist a wage subsidy for ability class α. Linearisation:
φα,new = φα,0 −φ Γ0α,0
∙
1
1− δ (1− φα)
¸
0
1
1 + Vα
" ¡
aIα,new − wα,new + σα
¢
−
¡
aIα,0 − wα,0
¢ # (3.33)
−φΓ0α,0
∙
−φαδ
(1− δ (1− φα))
+ 1
¸
0
1
1 + Vα
(fα,new − fα,0) ,
with
Vα =φ Γ0α,0
"
δ
¡
fα (δ − 1)−
¡
aIα − wα
¢¢
(1− δ (1− φα))2
#
0
,
where variables with subscript "0" are at the old steady and variables with subscript "new"
are at the new steady state.105
Hiring Rates
Non-linear equation:
ηSα = Γα
Ã
aE1α − wα + σSα + σα +
δ (1− φα)
¡
aIα − wα + σα
¢
− φαfαδ
1− δ (1− φα)
− hα
!
, (3.34)
where σSα is the hiring voucher for short-term unemployed workers of ability class α.
Linearisation:
103Due to the aggregation the value for the aggregate labour cost is not equal to the original value for real
labour costs (50334), which we used to compile the bargaining strength and the ability group specific relative
labour cost.
104See Appendix 3.A.2.
105In the calibration, we assume for simplicity that δE(ε|(1−φ))δφ = 0.
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ηSα,new = η
S
α,0 +η Γ
0
α,0
£¡
aE1α,new − wα,new + σSα + σα
¢
−
¡
aE1α − wα,0
¢¤
(3.35)
+ηΓ0α,0
∙
δ (1− φα)
1− δ (1− φα)
¸
0
£¡
aIα,new − wα,new + σα
¢
−
¡
aIα,0 − wα,0
¢¤
−ηΓ0α,0
∙
φ2δ
1− δ (1− φ2)
¸
0
(fα,new − fα,0)−η Γ0α,0 (hα,new − hα,0)
+ηΓ0α,0
"
−δ
¡¡
aIα − wα
¢
+ fα (1− δ)
¢
[1− δ (1− φα)]2
#
0
¡
φα,new − φα,0
¢
.
And equivalently for the second unemployment duration group.
3.A.3 Extensions
In this Section we discuss various other eﬀects - lying beyond the scope of our model - some of
which may be expected to weaken or even reverse our qualitative results.
Substitution Eﬀects
In our setting workers of diﬀerent ability groups are not substitutable. A strong substitutabil-
ity would make it profitable for firms to substitute medium and high ability workers with low
ability workers. First, this problem would be more severe for low wage subsidies as they are
paid permanently and as they are exclusively targeted at low wages. Second, the empirical
literature delivers evidence that the substitutability between diﬀerent ability groups is quite
low (see e.g. Buslei and Steiner, 1999 and SVR, 2006, for German evidence as well as Kremer
and Maskin, 1996, for cross country evidence). Thus, substitution eﬀects are not strong, but
would reinforce our ranking of policies.
Asymmetric Information
Subsidies, which are targeted at low wage workers, may provide an incentive for households
to shift from a full-time to a part-time position in order to cash the subsidy. If the subsidy
is restricted to full time employees only, there may be an incentive for firms and workers to
take advantage of asymmetric information to collude and cheat the government to qualify for
the subsidy (i.e. falsely claim a lower hourly wage and more hours; and maybe follow a black
market activity at the same time). While this problem may not be entirely absent for hiring
vouchers which are targeted at long-term unemployed workers, for low wage subsidies it is a lot
more diﬃcult to abuse such a scheme. Low-wage workers are only a subset of the target group
and they are only eligible if they were unemployed for longer than one year. Furthermore, the
voucher is only paid out for a limited period of time. This problem is though particulary relevant
for low-wage subsidies, as these are exclusively targeted at low wages and paid permanently.
Thus, we conlude that asymmetric information problems again reinforce the ranking in favour
of hiring vouchers for long-term unemployed.
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Households’ Job Acceptance Incentives
In our model above, as noted, hiring and firing decisions are made by firms, and the house-
holds’ employment incentives enter the model only through wage bargaining. We have argued
that this is reasonable in countries with high unemployment (like Germany), for then labour
demand is generally the short side of the labour market, so that firms’ labour demands play a
leading role in determining employment, while most unemployed households may be expected
to accept jobs willingly. The critical reader however may wonder if our ranking of policies (hir-
ing subsidies for long-term unemployed outperform low wage subsidies) would be overturned
if we took account of households’ job acceptance incentives. Then hiring vouchers may reduce
short-term unemployed households’ job acceptance rate, since they increase the households’
present value of income from unemployment. On the other hand, hiring vouchers raise firms’
job oﬀer rate and this may also raise long-term unemployed households’ job acceptance rate
due to strategic complementarities.
To assess the potential importance of these possibilities, consider the following thought
experiment. Let us interpret our hiring rate as a matching rate, i.e. as the product of the job
oﬀer rate (i.e. the probability that a firm oﬀers a job to an outsider) and the job acceptance
rate (i.e. the probability that the outsider accepts the job oﬀer). Assume that the government
allocates a net expenditure of € 50 (per year and per person of the workforce) for employment
subsidies. Then assume, that the new matching rate under low-wage subsidies of 50% (39%)
for short-term (long-term) low-ability unemployed consists of a job oﬀer rate of 66% (52%) and
a job acceptance rate of 75% (in both cases).106 To make the low wage subsidy equivalent with
the hiring voucher for long-term unemployed (in terms of job creation) an increase of the job
acceptance rate for the former case to 100%,107 while the job aceptance rate stays constant for
the latter, would not be suﬃcient.108
Skill-Acquisition Incentives
Low-wage subsidies may create disincentives to acquire human capital . While we assume that
the composition of diﬀerent ability groups is exogenously given, in the long-run employment
subsidies may aﬀect workers’ incentives to acquire human capital. Oskamp and Snower (2006)
show that the positive short-run employment eﬀects of a low wage subsidy may be undone by
negative long-run employment eﬀects, as fewer people choose to invest in skills and thus the
more unemployment-prone low ability group becomes larger. This eﬀect is particulary strong
for low wage subsidies and much less severe with hiring vouchers for long-term unemployed, as
they are non-permanent and not exclusively targeted at the lowest ability group.
106These matching rates correspond to the hiring rates which result from the policy exercise in Section 4.3.3.
107For short-term and long-term unemployed.
108With diﬀerent numerical values it would be mathematically feasible to change the ranking. However, such
an exercise remains economically highly implausible. With a job acceptance rate of 50%, an increase of this
rate by roughly 50% would be necessary (for a low wage subsidy) in order to obtain equivalence between a
low wage subsidy and a hiring voucher for long-term unemployed. Note that the job acceptance rate after the
introduction of a hiring voucher for long-term unemployed would in addition have to stay unaﬀected.
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4 Incentives and Complementarities of Flexicurity
4.1 Introduction
The Danish miracle of low and stable unemployment has been attributed to the Danish labour
market policy of flexicurity, which combines very flexible labour markets, i.e. low job security,
with generous unemployment support and active labour market policies. Consequently, the
Danish flexicurity has drawn substantial attention and been praised as a role model by the ILO
(e.g. Auer , 2000, Auer and Casez, 2003 and Egger et al., 2003) and by the OECD (e.g. OECD,
2004b). Also the European Commission has embraced the broader concept of flexicurity by
developing guidelines for national flexicurity reforms.109
This chapter110 analyzes how and to which degree the Danish flexicurity concept and its
various elements achieve a low unemployment rate and thus, a higher employment security.
Since the various policy components of flexicurity interact with eachother, it is essential not
to examine these policies in isolation, but to evaluate their relative importance by exploring
their complementarities and substitutabilities. This analysis will provide significant insights
on the role and composition of flexicurity in achieving low unemployment as well as for the
implementation of the Danish model in other countries.
To understand the interactions between these three components of flexicurity we develop
a microfounded model of searching workers and employing firms, calibrate it to Germany and
perform the policy experiment of implementing the full Danish Flexicurity set of policies in
Germany, namely low employment protection, high unemployment benefits and active labour
market policies, specifically workfare activation requirements, which are seen as the decisive
element (Andersen and Svarer, 2007 and 2008). We analyze the unemployment and inequality
eﬀects of the set of policies as well as the single policies and their complementarities.
Flexible labour markets enable firms to adapt flexibly to face the challenge of world com-
petition. In exchange for their job security workers receive generous unemployment support
(income security) which is combined with workfare policy to strengthen employment incentives
and ensure workers’ employment. This set of policies not only implies strong economic comple-
mentarities, as our analysis shows, but also entails political complementairites in the sense that
the ability to gain political consent for one policy depends on the acceptance of other policies
(see Orszag and Snower, 1998). Political implementation of broad labour market reforms is
often opposed to if the burden is placed narrowly on a specific group of workers. The joint
implementation of the flexicurity policies directly addresses distributional consequences of more
flexible labour markets, which are spread through the whole workforce, by providing more gen-
erous income support. These political complementarities might generate stronger support for
this reform. At the same time the active labour market policies, esp. the workfare activation
requirements put workers’ employment incentives back in place and generate strong economic
109Specifically, the European Commission has developed a common set of flexicurity principles, endorsed by the
European Council (European Commission, 2007 and Council of the European Union, 2007) to guide national
reforms as well as flexicurity pathways (European Expert Group on Flexicurity, 2007) as diﬀerent avenues
member countries can follow to reform their labour markets.
110For a diﬀerent version of this chapter see Brown and Snower (2009).
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complementarities and, thus, enable the sustainability of the flexicurity policy.
Our results show that implementing the Danish flexicurity concept in Germany would re-
duce unemployment by 50% and would significantly reduce earnings inequality. Furthermore
our analysis illustrates that the Danish flexicurity policies have some apparent complemen-
tarities in Germany, in the sense that the reduction of unemployment eﬀect is approx. 40%
greater when the policies are implemented in conjunction than in isolation. The strongest eco-
nomic complementarities in reducing unemployment are generated by the joint implementation
of higher unemployment benefits and the introduction of workfare. Flexible firing rules and
workfare are not complementary at all, while flexible firing rules and higher unemployment
benefits are weak.
The remainder is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the flexicurity concept, its
transferability and relates our work to the existing literature. Section 3 presents the theoretical
labour market model. Section 4 calibrates the model for Germany, shows and discusses the
single and joint eﬀects of the flexicurity policies and their complementarities. Finally, Section
5 concludes.
4.2 Flexicurity
Danish flexicurity is seen as variant of a wider concept which encompasses various existing
combinations.111 Wilthagen and Tros (2004) summarize the various dimensions of flexibility
(external numerical, internal numerical, functional and flexible pay) and security (job security,
income security, employment and combination security112) in a matrix. While the discussion on
flexicurity triggered a vast literature on this topic, it has not resulted in a consensus definition.
It is either seen as a result of the evolution of labour market institutions and social dialogue
(Bredgaard et al., 2006, Madsen, 2006b) or as a policy strategy (Wilthagen, 1998, Wilthagen
and Rogowski, 2002, Wilthagen and Tros, 2004, Wilthagen et al., 2004).
The flexicurity concept originated in the Netherlands in the mid 1990s when labour market
regulation was reformed. The reform introduced flexible and atypical employment contracts
which were entitled to similar social security and working condition rights as for standard em-
ployment contracts.113 As the Dutch version, Danish flexicurity focuses on external numerical
flexibility and stemmed from a social dialogue. Danish flexicurity is a result of the combination
of three central components, which form a “golden triangle” (Madsen, 2004):
1. very flexible labour markets, resulting from low employment protection for all employees
- high external numerical flexibility,
2. extensive unemployment benefits providing income security to the unemployed - up to a
replacement rate of 90% for low-skilled workers and
3. active labour market policies aimed at bringing workers back into employment - by
111For examples see e.g. Auer and Cazes (2003), Wilthagen and Tros (2004) and European Expert Group on
Flexicurity (2007).
112I.e., the ability to combine work and private life.
113For the Dutch flexicurity see Wilthagen (1998), Wilthagen and Tros (2004), Van Oorschot (2004), Maarten
(2008).
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strengthening employment incentives via activation and workfare requirements, by facilitating
reintegration as well as by skills upgrading.114
Generally the idea behind flexicurity is that the two components flexibility and security are
complementary policies. As Andersen and Svarer (2007) though point out these two elements
have been part of the existing policy framework in Denmark since the mid 1970s, when unem-
ployment was high and persistent. The low unemployment rate was achieved only when in the
mid 1990s these two features were augmented by a third, namely active labour market policies,
especially the introduction of workfare activation requirements.115 This policy implied as shift
from a focus on income security to one on employment security or as Torfing (1999) names it,
a shift from a safety-net to a trampoline, which ensured the transition back to employment.
Employment incentives were strengthened by reducing the 9 years of passive unemployment
benefit entitlement successively to four years, with maximally 1 year of passive entitlement
which is not renewable through activation as before.116
Andersen and Svarer (2007) underline the point that this reform and the introduction of
workfare had a decisive eﬀect on unemployment and motivated by the Danish flexicurity An-
dersen and Svarer (2008) look exclusively at the sole role of workfare on unemployment within
a search and matching framework with exogenous separations. It is admissible to use the search
and matching framework of Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) to analyze labour market poli-
cies, provided that these policies have no significant influence on the matching process itself.
However, it seems implausible that active labour market policies should have no eﬀect on the
matching process. To avoid running afoul of the Lucas Critique, we do not take this short-cut
but derive the policy eﬀects microfoundedly from the intertemporal maximization of economic
agents and model their incentives explicitly. Additionally, while examining the interplay be-
tween all elements of the Danish flexicurity, we use an endogenous job destruction rate. Clearly,
omitting this feature would bias the results.
In international comparisons the Danish employment security was perceived very high (Auer
and Cazes, 2003) and at the same time the Danish flexicurity generated the lowest European
inequality (Dennis and Guio, 2004). Consequently the issue of transferability of Danish flexicu-
rity receives a lot of attention. Some authors (Bredgaard et al, 2005, and Andersen and Svarer,
2007) regard the transfer of Danish flexicurity into other countries as a quick and dirty copy-
and-paste approach which neglects complex political, historical and social preconditions.117 We
wish to point out that balancing flexible firing rules and workfare requirements with higher un-
employment benefits provides the ability to gain political consent for the full set of policies. And
in the lines of Coe and Snower (1997) thereby, the flexicurity concept as a broad labour market
114Andersen and Svarer (2007) and Madsen (2008) point out these three key elements are aided by the other
arms of the extensive Danish welfare state, e.g. a comprehensive educational service, encompassing adult
vocational training and education, a well-functioning childcare system and publicly financed health care.
115For the Danish flexicurity and the labour market reforms see among many others Auer and Cazes (2003),
Andersen and Svarer (2007), Zhou (2007), Madsen (2006a, b) and (2007).
116In line with this rights and duties approach benefit entitlements are lost if workers do not accept activation
oﬀers.
117Further transferability issues as optimal sequencing and institutional capacity are pointed out by Wilthagen
(2005) and Zhou (2007).
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reform policy exploits the political complementarities among individual policy measures. The
focus in this chapter though lies on the economic complementarities of the flexicurity policies.
In a political-economic model Boeri et al.(2006) analyze the emergence of labour market
institutions, specifically, combinations of employment protection legislation strictness and gen-
erosity of unemployment benefits. They report that a flexicurity composition arises when wage
diﬀerentials are significant or the unemployment benefit system suﬃciently generous and pro-
gressive to generate consent to such a flexicurity policy strategy. The authors though completely
neglect active labour market policies which according to Andersen and Svarer (2007) and many
others were the decisive component in achieving Denmark’s low unemployment rate.
Algan and Cahuc (2006) argue that the feasibility of the Danish flexicurity model is strongly
dependent on the public-spiritedness of the workers. They theoretically analyze the implication
of feelings of guilt due to workers cheating on unemployment benefits for the design of labour
market institutions. They illustrate that the higher these feelings of guilt, the lower will be
the employment protection, the higher the unemployment benefits and the higher the labour
market participation. Furthermore, in their empirical analysis the authors show that civic
attitudes depend on cultural values and thus, can not be easily changed by reforming labour
market institutions. They thereby conclude that the implementation of flexicurity necessitates
a comprehensive policy, thereby aﬀecting civic behaviour of its citizens. The authors did not
take into account the third element of the Danish flexicurity model, the active labour market
policy, especially the activation requirements we consider in our analysis, which completes a
comprehensive flexicurity policy package which could change civic behaviour.
Also Zhou (2007) addresses the question whether it is feasible and desirable to transfer
the Danish flexicurity model to other countries. He empirically examines to what extend the
components of flexicurity have contributed to the low unemployment rate. Regarding the single
eﬀects of the components the author qualitatively achieves similar results as in our analysis,
but he completely disregards any complementarities in his analysis. In the theoretical model of
Zhou (2008) and (2007) the author adopts a simple theoretical two equation model which he
calibrates to the French economy to analyze the feasibility of financing the Danish concept. He
concludes that the implementation from a high unemployment level is very costly and implies
very limited short-run reductions of unemployment. In contrast to his analysis our approach
employs a richer and microfounded model which also incorporates the government budget but in
which the transition probabilities between the various labour market states depend on workers’
incentives. This model will enable us to analyze the eﬀect of the single policies and their
complementarities on workers’ employment incentives, thereby, their transitions and finally,
the feasibility of the Danish flexicurity concept in Germany.
In the following Section we will derive this model.
4.3 The Model
We construct a Markov model of the labour market in which the dynamics of employment and
unemployment are determined by transition probabilities among various labour market states.
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We derive these transition probabilities from optimization principles.
Our model is meant to be both rich enough to capture endogenous wage bargaining, hir-
ing and firing as well as household search, but it also aims to be simple enough to generate
straightforward, intuitively transparent, policy guidelines. Accordingly, our model involves
some judicious compromizes between analytical simplicity and the depiction of heterogeneous
labour market behaviour of workers and firms. The model structure is closely related to Brown
et al.(2007a),118 specifically, it extends their firm side and wage bargaining with household
search, as in Brown et al. (2008).
Specifically, our model contains workers in three labour market states:
1. the employed (N),
2. the unemployed (U) ,who are not activated, yet,
3. the activated (A), who are unemployed workers in activation, specifically in workfare
programmes.
Our model describes labour market activity for workers as a Markov process involving these
three states. Apart from the probability of activation which is a policy variable, the transition
probabilities among these states are derived from microeconomic foundations.
We assume constant returns to labour. Let qN be the labour productivity of an employee,
where N is the work eﬀort of the employed worker.119 The firm faces a random cost εt, which
is iid across workers and time. This cost may be interpreted as, say, an operating cost or a
negative productivity shock. Its mean is normalized to zero and its cumulative distribution
Γ (εt) is time-invariant.
Workers’ instantaneous utility υt (ct, lt) depends on comsumption ct and leisure lt, where
the time endowment is normalized to 1. For simplicity we assume that workers consume all
their income. Employed workers receive a wage wt and pay payroll taxes with a rate of τ t
and unemployed workers receive unemployment benefits bt. Employed workers provide work
eﬀort N , which creates disutility as it restricts the available time for leisure. Unemployed
workers divide their time between leisure and job search eUt . Activated unemployed workers
(A) in addition to searching for a job eAt have to provide the required workfare eﬀort A.120
Furthermore, in line with Andersen and Svarer (2008) we allow the utility function of employed
workers (N) to diﬀer from the unemployeds’ (U , A) to capture potential stigmatisation eﬀects
of unemployment.
Agents in our model pursue the following sequence of decisions. First the government sets
its policy variables and balances its budget. Second, workers make their search decision. Third,
the operating costs are revealed. Then, wages are determined through bargaining and fourth,
firms make their employment decisions.
118See also Snower and Merkl (2006). Lechthaler et al. (2008) included this model into a DSGE framework.
119We follow the notational convention that only those variables have time subscripts that actually vary through
time in our model.
120Thus, leisure time is the time which is not spent working, being on workfare or searching for a job: lAt =
1− At − eAt , lN = 1− N , lUt = 1− eUt .
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4.3.1 Government Budget
Our model considers 4 instruments of government policy:
(i) a proportional payroll tax, with a tax rate τ t, paid by all employed workers, set to
balance the governments’ budget,
(ii) unemployment benefits bt, paid to all unemployed workers,
(iii) legislation on the flexibility of the labour market, i.e. firing costs ft, at no expense,
(iv) active labour market policy121 in form of workfare activation, specifically, unemployed
workers are required to participate in workfare programmes to remain eligible for unemployment
benefits, with an activation probability αt and a work requirement At which creates some costs
κt122 per activated worker.123
Assuming a constant labour force L the government budget is given by
ntwtτ t = (at + ut)bt + atκt (4.1)
where wt is the wage, nt, ut, at the rate of workers employed, passively unemployed and
activated, respectively.
4.3.2 Transitions Among Labour Market States
1 - μA
μA
(1 – α)(1 - μU) 
μU
α(1 - μU) 
1 -  φ 
φ 
 A 
 N 
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Figure 4.1: Labour market flows.
The transitions among the labour market states are summarized in Figure 4.1.124 For analytical
simplicity, we choose to describe these transitions in terms of a small number of transition
variables.
121For simplicity in our model active labour market policy does not aﬀect workers’ human capital, thereby we
bias the model against us.
122For simplicity we assume that the eﬀort on workfare does not influence the cost of workfare.
123We assume that workers who are activated will always accept going on workfare since otherwise they would
suﬀer severe reductions in unemployment benefits.
124To simplify notation, we suppress the subscripts refering to time (t) here.
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The unemployed (U) are matched with probability μU and then become employed; altern-
tatively if they are not matched with probability
¡
1− μU
¢
they are activated with probability
α125 and enter workfare programmes; with the probability (1− α)
¡
1− μU
¢
they remain unem-
ployed on passive benefits. The activated workers are matched with probability μA and then
become employed (N); with probability
¡
1− μA
¢
they are not hired and remain unemployed
and in activation. At the end of a period, new hires turn into insiders. As insiders, they lose
their jobs with probability φ and then become unemployed; with probability (1− φ) they are
retrained.126
Thus the labor market system in period t may be described as follows:
St = TtSt−1 (4.2)
where St is a vector of the labor market states:
St =
¡
N It , N
E
t , Ut, At
¢0
(4.3)
and Tt is a Markov matrix of transition probabilities:
Tt =
(1− φt) μUt μAt
φt (1− αt)
¡
1− μUt
¢
0
0 αt
¡
1− μUt
¢
(1− μAt )
(4.4)
We now proceed to derive the transition probabilities from microeconomic foundations.
4.3.3 Households’ Search Decisions
As noted, workers’ utility υt depends on comsumption and leisure. As pointed out above workers
can be employed (N) or unemployed and when unemployed, they can be on passive benefits
(U) or activated in workfare programmes (A). The passive unemployed (U) and the activated
unemployed (A) workers determine the amount of eﬀort eUt , eAt they expend in searching for
a job. The probability of an unemployed or activated unemployed worker being employed
depends on his search intensity (i.e. the length of time unemployed workers spent searching).
The harder unemployed search for a job relative to the other workers the more likely they are to
find a a firm, which is hiring.127 Thus, an unemployed worker’s job expected finding probability
Et
¡
μUt
¢
is
Et
¡
μUt
¢
= ζ
eUt−1
e¯t−1
E (ηt) , (4.5)
and an activated unemployed worker’s expected job finding probability μAt is
125Frederiksson and Holmund (2006) argue that a fixed time duration of activation can be approximated by a
stochastic transition into activation.
126Entrants turn into insiders at the end of a period. In case they are fired at the beginning of the next period
these entrants have been insiders just for an instant.
127There is no on-the-job search.
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Et
¡
μAt
¢
= ζ
eAt−1
e¯t−1
E (ηt) , (4.6)
where ηt is the expected firm’s hiring rate, ζ is a scale parameter and e¯t is the average amount
of job search eﬀort:
e¯t =
Ã
UtX
i=1
eUt,i +
AtX
j=1
eAt,j
!
(Ut +At)
=
¡
uteUt + ateAt
¢
ut + at
(4.7)
and where Ut is the number of unemployed job searchers and At the number of activated job
searchers and ut = UtL and at =
At
L are the respective rates given the constant labour force L.
Thereby each household takes e¯t as exogenously given when it makes its search decision.128
Workers choose the search eﬀort which maximizes their expected present value of lifetime
utility taking into account the eﬀects of their leisure choices on the job finding rates.
A unemployed worker maximizes his expected present value of utility E
¡
V Ut
¢
over his search
eﬀort eUt :
Et
¡
V Ut
¢
= max
eUt
υUt
¡
bt, 1− eUt
¢
+ δEt
Ã
μUt+1
¡
eUt
¢
V Nt+1 +
¡
1− μUt+1
¡
eUt
¢¢
αt+1V At+1
+
¡
1− μUt+1
¡
eUt
¢¢
(1− αt+1)V Ut+1
!
, (4.8)
where υt is the contemoraneous utility, which depends on consumption and leisure, δ is the
discount factor, Et
¡
V Ut+1
¢
and Et
¡
V At+1
¢
an employed worker’s and an activated unemployed
workers’s present value of utility in t+ 1, respectively, which are:
Et
¡
V Nt+1
¢
= Et
¡
υNt+1
¡
wt+1 (1− τ t+1) , 1− N
¢¢
+ δEt
¡¡
1− φt+2
¢
V Nt+2 + φt+2V
U
t+2
¢
, (4.9)
Et
¡
V Ut+1
¢
= Et
¡
υUt+1
¡
bt+1, 1− eUt+1
¢¢
+ δEt
⎛
⎜⎝
μUt+2
¡
eUt+1
¢
V Nt+2
+
¡
1− μUt+2
¡
eUt+1
¢¢
αt+2V At+2
+
¡
1− μUt+2
¡
eUt+1
¢¢
(1− αt+2)V Ut+2
⎞
⎟⎠ , (4.10)
and
Et
¡
V At+1
¢
= Et
¡
υAt+1
¡
bt+1, 1− eAt+1 − At+1
¢¢
+ δEt
¡
μAt+2
¡
eAt+1
¢
V Nt+2 +
¡
1− μAt+2
¡
eAt+1
¢¢
V At+2
¢
.
(4.11)
Along the same line, an activated unemployed worker maximizes his present value of utility
Et
¡
V At
¢
over search eﬀort eAt :
128Note that we are assuming that the eﬀort decisions of an entrant aﬀects the probability of getting hired
(relative to the probability that other job searchers get hired), but it does not aﬀect the productivity of the
entrants, once they are at work. In other words, the unemployed’s eﬀort decision aﬀects the probability of
getting hired, but not the productivity on the job.
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Et
¡
V At
¢
= max
eAt
υAt
¡
bt, 1− eAt − At
¢
+ δEt
¡
μAt+1
¡
eAt
¢
V Nt+1 +
¡
1− μAt+1
¡
eAt
¢¢
V At+1
¢
. (4.12)
The first-order conditions for these decision problems for the passive and activated unem-
ployed, respectively, are:
−υUeUt =
δζEt
¡
ηt+1
¢
e¯t
Et
¡
V Nt+1 − αt+1V At+1 − (1− αt+1)V Ut+1
¢
129 (4.13)
−υAeAt =
δζEt
¡
ηt+1
¢
e¯t
Et
¡
V Nt+1 − V At+1
¢
. (4.14)
In other words, the marginal utility of leisure must be set equal to the discounted marginal
job finding propensity
µ
ζδEt(ηt+1)
e¯t
¶
times the reward for seeking a job. This reward is the
diﬀerence between the expected present value of lifetime utility of being employed Et
¡
V Nt+1.
¢
and the present value of lifetime utility of not finding a job. For activated workers the latter
value corresponds to the the expected present value of lifetime utility of being an activated
unemployed worker Et
¡
V At+1.
¢
, and for not activated unemployed workers it is equal to the
weighted average of the expected present value of liftime utility of a passive and an activated
unemployed Et
¡
V Nt+1. − αt+1.V At+1. − (1− αt+1.)V Ut+1.
¢
. The weights are given by the respective
probabilities of being activated and remaining on passive benefits. Given diminishing marginal
utility of leisure, the optimal leisure depends inversely on the reward for seeking a job.
Once workers have decided on their search eﬀort, the idiosynchratic operating cost is revealed
and insiders bargain for wages.
4.3.4 Wage Determination
For simplicity, let the wage wt be the outcome of a Nash bargain between the median insider
and her firm. Our wage bargaining model is analoguous to the median voter model, where the
utility of the median voter is maximized. The firm bargains with a union which maximizes the
utility of the median insider. When the bargaining decision takes place, nobody has been fired
yet. The median insider is the worker who is situated exactly in the middle of the distribution
and who faces no risk of dismissal at the negotiated wage. She has average operating costs
normalized to zero. The wage is renegotiated in each period t.
Under bargaining agreement, the insider receives the wage wt(1− τ t) where τ t is the payroll
tax rate, and has some disutility from regular employment N , and the firm receives the expected
profit
¡
qN − wt
¢
in each period t. Thus the expected present value of the insider’s utility
Et
¡
V It
¢
130 under bargaining agreement is
129This can also be written as −υeUt =
δζηt+1
e¯t
¡
V Nt − V Ut − λt
¡
V At − V Ut
¢¢
. In absence of workfare, for λt = 0
this reduces to −υeUt =
δζηt+1
e¯t
¡
V Nt − V Ut
¢
.
130Please note that V It , the expected present value of utility of an insider, is equal to V Nt , that of an employed
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Et
¡
V It
¢
= υt(wt(1− τ t), 1− N) + δEt
¡¡
1− φt+1
¢
V It+1 + φt+1V
U
t+1
¢
(4.15)
where φt+1 is the firing rate and V Ut+1 the expected present value of a unemployed workers’
returns. The expected present value of firm’s returns under bargaining agreement are
Et (Πt) =
¡
Nq − wt
¢
+ δEt
¡¡
1− φt+1
¢
Πt+1 − φt+1ft+1
¢
(4.16)
where ft are firing costs.
Under disagreement insiders workers go on strike and cause a cost −θft with 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1
to the firm up to short of inducing dismissal,131 and the insider’s fallback income is assumed
for simplicity to be equal to the unemployment benefits bt. Under disagreement the firm (goes
to a secondary, temporary market and) tries to hire temporarily activated workers (in partial
replacement of the workers on strike).132 As it has to search for these workers, hiring of
temporary workers takes place with the probability χ.
Assuming that disagreement in the current period does not aﬀect future returns,133 the
present values of utility under disagreement for the insider are
Et
¡
V 0It
¢
= υt (bt, 1) + δEt
¡¡
1− φt+1
¢
V It+1 + φt+1V
U
t+1
¢
(4.17)
and for the firm are
E
¡
Π0It
¢
= −θft + χ
¡
Aq − bt
¢
+ δEt
¡¡
1− φt+1
¢
ΠIt+1 − φt+1ft+1
¢
. (4.18)
Thus, the insider’s bargaining surplus is
Et
¡
V It
¢
− Et
¡
V 0It
¢
= υt(wt(1− τ t), 1− N)− υt (b, 1) (4.19)
and the firm’s surplus is
Et (Πt)−Et (Π0t) = Nq − wt + θft − χt
¡
At q − bt
¢
(4.20)
The negotiated wage maximizes the Nash product (Λ):
Λt =
¡
υNt (wt(1− τ t), 1− N)− υUt (bt, 1)
¢γ ¡Nq − wt + θft − χ ¡Aq − bt¢¢1−γ , (4.21)
worker, as for simplicity there is no productivity diﬀerential between entrants and insiders.
131This cost may be generated through activities such as picket lines, work-to-rule, sabotage, etc. Employed
workers have an incentive to impose this cost if these activities per se are costless to them (but of course costly
to the firm). The reason is that reducing the firm’s fallback profit raises the bargaining rent, some of which is
captured by the workers. However the incumbent workers have no incentive to drive the firm’s fallback profit
below −ft, for then the firm would find it worthwhile to fire them.
132For this to happen, the following must hold Aq − b > 0.
133Once an agreement has been reached, insiders go back to work and temporarily hired workers, who are in
activation, are fired.
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where γ represents the bargaining strength of the insider relative to the firm, and satisfies:
1 =
υNt,wtγ
¡
Nq − wt + θft − χt
¡
At q − bt
¢¢
(1− γ) (υt(wt(1− τ t), 1− N)− υUt (bt, 1))
(4.22)
4.3.5 Firms’ Hiring and Firing Decisions
First consider the firing rate φt for insiders. An insider is associated with the wage wt and the
firing cost ft. Let the time discount factor be δ. Recalling that the insider’s productivity is
Nq, the expected present value of profit generated by an insider, after the random cost εt at
time t is observed, is134
Et
¡
πIt
¢
=
¡
Nq − wt − εt
¢
+
∞X
i=t+1
δi
Ã
(1− φi)i
¡
Nq − wi −Ei
¡
εi|εi < νIi
¢¢
−φifi(1− φi)i−1
!
, (4.23)
so that
Et
¡
πIt
¢
=
Nq − wt − δφtft − δ (1− φt)Et
¡
εt|εt < νIt
¢
1− δ (1− φt)
− εt.135 (4.24)
The expected incentive to retain the insider
¡
νIt
¢
is defined as the diﬀerence between the
expected goss profit from retaining the insider
µ
Et
¡
πIt
¢
=
Nq−wt−δφtft−δ(1−φt)Et(εt|εt<νIt )
1−δ(1−φt)
¶
136
and the expected profit from firing him (−ft), i.e. this insider retention incentive is
νIt =
Nq − wt + (1− δ) ft − δ (1− φt)Et
¡
εt|εt < νIt
¢
1− δ (1− φt)
(4.25)
An insider is fired in period t when the realized value of the random cost εt is greater than the
insider employment incentive:137 εt > νIt . Since the cumulative distribution of the operating
cost is Γ (εt), the insider’s firing rate is
φt = 1− Γ
¡
νIt
¢
(4.26)
Next consider the hiring rate ηt for unemployed and unemployed, activated workers. The
expected present value of profit generated by an entrant (a worker who has been hired after
being unemployed), after the random cost εt at time t is observed, is
Et
¡
πEt
¢
=
¡
Nq − wt − εt − h
¢
+
∞X
i=t+1
δi
Ã
(1− φi)i
¡
Nq − wi −Ei
¡
εi|εi < νUi
¢¢
−φifi(1− φi)i−1
!
, (4.27)
134In the first period, profit is
¡
qN − wt − εt
¢
; in the second period, the insider is retained with probability
(1− φt) and the insider is fired with a probability of φt and so on.
135Et
¡
εt|εt < νIt
¢
is the expected value of the operating cost conditional on being retained.
136The "gross" profit is expected profit generated by retaining him, without accounting for the operating cost.
137Equivalently, the insider is fired when the profit from retaining the insider is less than the firing
cost
Nq−wt−δφtft−δ(1−φt)Et(εt|εt<νIt )
1−δ(1−φt)
− εt < −ft.
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where h is the hiring cost, so that
Et
¡
πEt
¢
=
Nq − wt − δφtft − δ (1− φt)Et
¡
εt|εt < νUt
¢
1− δ (1− φt)
− εt − h. (4.28)
The expected incentive to hire an entrant
¡
νEt
¢
is defined as the diﬀerence between the
expected gross profit from employing the entrant138 and the expected profit from not doing so
(i.e. zero). Thus the unemployed hiring incentive is
νEt =
Nq − wt − δφtft − δ (1− φt)Et
¡
εt|εt < νUt
¢
1− δ (1− φt)
− h (4.29)
An unemployed worker is hired in period t when the realized value of the random cost εt is
less than the entrant hiring incentive:139 εt < νEt . Thus the hiring rate for unemployed (passive
and activated) is
ηt = Γ
¡
νEt
¢
. (4.30)
4.3.6 Employment, Unemployment and the Labour Market Equilibrium
The change in employment (∆Nt) is the diﬀerence between the outflow from the total un-
employment pool
¡
μUt Ut−1 + μAt At−1
¢
and the outflow from the employment pool (φtNt−1):
∆Nt = μUt Ut−1 + μAt At−1 − φtNt−1. Assuming a constant labour force L and defining the
employment rate to be nt = Nt/Lt, we obtain the following employment dynamics equation:140
nt = μUt ut−1 + μ
A
t at−1 + (1− φt)nt−1 (4.31)
The passive unemployed comprise those workers who were unemployed in the previous period
and who have neither been hired or activated in the current period and those who have been
fired. Thus the passive unemployment dynamics equation is
ut =
¡
1− μUt
¢
(1− αt)ut−1 + φtnt−1 (4.32)
The activated unemployment rate is the diﬀerence between 1 and the aggregate employment
and unemployment rates:
at = 1− nt − ut (4.33)
=
¡
1− μUt
¢
αtut−1 + (1− μAt )at−1.141
138This "gross" profit is the expected profit generated by hiring an unemployed worker, without taking the
operating cost into account.
139Equivalently, the entrant is hired when the profit from employing this worker is greater than than the hiring
cost:
Nq−wt−δφtft−δ(1−φt)Et(εt|εt<νUt )
1−δ(1−φt)
− εt > h.
140Note that ∆nt = μUt (1− nt−1 − at−1) + μAt (1− nt−1 − ut−1)− φtnt−1.
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The labour market equilibrium is the solution of the system comprising
• the employment and unemployment dynamics, eqs. 4.31, 4.32, 4.33,
• the firing and hiring rate as well as the job finding rates, eqs. 4.26, 4.30, 4.5, 4.6,
• the entrant hiring incentive and the insider retention incentive, eqs. 4.29, 4.25,
• the search equations, eqs. 4.13, 4.14, 4.7,
• the negotiated wage, eq. 4.22, and
• the government budget constraint (eq. 4.1).
We now proceed to calibrate the model above for German data and analyze the eﬀectiveness
of Danish flexicurity on unemployment and inequality We will proceed as follows: first, the
calibration, then the numerical results and an intuitive discussion of the policy eﬀects.
4.4 Quantitative Evaluation
In this Section we evaluate the unemployment and inequality eﬀects of implementing the Danish
flexicurity concept in Germany. Our analysis shows that, for reasonable parameter values, the
Danish flexicurity policy has huge incentive eﬀects and sizeable complementarities in terms of
unemployment. For our purpose, we specify particular functional forms for the behavioural
relations above and calibrate the resulting model.
4.4.1 Specification
We start by specifying the functional forms: We assume a logistic distribution for the operating
cost εt, such that the time-invariant cumulative density function is
Γ(νI,Et ) =
Ã
1
1 + e−(ν
I,E
t −E(εt))/s
!
; (4.34)
recall that due to normalisation E (εt) is zero, s is the scale parameter of the distribution. In
line with Andersen and Svarer (2008) and Fredriksson and Holmlund (2006) workers’ utility is
aditively separable as well as logarithmic in consumption and leisure and the function diﬀers
between employed and unemployed (non-activated and activated) workers:
υU,At (c
U,A
t , l
U,A
t ) = ln c
U,A
t + ln l
U,A
t (4.35)
υNt (c
N
t , l
N
t ) = lnxc
N
t + ln l
N
t , (4.36)
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where x > 1 is a non-monetary payoﬀ from employment.142 This yields the wage
wt =
γ
¡¡
N − χtAt
¢
q + θft + χbt
¢
(1− γ) ln(xwt(1−τ t)(1−N )bt ) + γ
. (4.37)
For these functional forms, we now proceed to calibrate the resulting model.
4.4.2 Calibration
The period of analysis is one quarter. The quarterly interest rate r is set to yield a rate of
3% per year, which corresponds to the average money market rate over the last 10 years in
Germany,143 and we set the discount factor to δ = 1
1+r . Hiring costs are set to 60% of quarterly
productivity as used by Mortensen and Pissarides (1999).144
We apply institutional features of the German labour market by calibrating the unemploy-
ment benefit in the steady state to b0 = β0w0(1− τ 0) with a net replacement rate for Germany
of β0 = 0.62145 and quarterly firing costs relative to the wage to f0 = ρ0w0 with ρ0 = 2.4, in line
with yearly values provided by Chen and Funke (2003) and Bentolila and Bertola (1990).146
The unemployment rate is set to the standardized unemployment rate of Germany 2005,
namely 0.095, see OECD (2007). Given this unemployment rate the quarterly job finding rate
μu0 = 32%, taken from Wilke’s (2005) Kaplan-Meier functions for Germany, yields a steady
state firing rate of φ0 =
μu u
n = 3.4%. The free parameter s = 1.68 of the CDF of the operating
costs and ζ = 0.36 are set to match the job finding and the firing rate and generate a long-
run wage elasticity of labour demand, which is within the range of −0.1 and −1.3 found for
Germany, see Riphahn et al. (1999), specifically of −0.86.
Andersen and Svarer (2008) assume that workers spend 60% of their time at work (N). The
relative time use for eﬀort and leisure of employed workers per weekday for Western Europe
from Krueger and Mueller (2008) suggests a value for N of 69%,147 while the relative allocation
in Freeman and Schettkat (2005) points at a value between 61-64%.148 Similiarly, from the
relative time use for eﬀort and leisure of unemployed workers we can determine the eﬀort of
unemployed workers: the analysis of Krueger and Mueller (2008) suggests a value of 10%149
142Thus, the utility of consumption for unemployed diﬀers from that of employed. This can be interpreted
e.g. as the converse of the circumstance that being unemployed negatively aﬀects workers’ subjective well being
(stigmatising eﬀects), see Krueger and Mueller (2008) also for previous research on this topic. Separability
implies that leisure does not depend on current income.
143See Deutsche Bundesbank (2008).
144These costs consist of 30% recruiting and 30% training costs; see Mortensen and Pissarides (1999).
145For simplicity, we took the unweighted average across six family types as well as over the initial period of
unemployment and long-term unemployment for 2005, see OECD (2008).
146Please note that variables and parameters with subscript "0" denote the value at the calibrated steady state
for Germany, i.e. before any flexicurity policy exercise.
147Employed workers spend 395 minutes per weekday on the eﬀort considered here - 395 for work and 0 for
job search - and 179 minutes for leisure and socialising, see Table 3 from Krueger and Mueller (2008). Thus,
employed workers divide their time in 69% eﬀort and 31% leisure.
148Here we compare market work and leisure for women and men, respectively. Western Europe here comprises
Netherlands, Italy and Austria. Freeman and Schettkat (2001) provide values for Germany but do not distinguish
between employed and unemployed.
149Unemployed workers from Western Europe spend 33 minutes on eﬀort - 19 for work and 14 for job search -
and 313 minutes for leisure and socialising, see Table 3 from Krueger and Mueller (2008). Thus, workers divide
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and Freeman and Schettkat (2005) oﬀer values from 11% to 18%.150 In line with these studies
we set N = 65% and eU0 = 15%. These values then yield the value for the utility paramter
of x ≈ 1.84. Furthermore, for simplicity q is normalized to 1 and we use a bargaining power
γ equal to 0.6 which corresponds to the average of the values estimated for union bargaining
power in Germany by Dumont et al. (2006). This in turns determines a value for θ ≈ 0.03. The
resulting elasticity of the wage to firing costs with a value of 0.05 is very conservative compared
to the results from van der Wiel (2008), which suggest a value of 0.1.151
With this calibration our model generates reasonable values for various elasticities which
can be found in the literature: our calibration yields an elasticity of unemployment duration to
unemployment benefits of −0.5, Hornstein et al. (2005) refering to various studies report values
between -0.1 and -1.152 Furthermore, the amplification mechanism of our calibrated model with
an elasticity of unemployment to productivity of approximately −5 is nearer to the data than
e.g. the standard search and matching model.153
Before the policy exercises a tax rate of τ 0 ≈ 0.06 balances the government’s budget.
In the following policy exercise we apply Danish values to the poicy variables: the net
replacement rate will be increased to the Danish level of β1 = 0.69.154 The firing cost parameter
ρ for the policy exercise is set to ρ1 = 0.3, which is suggested by the relative value (50%) of
the employment protection indice of Denmark relative to Germany by the OECD (2004b) for
regular employment as well as by Lazear (1990) in terms of severance pay.155
Andersen and Svarer (2007) point out that unemployed workers receive an activation oﬀer
not later than after 12 months of unemployment, thus we set λ1 = 0.25. Furthermore, we
assume that workfare requirements correspond to the work eﬀort of employed workers, thus,
we set A1 = N = 65% and will assume that the cost of workfare is comparable to the one
applied in Denmark, thus, we choose a cost per activated worker κ1 equal to 2.5% in line with
Andersen and Svarer (2008).156
The only parameter where to the best of our knowledge the literature does not supply any
their time in approximately 1:9 into eﬀort and leisure.
150Again we compare market work and leisure for women and men, respectively.
151Van der Wiel (2008) estimated that the reduction of the period of notice of 3.4 months by one month leads
to a wage reduction of 3%. This suggests an elasticity of 0.1
152Furthermore, our calibrated model implies a wage elasticity to producitvity of 0.43 which matches approx-
imately Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008)’s estimate for the cyclicality of wages of 0.45, though for the US.
153Shimer (2005) shows that while for the U.S. unemployment is 10 times more volatile than productivity, the
search and matching model can only generate a value of 0.5.
154For simplicity, we took the unweighted average across six family types and over the initial period of unem-
ployment and long-term unemployment for 2005, see OECD (2008). Madsen (2007) and Andersen and Svarer
(2007) illustrate that unemployment benefits amount to 90 % of previous earnings but face an absolute ceiling
implying that gross compensation rates decline rapidly with previous income once the limit is reached.
155This value might well be to high: Emerson (1988), Bertola (1990) and Garibaldi (1998) rank Denmark in
terms of employment protection far above Germany near the UK. Bentolila and Bertola (1990) suggest a firing
cost value for the UK which is one third of the value for Germany. Various indices on employment protection
provide ranges for the relative values of firing costs of Denmark from 0% to 80% of the German value: the
World Bank (2008) 0.3 (diﬃculty of firing) or 0 (firing costs); Belot et al. (2007) 0.6 (for regular jobs) and 0.3
(for overall protection); OECD (2004) 0.6 or 0.7 for overall strictness (version 1 or 2); Botero et al. (2004) 0.8
(employment laws index); Garibaldi (1998) 0.4 (strictness of procedural constraints).
156They argue that this corresponds to a cost of workfare in Denmark of around 3% of GDP. They point out
that if the activation results in output, it could be interpreted as the net cost per activated worker.
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estimates is χ which determines the wage eﬀect of workfare. We will set this parameter to
replicate the unemployment rate of Denmark to evaluate the strength of this channel, but we
will provide a robustness analysis. Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 summarize the calibrated parameters,
the values of the variables in the calibrated steady state and the flexicurity policy parameters.
Parameter Description Value
δ discount factor 0.99237
N work eﬀort 0.65
h hiring cost in terms of productivity 0.6
p quarterly productivity 1
r quarterly interest rate 0.0074
s scale parameter of the operating costs distribution 1.68
θ parameter determining the wage eﬀect of firing costs 0.03
ζ job finding rate parameter 0.36
x utility parameter 1.84
β0 net replacement rate 0.62
ρ0 firing cost parameter relative to the wage 2.4
τ 0 tax rate 0.06
Table 4.1: Parameter values.
Variable Description Value
φ0 firing rate 3.4%
μu0 job finding rate 32%
u0 unemaployment rate 9.5%
eU0 search eﬀort 0.15
Table 4.2: Steady state labour market values.
Parameter Description Value
β1 flexicurity net replacement rate 0.69
A1 work eﬀort in workfare 0.65
κ1 cost per activated worker 0.025
λ1 probability of activation 0.25
ρ1 flexicurity firing cost parameter relative to the wage 1.2
χ1 wage eﬀect of workfare parameter 0.4
Table 4.3: Flexicurity policy parameters.
4.4.3 Results and Intuition
As pointed out above we apply policy variables which match the Danish flexicurity approach in
line with Andersen and Svarer (2008). Assuming a probability for a firm of finding an activated
unemployed worker of χ1 = 40% the flexicurity approach of adopting Denmarks’ level of unem-
ployment benefit, employment protection and introducing workfare reduces unemployment by
50%, yielding an unemployment rate of 4.8% which is equal to Denmark’s 2007 unemployment
rate, OECD (2007), and reduces inequality, in terms of the Gini coeﬃcient157 from 3.4% to
157Note that the Gini coeﬃcient generated here is lower than in reality, as our model does not generate income
diﬀerentials, does not distinguish ability groups and does not take non-wage related inequalities into account.
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1.6%; see Table 4.4. In the following we will discuss the single eﬀects and complementarities
leading to these results.
Flexicurity Instrument % Change of Unemployment Gini Coeﬀ.
Workfare Introduction (α1, A1 ) −85% 0.5%
Firing Cost Reduction (ρ1) −16% 2.8%
Unemployment Benefit Increase (β1) 65% 5.4%
Joint eﬀect −50% 1.6%
Table 4.4: Single and joint eﬀects of the flexicurity instruments on unemployment and inequal-
ity.
Single Eﬀects
Reducing Firing Costs
Figure 4.2 displays the eﬀects of reducing the firing costs parameter ρ1.158 Reducing firing
costs reduces the insider retention incentive and increases the outsider hiring incentive and
thereby, increases the firing rate as well as the hiring rate. The resulting direct eﬀect on
unemployment is ambiguous, which is commonly pointed out in the literature, e.g. Nickell
(1997) and Bentolila and Bertola (1990). At the same time lower firing costs though lower
the wage and consequently increase both retention and hiring incentives. This indirect wage
eﬀect of reducing firing costs counterbalances the positive direct eﬀect on the firing rate and
strengthens the positive direct eﬀect on the hiring and thereby on the job finding rate. In our
empirical exercise the indirect eﬀect on the firing rate outweighs the respective direct eﬀect,
thereby the firing rate falls, and this in sum leads to a reduction of the unemployment rate.159
Furthermore, our empircial exercise indicates that a reduction of firing costs induces house-
holds to search more for jobs. The reason is that lower wages lead to a reduction of the reward
for searching for a job, thereby, providing less incentives to search.160 This wage eﬀect out-
weighs the direct positive eﬀect resulting from strategic complementarities, namely households
search more when facing a higher hiring rate and a lower firing rate.
The Gini coeﬃcient is lower with lower firing costs since inequality is reduced directly
through a lower wage and indirectly through lower unemployment.
Increasing Unemployment Benefits
Raising unemployment benefits to the Danish level of a replacement rate of β1 = 0.69 leads
to an increase of unemployment by 65% (see Figure 4.3) and increases inequality to a Gini
coeﬃcient of 5.4%.161
158Recall that f1 = ρ1w0. We reduce ρ for a given calibrated wage of the prepolicy steady state, which is
equivalent to reducing f .
159The stronger eﬀect of lower firing costs on firings relative to hirings is in line with empirical results by Messina
and Valanti (2007) showing that firing costs have stronger eﬀects on job destruction relative to creation.
160This eﬀect is counterbalanced by a lower tax on wages resulting from lower unemployment.
161Recall that b1 = β1w0 (1− τ0). We reduce the net replacement rate β for the calibrated wage w0 and tax
rate τ0 of the prepolicy steady state.
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Figure 4.2: The eﬀects of percentage changes of the firing costs parameter ρ on unemployment
u, firing rate φ, the job finding rate μ, the wage w and search eﬀort U .
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Figure 4.3: The eﬀects of changes in the replacement rate β on unemployment u, firing rate φ,
the job finding rate μ and the wage w.
The eﬀect is straightforwardly due to the resulting higher wage, which reduces firms’ un-
employed hiring incentive and insider retention incentive. Thereby employment falls. At the
same time higher unemployment benefits reduce the reward for searching for a job. This results
since the increase in unemployment benefits and the resulting increase in taxes as well as the
lower hiring and higher firing rates raise the present value of utility of an unemployed worker
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relative to that of an employed worker - despite the wage increase. Thus, workers search less.
Furthermore, increasing unemployment benefits to the Danish level increases inequality
mainly due to higher unemployment which reduces the group receiving the higher income.
Introducing Workfare
As pointed out in the previous Section we introduce the Danish workfare requirements in
line with Andersen and Svarer (2008). Assuming a probability for a firm, whose workers
are on strike, of temporarily employing activated unemployed of χ1 = 40% the introduction
of workfare reduces unemplyoment by 85% and thereby significantly reduces inequality, the
Gini coeﬃcient falls to 0.5%. For an increasing value of A1 Figure 4.4 illustrates the three
eﬀects of workfare, which are also commonly reported in the literature.162 The locking-in eﬀect,
namely that workers’ employment probability is reduced while they are on workfare, since
they have less time to search for a job, is reflected by the decreasing search eﬀort of activated
workers with increasing work eﬀort on workfare. The so-called threat eﬀect, which refers to the
fact that unemployed workers exit unemployment more quickly before being activated, since
remaining in unemployment becomes less attractive relative to employment,163 is revealed by
the increasing search eﬀort of unemployed workers. Furthermore, also employed workers react
to the introduction of workfare - they bargain a lower wage.164
Introducing Workfare
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Figure 4.4: The eﬀects of increasing workfare eﬀort A with λ = 0.25 on wage and search eﬀort
of the unemployed and the activated, reflecting wage, threat and locking-in eﬀect, respectively.
162See Andersen and Svarer (2007), (2008). The following results are in line with Andersen and Svarer (2008).
163See Svarer (2007) and Rosholm and Svarer (2008) for empirical analyses of the threat eﬀect.
164We assume that the active labour market policy (ALMP) is represented by workfare and this instrument
does not have any eﬀect on workers’s productivity. Thus, our model does not take the post-programme eﬀect
into account. This eﬀect refers to the better employment probability after having taken part in the ALMP.
By omitting this positive eﬀect, we bias our analysis against ALMP. The model adopted here could easily be
extended to incorporate other instruments.
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The reason for the reduction in the negotiated wage lies in the fact that firms whose workers
are on strike draw back on activated workers. Clearly, via the wage reduction, the introduction
of workfare raises firms’ unemployed hiring incentive and insider retention incentive. Thereby
due to workfare indirectly more workers are hired and less fired and thus, employment falls.
Since to the best of our knowledge the empirical literature does not supply any estimates
for χ (wage eﬀect of workfare), in Table 4.5 we provide the unemployment and inequality
results for alternative values of this parameter. The weaker the wage eﬀect the weaker is the
unemployment reducing eﬀect of this policy as well as of the full set of flexicurity policies. Since
according to Andersen and Svarer (2007) the wage eﬀect is one of the the dominant channels
of workfare, the value adopted for χ seems reasonable.
Eﬀect of
Workfare Flexicurity
χ- Value on Unemployment on Inequality on Unemployment on Inequality
0.1 −26% 2.5 16 3.8
0.2 −50% 1.7 −13% 3.1
0.3 −70% 1 −29% 2.3
0.4 −85% 0.5 −50% 1.6
0.5 −94% .2 −68% 1.0
0.6 −98% 0.1 −82% 0.6
Table 4.5: The unemployment and inequality eﬀects of workfare and the full set of flexicurity
policies for various values of the wage eﬀect of workfare.
The direct eﬀect of workfare on the household side is the relative increase of the reward for
seeking a job for all unemployed, especially for the activated as illustrated in Figure 4.5.
Effect of Workfare Effort on the Reward for Seeking a Job
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Figure 4.5: The eﬀect of increasing workfare eﬀort on the reward for seeking a job for passive
and activated unemployed workers in comparison to the reward in absense of workfare.
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The higher reward amplified by a higher hiring rate as in eqs. 4.13, 4.14 leads to a reduction
of leisure time. This increased eﬀort though only translates into higher search eﬀort for the not
yet activated unemployed workers (threat eﬀect), since the activated workers need to incur work
eﬀort on workfare, in line with our specification of the utility function and calibration, they
have less time to search for a job (locking-in eﬀect). This locking-in eﬀect manifests itself via eq.
4.6, whereby the relatively less hard a worker searches for a job the respectively lower will be
his job finding rate. Thereby, while the hiring rate increases, only unemployed, non-activated
workers’ job finding rate rises, the job finding rate for activated workers falls, in despite of a
much higher reward for seeking a job because they search less than the not activated workers.
Despite of the cost of workfare, the tax rate falls since employment increase and unemploy-
ment decreases.
Joint Eﬀects and Complementarities
As can be seen from Table 4.4, the flexicurity group of labour market policies we are con-
sidering here are complementary for Germany in the sense that the unemployment eﬀect of
each policy is greater when implemented in conjunction with the other policies than in isola-
tion (Coe and Snower, 1997), or in other words the eﬀectiveness of one policy depends on the
implementation of other policies (Orszag and Snower, 1998).165 As pointed out be Coe and
Snower, who analyzed policy complementarities in a static world, a wide range of labour mar-
ket institutions have complementary eﬀects on unemployment and thus, labour market policies
targeted at reforming these institutions are also complementary.
The three flexicurity instruments have some apparent complementarities. Implementing the
three instruments jointly leads to a percentage reduction of unemployment which is 39% (size
of the complementarity in %) higher than summing up the respective single eﬀects.166
Policy Sum of Single Effects Joint Effect Complementarity
Flexicurity −36% −50% 39%
Workfare (1,1A) and Higher Benefits (1) −20% −36% 83%
Lower Firing Costs (1) and Higher Benefits (1) 49% 38% 22%
Workfare (1,1A) and Lower Firing Costs (1) −100% −90% −10%
Table 4.6: Unemployment eﬀects of various combinations of the flexicurity instruments.
Table 4.6 illustrates the unemployment eﬀects of the flexicurity policies as well as pairwise
combinations of the three policies. The strongest economic complementarities in reducing
unemployment are generated by the joint implementation of higher unemployment benefits
and the introduction of workfare. Flexible firing rules and workfare are not complementary at
165Formally presented by Coe and Snower (1997) as follows: a set of policy instruments xi, i = 1, ..., n, has
complementary eﬀects on a policy objective y when ∂
2y
∂xi∂xj
> 0 for i 6= j.
166We measure the size of the complementarity in percentage terms as Oskamp and Snower (2008), as the rela-
tive diﬀerence between the joint eﬀect and the sum of the single eﬀects of the set of policies under consideration.
In other words the percentage reduction in the total unemployment rate is 14 percentage points higher.
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all, while flexible firing rules and higher unemployment benefits are. In the following we will
discuss these complementarities generated by the policies.
Increasing Unemployment Benefits and Reducing Firing Costs
As pointed out above higher unemployment benefits increase the unemployment rate, but
implementing them with lower firing costs jointly increases the unemployment rate by less
than when implementing them separately. Thus, for the above calibrated model for Germany
these two policies are complementary in terms of reducing unemployment. This implies that a
reduction of firing costs has a bigger employment eﬀect if unemployment benefits are high. The
reasons is the following: high firing costs and high unemployment benefits give leverage to each
other. Higher unemployment benefits reduce firms’ hiring and retention incentives and thereby,
leverage the eﬀect of firing costs in reducing these incentives. This interaction also holds vice
versa, while firing costs reduce firms’ hiring incentives, they thereby magnify the weakening
of the reward for seeking a job. Thereby, the postive impact on unemployment of increasing
the replacement rate when firing costs are high - due to the high leverage eﬀect - can not be
compensated by the negative impact of reducing firing costs when replacement rates are low.
The joint implementation of low firing costs and a high replacement rate avoids this leverage
eﬀect.167
Increasing Unemployment Benefits and Introducing Workfare
The strongest complementarity is reached when higher unemployment benefits and workfare
requirements are implemented jointly.
The joint introduction of these two policies couldn be justified by the concept of political
complementarities, see Orszag and Snower (1998), which arise when the ability to gain voters’
approval for a policy depends on the implementation of another policy. Similarily, Andersen
and Svarer (2007) illustrate that the strong egalitarian foundations of the Danish welfare system
ruled out general reductions in unemployment benefits to strengthen incentives.
On the economic side one could expect a reduction of unemployment benefits and workfare
instruments to be equivalent from an utility perspective and thereby, make a distinction unnec-
essary. But as pointed out be Andersen and Svarer (2008), the labour market eﬀects of these
two policies are distinct and will diﬀer across the three groups of workers, namley employed,
unemployed and activated. This is so for several reasons. First, employed workers’ contem-
poraneous (consumption) utility is aﬀected by both policies - in both cases indirectly via the
wage. But while a reduction in benefits has the same eﬀect on unemployed and activated work-
ers, this is not the case for workfare policies. The reason is that workfare has no direct eﬀect
on the instantaneous utility of the unemployed, but on the activated workers’. Furthermore,
benefit changes and workfare requirements aﬀect search incentives diﬀerently. The reason is
167Alternatively, one can argument via the tax-benefit multiplicator: since all workers behave the same and
reduce their search eﬀort due to a rise in unemployment benefits, their behaviour does not aﬀect their job
finding probability and the only channel through which the unemployment benefits changes unemployment is
via the wage. A benefit increase implies a higher tax rate, which raises the wage even more and leads to higher
unemployment, which in turn necessitates a higher tax rate and so on. A reduction of the firing costs weakens
this tax-benefit multiplicator, via its employment enhancing eﬀect it reduces the tax rate.
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that workfare requirements aﬀect the marginal cost of search directly, whereas benefits have an
eﬀect via an income eﬀect.
The strong complementarity is based on these eﬀects of the two instruments. Analogous to
the above joint implementation of reduced firing costs and increased unemployment benefits, an
introduction of workfare requirements has much stronger eﬀects when the disincentive eﬀects
due to unemployment benefits are high. While the disincentive eﬀects are the same, workfare
has much stronger eﬀects on unemployment than the flexible firing rules, thereby also the
complementarity is stronger.
Reducing Firing Costs and Introducing Workfare
While being powerfull tools to reduce unemployment, clearly, flexible firing rules and workfare
requirements are weak substitutes in this respect, since the reduction of unemployment is
reduced by 10% if both instruments are implemented jointly compared to summing up the
single eﬀects. As pointed out above, these policies have stronger eﬀects when the disincentive
for workers and firms to match are high. Since workfare has strong eﬀects on unemployment
and increases firms’ and workers’ incentive eﬀects, a reduction of firing cost does not contribute
to the reduction of unemployment as it would do in the absence of workfare.
Flexicurity
As illustrated above the unemployment eﬀect of the joint implementation of the three flex-
icurtiy instruments for Germany implies a complementarity of these instruments of 39%. To
understand how this complementarity of all three instruments can be rationalized it is useful
to compare their unemployment eﬀect with the sums of the eﬀects of the pairwise joint imple-
mentation and the respective single third instrument, as presented in Table 4.7:
Policy Joint Eﬀect
Flexicurity (α1, A1 , β1 and ρ1) −50%
Sum of Pairwise and Single Eﬀects
Workfare and Higher Benefits (α1, A1 and β1) + Lower Firing Costs (ρ1) −52%
Lower Firing Costs and Higher Benefits (ρ1 and β1) + Workfare (α1, A1 ) −47%
Workfare and Lower Firing Costs (α1, A1 and ρ1) + Higher Benefits (β1) −25%
Table 4.7: Unemployment eﬀects of various joint implementations of flexicurity instruments.
These results underline our previous argumentation. First, the sum of the eﬀects of the
pairwise implementation of workfare and high unemployment benefits (α1, A1 and β1) and the
single eﬀects of a reduction of firing costs (ρ1) is greater than the eﬀect of flexicurity, since the
former includes the high complementarity between workfare and high unemployment benefits
but not the substitutability between workfare and the firing cost reduction. Second, flexicurity
has a stronger eﬀect on unemployment than the sum of the combination of low firing costs and
high benefits, which implies only a weak complementarity, together with workfare. Third, the
combination of the pairwise introduction of workfare and lower firing costs (α1, A1 and ρ1) and
77
the single implementation of higher unemployment benefits has a much smaller unemployment
mitigation eﬀect since it only takes into account the substitutability between the former two
instruments
Finally, our analysis replicates the Danish experience,168 whereby the workfare component
is the decisive element in generating the economic eﬀectiveness of the flexicurity policy.
4.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter analyzes the channels and complementarities of the Danish flexicurity concept in
reducing unemployment and inequality. We perform the experiment of implementing Danish
flexicurity in Germany using a calibrated, microfounded model, which is derived from the
agents’ labour market incentives.
This policy experiment replicates the Danish miracle in Germany and illustrates the strong
complementarities of nearly 40% underlying the Danish flexicurity concept when implemented
in Germany. Furthermore, our results emphasize the strong role of workfare policies in setting
employment incentives right.
Our results underline the need for fundamental labour market reforms with a set of broad
and deep policies which imply strong economic complementarities and at the same time en-
compass political complementarities by taking distributional objectives into account thereby
facilitating the consent for implementing the reforms.
The flexicurity policy enables firms to adapt to the global market, supports workers and
at the same time enhances their adaptability, which is strongly required in the new wave of
globalisation.169 Thereby, this reform policy with a focus on employment security is a viable
and option for Germany which tends to emphasize income and job security.
168See Andersen and Svarer (2007) and (2008).
169See Snower et al. (2009).
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5 An Incentive Theory of Matching
5.1 Introduction
The literature on search and matching in the labour market rests heavily on the assumption of
a stable matching function (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994). According to Pissarides (2000,
p. 3-4), the matching function aims to summarize “heterogeneities, frictions and information
imperfections” and represent “the implications of the costly trading process without the need
to make the heterogeneities and the other features that give rise to it explicit.” Various authors
(e.g. Lagos, 2000) have noted that policies which aﬀect labour market heterogeneities (e.g.
retraining programs), frictions (e.g. job counselling) and information imperfections (e.g. job
exchanges) may naturally be expected to influence the matching function. In short, there is no
reason to believe that the matching function is invariant with respect to labour market policies
that are designed to improve the matching process.170
This chapter171 provides a simple analytical framework that makes the above heterogeneities
and frictions explicit, and describes the matching process as the outcome of optimizing behav-
iour by firms and workers. Our analysis thereby obviates the need for a matching function to
capture the above heterogeneities and frictions.172 In this context, we show that, in general,
the matching process is indeed aﬀected by labour market policies, as well as a variety of labour
and macroeconomic shocks. This calls into question the usefulness of matching functions for
policy analysis and prediction. In short, the matching function runs afoul of the Lucas critique.
We present two simple models of heterogeneous variations in the characteristics of workers
and jobs, combined with adjustment costs in responding to these variations. In this context,
we derive the job oﬀer and firing decisions of firms and the job acceptance and quit decisions
of workers, and show how these decisions generate labour market matches and separations.
Needless to say, we make no attempt to be comprehensive in covering the wide variety of
frictions that are prevalent in labour markets, but we believe that our analysis is suﬃcient to
clarify a general modeling strategy for moving beyond the matching function. Our analysis
may be called an incentive theory of matching, since it explains the microeconomic decisions
relevant to the matching process in terms of the incentives that economic agents face.
We calibrate our incentive model for the U.S. economy and show that it can account for some
important empirical regularities that the conventional matching model cannot. First, our model
generates labour market volatilities that are close to what can be found in the empirical data,
specifically for the unemployment rate, the job finding rate and the separation rate. This is
remarkable, as we do not rely on any type of real wage rigidity. Instead, our calibration permits
us to replicate the stylized fact that wages are as volatile as productivity (see, for example,
170Several empirical studies indicate instabilities of the matching function. Very often a negative time trend
is found when estimating the search and matching function, thus casting doubt on the stability through time
(Blanchard and Diamond, 1989, for the United States, and Fahr and Sunde, 2001, 2004, for Germany).
171For a diﬀerent verison of this chapter see Brown et al. (2009).
172As shown in the Appendix 5.A.1, the matching function may remain useful to capture information imper-
fections regarding workers and jobs that, on the basis of the imperfect information, appear homogeneous to the
searchers.
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Hornstein et al., 2005). The standard calibration of the conventional matching model173 is
unable to generate these high volatilities of labour market variables (see Shimer, 2005). Second,
it generates a strong negative correlation between the job finding rate and the unemployment
rate. And third, it can account for a strong negative correlation between job creation and job
destruction. The standard calibrations of the matching model, with endogenous job destruction
(see Krause and Lubik, 2007), cannot account for these last two stylized facts.174
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 covers the conceptual issues
underlying our approach to matching. Section 3 sets the stage by presenting a particularly
simple and transparent incentive model of matching. Section 4 presents an extended incentive
model. Section 5 discusses the calibration strategy. Section 6 presents the numerical results
and Section 7 concludes.
5.2 Conceptual Issues
It is convenient to think about the coexistence of unemployed workers alongside unfilled jobs in
terms of heterogeneities and imperfect information. In the presence of heterogeneous workers
and jobs, some workers are oﬀered employment because they are suﬃciently profitable; others
remain unemployed because they are insuﬃciently profitable. These diﬀerences may arise since
workers diﬀer in terms of their productivities at various jobs, their costs of being identified as
searching and employable, their relocation and training costs, etc. In the same vein, some job
oﬀers are accepted because they oﬀer suﬃcient remuneration; others are rejected because they
are not suﬃciently remunerative. These diﬀerences may exist because jobs diﬀer in terms of
job productivities associated with various workers, costs of being identified as vacant, etc.
In the presence of imperfect information, jobs that are in fact heterogeneous may look ho-
mogeneous to a searching worker, who then may choose randomly among these jobs. Similarly,
workers that are in fact heterogeneous may look homogeneous to a searching firm, leading the
firm to make a random choice among these workers. (In addition, of course, there is also random
choice among jobs and workers that are in fact homogeneous.)
The matching function is an analytic device that is meant to capture both the heterogeneities
and the imperfect information. As aptly noted by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001, p. 390):
“The attraction of the matching function is that it enables the modeling of frictions in otherwise
conventional models, with a minimum of added complexity. Frictions derive from information
imperfections about potential trading partners, heterogeneities..."
The heterogeneities are particularly important in accounting for unemployed workers along-
173The “standard” calibration of the model excludes rigid wages and small surplus calibrations. Although the
rigid wage version of the search and matching model can also generate higher volatilities (Hall, 2005), it implies
that counterfactual prediction that wages are acyclical. Thus we do not make this assumption here. We also
do not rely on Hagedorn and Manvoskii’s (2008) small surplus calibration, in which the average unemployed
worker is basically indiﬀerent between working and not working. In the calibrated version of our model, the
current period’s utility of an average unemployed is only about 60% of the utility of an employed.
174The search and matching model with exogenous job destruction actually has a strong negative correlation
between the job finding rate and the unemployment (see Shimer, 2005). However, there is an intensive debate
in the literature whether separations are exogenous or not (see, for example, Hall, 2006, and Fujita and Ramey,
2009, for opposing views). Separations are endogenous in our analysis.
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side unfilled jobs. In practice, workers are rarely indistinguishable in terms of all the character-
istics relevant for job acquisition and thus firms are rarely in a position of choosing randomly
among interchangeable workers. Similarly, workers are rarely in a position of choosing randomly
among interchangeable jobs. Often firms and workers draw on a store of prior information, so
that their objects of choice are heterogeneous. Of course firms and workers also assemble op-
portunities blindly — as when they place and read advertisements — but these activities are
usually far less costly than the subsequent ones of choosing among heterogeneous options. So
if the matching function is to capture the costly process of labour market choice "without the
need to make the heterogeneities ... explicit" (Pissarides, 2000, p.4), then it is important that
it be able to capture matching behaviour among heterogeneous agents.
This chapter focuses on these heterogeneities. We examine whether a stable matching
function can reproduce the behaviour of optimizing agents among heterogeneous options. We
do not dispute that a matching function may be appropriate in describing the outcome of
choices among options that look homogeneous, due to imperfect information. What is at issue
is whether it can describe heterogeneous choice. On this account, we present choice-theoretic
models of hiring and job acceptance, as well as firing and quits, for heterogeneous workers and
jobs.175
Shimer (2007, p. 1074) makes an insightful distinction between search and mismatch: “Ac-
cording to search theory, unemployed workers have left their old jobs and are actively searching
for a new employer. In contrast, this dynamic model of mismatch emphasizes that unemployed
workers are attached to an occupation and a geographic location in which jobs are currently
scarce. Mismatch is a theory of former steel workers remaining near a closed plant in the hope
that it reopens. Search ... is a theory of former steel workers moving to a new city to look
for positions as nurses.” While this distinction is undoubtedly important, it is worth emphasiz-
ing that adjustment costs are responsible for both mismatch and search. The reason that the
former steel workers remain near the closed plant is that the cost of adjusting to another job
(net of the expected benefits) is greater than the cost of waiting for the plant to open (again
net of the expected benefits). Moreover, if the former steel workers can’t find jobs as nurses
despite the existence of nursing vacancies, then the reason is that either it was too costly for
the workers to find the available vacancies or it was too costly for the employers to find the
available workers. So, under both mismatch and search, unemployed workers and vacancies
coexist because it is too costly to fill the vacancies with the unemployed workers. Otherwise,
obviously, the match would have been made. Under mismatch, the costs are frequently large
and persistent, whereas under search they are often small and transient; but the fact remains
that adjustment costs are responsible for the friction in both cases.
We investigate the role of these adjustment costs as a source of labour market frictions. The
adjustment costs of course come in many guises. Some are costs of geographic and occupational
mobility (as in Shimer’s analysis); others are costs of obtaining the relevant information (the
175In the Appendix 5.A.1, we present a model of both heterogeneous choice as well as choice among agents who
appear homogeneous, combining our analysis (dealing with heterogeneities) with a matching function analysis
(dealing with random choice among homogeneous agents).
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standard search costs, e.g. costs of advertising, monitoring, screening).
While various other authors have modeled the matching process without resorting to a
matching function (e.g. Hall, 1977, Lagos, 2000, Shimer, 2007, and others), our analysis explic-
itly focuses on two-sided search (i.e. search by both workers and firms at the same time) and an
optimizing framework that replaces the matching function. Due to our focus on heterogeneities
and adjustment costs, it is not necessary for our analysis to make a sharp distinction between
search and mismatch. Our analysis is meant to cover both phenomena, depending on how we
choose to interpret the nature of the heterogeneities and adjustment costs. In this context, as
noted above, we show that our analysis can explain various stylized facts that are not accounted
for in the convential search and matching literature.
5.3 A Simple Model
To set the stage, we begin by constructing a particularly simple model of the incentive theory of
matching, based on heterogeneous jobs and workers. Our model has the following sequence of
labour market decisions. First, the realized values of the shocks are revealed. Second, the firms
make their hiring and firing decisions and the households make their job acceptance and refusal
decisions, taking the wage as given. Unemployed workers search for jobs; employed workers do
not.
For simplicity, we will not consider vacancies in our model. While it is of course possible to
include them (as shown in the Appendix 5.A.1), doing so would complicate our analysis without
amplifying the basic point of this chapter, namely, to describe the matching process without
need for a matching function, which is vulnerable to the Lucas critique. Beyond that, it is worth
noting that vacancy data is the Achilles’ heal of conventional empirical matching models. For
long time series, we have only a very rough proxy for U.S. vacancies, namely, the Conference
Board help-wanted advertising index, measuring the number of help-wanted ads in 51 major
newspapers. Over the past decade, this index shows a clear downward trend (adjusting for the
business cycle), which may well be due to internet advertising. Although an internet advertising
index exists, it is far from clear how this index can be made comparable to the newspaper index.
Moreover, while the Conference Board advertising index and the JOLTS survey on vacanices
exhibit similar dynamics for the limited sample periods in which comparable data sets are
available (Shimer, 2005), it appears, surprisingly, that the number of vacancies (as defined by the
JOLTS survey) is consistently and substantially smaller than the number of new hires! There
are two obvious reasons why this should be so, both highlighting weakenesses of vacancies data:
(i) Only a fraction of the jobs that get filled are preceded by vacancy postings. (The matching
function has nothing to say about the many hires that occur without formal advertising.)
(ii) The JOLTS survey, like all other surveys, ignores high-frequency vacancy movements. In
particular, JOLTS measures end-of-month reported job openings, not job openings that get
filled before the month is over. Overall, such considerations indicate that vacancy data is much
less reliable than the other data (e.g. unemployment rates, productivity) used in conventional
empirical matching models. On account of this as well as analytical simplicity, our incentive
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model will not cover vacancies.
To keep our analysis as simple as possible, we assume in this Section that the real wage w is
exogenously given. This assumption is relaxed in the next Section, where wages are determined
through bargaining. Our basic result concerning the stability of the matching function, however,
can be derived straightforwardly under an exogenous wage.
Furthermore, to provide a maximally transparent comparison of our incentive model and
the standard matching model, we assume that workers and firms are myopic (i.e. their rates of
time discount are 100%). This assumption is also relaxed in the next Section.
5.3.1 The Firm’s Behavior
We assume that the profit generated by a particular worker at a particular job is subject to
a random shock ε, which is meant to capture idiosyncratic variations in workers’ suitability
for the available jobs. For example, workers in a particular skill group and sector may ex-
hibit heterogeneous profitabilities due to random variations in their state of health, levels of
concentration, and mobility costs, or to random variations in firms’ operating costs, screening,
training, and monitoring costs, and so on. In short, the random shock ε is a short-hand for
workplace heterogeneities. It is positive and iid across workers, with a stable probability density
function Gε (ε), known to the firm.176 Let the corresponding cumulative distribution be Cε (ε).
The period of analysis is equal to the period between successive realizations of ε.
The average productivity of each worker is a, a positive constant. The hiring cost h per
worker is a constant. The profit generated by an entrant (a newly hired worker) is
πE = a− ε− w − h, (5.1)
where the superscript “E” stands for “entrant” and w is the real wage.
The firm’s “job oﬀer incentive” (its payoﬀ from hiring a worker) is the diﬀerence between its
gross profit177 from hiring an entrant worker (a− w − h) and its profit from not doing (namely,
zero):
νE = a− w − h. (5.2)
The firm oﬀers this job to a worker whenever that worker generates positive profit: ε < νE.
Thus the job oﬀer rate is
η = Cε
¡
νE
¢
. (5.3)
The firm’s “retention incentive” (its payoﬀ from retaining a worker) is the diﬀerence between
its gross profit from retaining a worker is (a− w) and the (negative) profit from firing that
worker:
νI = a− w + f , (5.4)
176Our analysis can of course be extended straightforwardly to shocks with AR and MA components. For
mobility costs, the shocks are often serially correlated in practice.
177This "gross" profit is the expected profit generated by hiring an unemployed worker, without taking the
operating cost into account.
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where the superscript “I” stands for the incumbent employee who has been retained, and f is
the firing cost per worker, assumed constant. The firm with a filled job will fire an incumbent
worker whenever she generates negative profit: ε > νI . Thus the firing rate is:
φ = 1− Cε
¡
νI
¢
. (5.5)
Note that due to the hiring and firing costs, the retention incentive exceeds the job oﬀer incentive
(νI > νE) and thus the retention rate exceeds the job oﬀer rate ((1− φ) > η).
5.3.2 The Worker’s Behavior
The worker faces a discrete choice of whether or not to work. If she works, her disutility
of work eﬀort is e, which is a random variable, which is iid, with a stable probability density
function Ge (e), known to the worker. The corresponding cumulative distribution is Ce (e). The
random variable captures heterogeneities in the disagreeability of work, due to such factors as
temporary variations in health, moods, idiosyncratic reactions to particular workplaces, and
personal circumstances. If the worker does not work, her utility is b (a constant). Her utility
is linear in consumption and work eﬀort.178 She consumes all her income. Thus the utility of
an employed worker is V N = w − e, and the utility of an unemployed worker is V U = b.
A worker’s “work incentive” (her payoﬀ from choosing to work) is the diﬀerence between
her gross utility from working (w) and her utility from not working (b):
ι = (w − b) . (5.6)
Assuming that w > b and letting E (e) = 0, all unemployed workers have an ex ante incentive
to seek work.
An unemployed worker will accept a job oﬀer whenever e < ι. This means that the job
acceptance rate is
α = Ce (ι) . (5.7)
Along the same lines, an employed worker will decide to quit when e > ι. This means that
the quit rate is
χ = 1− Ce (ι) . (5.8)
Note that, for simplicity, we have assumed that the job acceptance rate is identical to the job
retention rate (α = 1− χ). When unemployed workers face costs of adjusting to employment
(e.g. buying a car to get to work, or psychic costs of changing one’s daily routine) or when
employed workers face costs of adjusting to unemployment (e.g. building networks of friends
with potential job contacts, psychic costs of adjusting to joblessness), then the job acceptance
rate would fall short of the job retention rate.179
178Observe that on the firm’s side, we distinguish between entrants (E) and incumbent workers (I); whereas
on the workers’ side, we distinguish between employed (N) and unemployed (U) workers. The rationale for these
two distinctions is that the firm can hire two types of workers (entrants and incumbents), whereas the worker
can be in two states (employment and unemployment).
179Specifically, for example, the unemployed worker’s job acceptance incentive could be expressed as ιU =
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5.3.3 Employment
An unemployed worker gets a job when two conditions are fulfilled: (i) she receives a job oﬀer
and (ii) she accepts that oﬀer. Thus the match probability (μ) is the product of the job oﬀer
rate (η) and the job acceptance rate (α):
μ = ηα. (5.9)
Consequently the number of unemployed workers who get jobs in period t is μU−1, where U−1
is the number of unemployed in the previous period.180
An employee separates from her job when at least one of two conditions is satisfied: (i) she
is fired or (ii) she quits. Thus the separation probability is
σ = φ+ χ− φχ. (5.10)
This implies that the number of employed who separate from their jobs in period t is σN−1,
where N−1 is the number of employed in the previous period.
The change in employment is ∆N = N − N−1 = μU−1 − σN−1. The labour force L is
assumed constant. Thus U = L−N and employment may be described by
N = μU−1 + (1− σ)N−1 = μL+ (1− μ− σ)N−1. (5.11)
Expressing the equation in terms of the employment rate, n = N/L, yields the following
employment equation:
n = μ+ (1− μ− σ)n−1. (5.12)
(Although we have not included vacancies in our model - since doing so would complicate
our analysis without contributing substantially to our main message - the Appendix 5.A.1 shows
how that can be incorporated straightforwardly into our analysis.)
5.3.4 The Matching-Function Representation
We now juxtapose the model above with its matching-function counterpart in order to inves-
tigate the stability of the matching function. For this purpose, let us assume that the model
above describes the real world, and then let us ask whether the behaviour of this model can
be replicated by a corresponding model containing a matching function. We will show that
such replication cannot occur unless the matching function changes whenever the underlying
parameters of the model change. These parameter changes include macroeconomic variables
(such as productivity, a) and policy variables (such as unemployment benefits, underlying the
parameter b). Thus, in this analytical context, the matching function runs afoul of the Lucas
w−b−ξU , where ξU is the cost of adjusting to employment, and the incumbent worker’s job retention incentive
could be expressed as ιN = w − b + ξN , where ξN is the cost of adjusting to unemployment. Then the job
acceptance rate becomes α = Ce
¡
ιU
¢
, the job retention rate becomes Ce
¡
ιN
¢
so that the quit rate becomes
χ = 1− Ce
¡
ιN
¢
.
180All other variables (without subscripts) refer to the current period.
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critique: policy analysis and comparative static prediction on the basis of a stable matching
function would yield misleading results.
Naturally, the incentive model above is extremely simple, but it is precisely this simplicity
that allows us to bring the Lucas critique of the matching function into sharp relief. Needless
to say, the same critique can be formulated with respect to more complicated models (such as
the one in the next Section), since the underlying idea is quite general: For any given matching
function - specified independently of the optimizing decisions relevant to the matching process
- it is always possible to construct a microfounded macro model that systematically fools this
matching function. In this sense, the diﬃculty of the matching functions is analogous to that of
expectation-generating mechanisms in traditional macro models that were incompatible with
rational expectations.
Let the matching function be
x = x (u, v) , (5.13)
where u is the unemployment rate and v is the vacancy rate (number of vacant jobs relative
to the labour force). This function satisfies the standard conditions: xi > 0, xii < 0, i = u, v;
x (u, 0) = x (0, v) = 0; and there are constant returns to scale: gx (u, v) = x (gu, gv) where g is
a positive constant.
Let θ = v/u denote labour market tightness, so that q (θ) = x (u/v, 1) is the probability
that a job is matched with a worker, and θq (θ) is the probability that a worker is matched by
a job. Along the lines of the simple labour market matching models, we assume that jobs are
destroyed at an exogenous rate λ, 0 < λ < 1. Then the change in the employment rate is181
∆n = θq (θ) (1− n−1)− λn−1, implying the following employment dynamics equation:
n = θq (θ) + (1− θq (θ)− λ)n−1. (5.14)
Vacancies are posted until the expected profit is reduced to zero: a−w = κq(θ) , where κ is a
vacancy posting cost, κ/q (θ) is the expected vacancy posting cost per worker. Expressing this
zero-profit condition in terms of labour market tightness:
θ = g
µ
κ
a− w
¶
, (5.15)
where g = q−1.
The equilibrium employment rate n is obtained by substituting the zero-profit condition
(5.15) into the employment dynamics equation (5.14).
5.3.5 Equivalence Conditions
In order for the two models to be comparable, let the exogenous wage w be identical in both
models and suppose that the separation rate σ in the incentive model is a constant equal
181To keep this model comparable with our the simple incentive model above, we assume (without loss of
generality) the same timing in both models. Matches are not destroyed in the match period and they become
immediately productive.
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to the job destruction rate λ in the conventional matching model. Then the two models are
observationally equivalent when θq (θ) + (1− θq (θ)− σ)nt−1 = μ+ (1− μ− σ)nt−1, so that
θq (θ) = μ, (5.16)
which we call the “equivalence condition.” By implication,
κ
a− wg
µ
κ
a− w
¶
= Cε (a− w − h)Ce (w − b) . (5.17)
Diﬀerentiating with respect to b,
0 = −Cε (a− w − h)C 0e (w − b) . (5.18)
Furthermore, diﬀerentiating with respect to productivity a yields:
− κ
(a− w)2
µ
κ
a− wg
0
µ
κ
a− w
¶
+ g
µ
κ
a− w
¶¶
= C 0ε (a− w − h)Ce (w − b) . (5.19)
Condition (5.18) holds only when the slope of the cumulative distribution is C 0e (w − b) = 0,
which implies that the underlying density isGe = 0. This occurs when there exist no households
with a marginal disutility of eﬀort e over the relevant range. (It is on this account that the
number of households that accept jobs is not aﬀected by (w − b) .) A distribution of e with zero
mass is indeed a special case; it amounts to excluding the possibility of heterogeneous workers
in our model.
Condition (5.19) can only hold by accident; in general, this condition is not met. Alter-
natively, it is clear that for any change in one or more of the parameters (a,w, κ, h, b), that
matching function (and thus the g function) needs to change in order to ensure that condition
(5.19) holds.
By assumption, the matching function is a shorthand for heterogeneities and frictions ad-
dressed explicitly in the incentive model of matching. It is a useful shorthand if it can be shown
that it is observationally equivalent to the explicit model of the underlying heterogeneities and
frictions, so that it is stable with respect to the macroeconomic and policy variables whose
eﬀects the matching model aims to analyze (to avoid the Lucas critique).
The comparison above indicates that these two conditions are not satisfied. The standard
matching model cannot reproduce the labour market dynamics of the incentive model above.
This non-equivalence is not a special case to be ascribed to the particular specification of the
incentive model. It is easy to see that the reasoning above is applicable to a broad family of
models.
The source of the non-equivalence is analogous to the non-equivalence of adaptive-expectations
and rational-expectatons macro models. Adaptive-expectations models were unable to repro-
duce the dynamics of rational-expectations models because, for any given function specifying
adaptive expectations, it is always possible to find a hypothetically “true” stochastic generating
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process which produces predictable errors, that is, errors not reconcilable with rational expec-
tations. Along the same lines, the comparison above makes clear that for any given matching
function, it is always possible to find a hypothetically “true” model of the underlying het-
erogeneities and frictions which produces labour market dynamics that cannot be replicated
through the matching function. Just as an expectations generating mechanism that is specified
a priori (independently of the underlying macro model) is not a reliable tool for investigating
the influence of macro policy, so a matching function that is specified a priori is also not a
reliable tool to explore the influence of labour market policy. The same can be said regarding
the influence of other macro and labour parameters.
Alternatively, we can say that the matching function is not stable with respect to the
parameters whose influence the matching models are meant to analyze. If the incentive model
above is assumed to be the “true” model of the labour market, then the standard matching
model can reproduce the “true” employment eﬀects of variations in all the relevant parameters
- the wage w, productivity a, the hiring cost h, or the leisure utility b - only if we assume that
the matching function is modified whenever these parameters are changed. This instability
of the matching function makes it an inappropriate tool for investigating the eﬀectiveness of
policy changes or macroeconomic fluctuations.
Although the simple model above is useful to examine why the matching function is subject
to the Lucas critique, we now need to relax several restrictive assumptions of the incentive
model above - that households and firms are myopic, wages are exogenous, and productivity is
constant - in order to examine the relative performance of the incentive model and the standard
matching model in accounting for well-known stylized facts. In the context of conventional
calibrations, we will show that the incentive model fares better than the standard matching
model in reproducing the volatilities of major labour market variables.
5.4 An Extended Incentive Model
We now extend the simple model above by
• including aggregate risk: the average aggregate productivity parameter a is now subject
to random productivity shocks;
• allowing for rates of time discount that are less than 100%, so that workers and firms
become intertemporal optimizers and
• introducing wage determination through bargaining.
The first extension enables us to simulate productivity shocks as done in Hall (2005), Shimer
(2005) and numerous other papers and to make our framework quantitatively comparable to the
matching theory. The second and third extensions provide a richer depiction of the determinants
of employment and wages.
In this context, the new sequence of decisions may be summarized as follows. First, the
aggregate productivity shock and the idiosyncratic shocks are revealed. Second, the wage is set
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through bargaining. Third, the firms make their hiring and firing decisions and the households
make their job acceptance and refusal decisions, taking the wage and the realization of the
aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks as given.
5.4.1 The Firm’s Behavior
Since the firm is not myopic in this model, its hiring and firing decisions depend on its expected
profits not only in the current time period, but also in future time periods.
The Firing Decision
The expected present value of profit generated by an incumbent employee, after the random
profitability term εt is observed, is182
Et
¡
πIt
¢
= (at − wt − εt) + δEt
¡
πIt+1
¢
, (5.20)
where δ is the time discount factor, at is the incumbent employee’s productivity, and
Et
¡
πIt+1
¢
= Et
£
(1− σt+1)
¡
at+1 − wt+1 −Et
¡
εt+1|
¡
εt+1 < νIt
¢¢
+ δπIt+2
¢
− φt+1f
¤
. (5.21)
E
¡
ε|ε < νIt
¢
is the expectation of the random term ε, conditional on this shock falling short of
the incumbent employee’s retention incentive νIt , which is defined as
νIt = at − wt + δEt
¡
πIt+1
¢
+ f , (5.22)
i.e. the retention incentive is the diﬀerence between the gross expected profit from retaining
the employed worker
¡
at − wt + δEt
¡
πIt+1
¢¢
and the expected profit from firing her (−f).
An incumbent worker is fired in period t when the realized value of the random cost εt
is greater than the incumbent worker employment incentive: εt > νIt . Since the cumulative
distribution of ε is Cε
¡
νIt
¢
, the employed worker’s firing rate is
φt = 1− Cε
¡
νIt
¢
. (5.23)
The Job Oﬀer Decision
The expected present value of profit generated by an entrant, after the random cost εt has
been observed, is
Et
¡
πEt
¢
= at − wt − εt − h+ δEt
¡
πIt+1
¢
. (5.24)
We define the firm’s expected job oﬀer incentive νEt as the diﬀerence between the gross
expected profit from a hired worker (at − wt − h + δEt
¡
πIt+1
¢
) and the profit from not hiring
182In the first period, profit is (at − wt − εt); in the second period, the worker is retained with probability
(1− φt) and then generates an expected profit of at − wt, and the worker is fired with a probability of φt and
then generates a firing cost of ft; and so on.
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him (i.e. zero):
νEt = at − wt − h+ δEt
¡
πIt+1
¢
(5.25)
A job is oﬀered when νEt > εt. Thus the job oﬀer rate is
ηt = Cε
¡
νEt
¢
. (5.26)
5.4.2 The Worker’s Behavior
The incumbent worker’s expected present value of utility ex post (once the realized value of
the disutility shock et is known) is
Et
¡
V Nt
¢
= wt − et + δEt
¡
(1− σt+1)V Nt+1 + σt+1V Ut+1
¢
, (5.27)
where Et
¡
V Nt+1
¢
is the expected present value of utility of the following period (before the
realized value of the shock et is known):
Et
¡
V Nt+1
¢
= Et
¡
wt+1 −Et (et+1|et+1 < ιt+1) + δ
¡
(1− σt+2)V Nt+2 + σt+2V Ut+2
¢¢
. (5.28)
The expected present value utility from unemployment is
Et
¡
V Ut
¢
= bt + δEt
¡
μt+1V
N
t+1 +
¡
1− μt+1
¢
V Ut+1
¢
. (5.29)
An unemployed’s expected “work incentive” ιt (the incentive for an unemployed to accept
work) is the expected diﬀerence between the gross183 present value from working Et
³
V˜ Nt
´
=
wt + δEt
¡
(1− σt+1)V Nt+1 + σt+1V Ut+1
¢
and the present value from not working Et
¡
V Ut
¢
in the
current period:
ιt = Et
³
V˜ Nt − V Ut
´
. (5.30)
Thus the unemployed accepts a job oﬀer when et < Et
³
V˜ Nt − V Ut
´
, so that et < ιt.Consequently,
the job acceptance rate is
αt = Ce (ιt) . (5.31)
The incumbent worker decides to quit his job when the present value of becoming unem-
ployed exceeds the present value of remaining employed (Et
³
V˜ Nt
´
− et < Et
¡
V Ut
¢
), so that his
expected work incentive is lower than the utility cost et > Et
³
V˜ Nt − V Ut
´
= ιt. Thus the quit
rate is
χt = 1− Ce (ιt) . (5.32)
5.4.3 Employment
As in the previous model, the match probability is
183The employed worker’s "gross" expected present value from working is the employed worker’s expected
present value of utility without taking the utility shock into account.
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μt = ηtαt, (5.33)
and the separation probability is
σt = φt + χt − φtχt, (5.34)
and the associated employment dynamics equation is
nt = μt + (1− σt − μt)nt−1 (5.35)
where the employment persistence parameter (1− σt − μt) depends inversely on the match
probability μt and the separation probability σt. An alternative interpretation of the persistence
parameter is given by
1− σt − μt = (1− φt) (1− χt)− ηtαt, (5.36)
where (1− φt) (1− χt), the product of the incumbents’ retention rate and staying rate, is
the incumbents’ survival rate. Thus the persistence parameter is the diﬀerence between the
incumbents’ survival rate and the unemployed workers’ match probability.
5.4.4 Wage Determination
We now endogenize the real wage through bargaining. The conventional matching models
assume that the real wage is the outcome of Nash bargaining, which takes place after the
match has been made. This sequence of decisions is conceptually problematic, particularly
when match productivities are heterogeneous. Should not the firms’ and workers’ incentives to
match depend on the wage oﬀered? If workers and jobs diﬀer in terms of their productivities,
will not a change in the wage lead to a change in the number of matches that are productive?
In practice, of course, we don’t find workers and firms agreeing to match before the terms of
the employment contract have been set.
This diﬃculty is easy to overlook in the conventional matching models, where matches are
generated mechanically through a matching function, all matches generate a bargaining surplus,
and this bargaining surplus is shared by the worker and the firm through the subsequent wage
negotiation. But once the matching process is endogenized in terms of the worker’s and firm’s
incentive to match - as is done in our incentive model - the diﬃculty comes into sharp relief.
Then we see that the match probability depends on the firm’s job oﬀer rate and the worker’s
job acceptance rate, and these rates in turn depend on the wage. Similarly, the separation
probability depends on the firm’s firing rate and the worker’s quit rate, and these rates are also
wage-dependent. In this context, it is clear that the number of matches made and destroyed
per period of time cannot be determined without prior knowledge of the wage.
On this account, we assume here that wage bargaining takes place before the job oﬀer,
acceptance, firing and quit decisions are made. Our aim is to formulate a wage determination
model that is (i) simple and tractable, (ii) comparable to the wage bargaining process in the
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conventional matching models (with the exception of the timing issue above) and (iii) able to
reproduce the stylized fact that wages are as volatile as productivity. For this purpose, we let
the incumbent workers and entrants receive the same wage wt,184 determined through Nash
bargaining between the firm and its median incumbent worker. The median worker faces no
risk of dismissal, as he is at the middle of the ε distribution. These assumptions satisfy the
three aims above, because (i) the simplify the analysis by allowing the employment rate to
depend on the wage, but not vice versa, (ii) the Nash bargaining between the firm and the
median incumbent is comparable to the wage bargaining in the conventional matching models,
and (iii) the negotiated wage turns out to be as volatile as productivity.
Needless to say, other models of wage negotiations could be incorporated into our analysis
(e.g. individualistic wage bargaining, monopoly union wage setting, separate wage negotiations
for incumbents and entrants, etc.), but we do not do so here since they would substantially
complicate the model,185 without aﬀecting the main points of our analysis, namely, that the
matching and separation rates can be determined endogenously through the job oﬀer, job
acceptance, firing and quit decisions, and that these decisions are not replicable through a
stable matching function.
The wage bargain takes place in each period of analysis. In the current period t, under
bargaining agreement, the median incumbent worker receives the wage wt incurs eﬀort cost eM
and the firm receives the expected profit
¡
at − wt − εM
¢
in each period t. Thus the expected
present value of the median incumbent worker’s utility E(V Mt ) under bargaining agreement is
Et(V Mt ) = wt − eM + δEt
¡
(1− σt+1)V Nt+1 + σt+1V Ut+1
¢
. (5.37)
The expected present value of firm’s returns under bargaining agreement are
Et
¡
ΠMt
¢
=
¡
at − wt − εM
¢
+ δEt
¡
(1− σt+1)ΠNt+1 − φt+1f
¢
. (5.38)
Under disagreement in bargaining, the incumbent worker’s fallback income is d, which can be
conceived as financial support from family and friends, strike pay out of a union fund, or other
forms of support. The firm’s fallback profit is −z, a constant. Assuming that disagreement in
the current period does not aﬀect future returns, the present value of utility under disagreement
for the incumbent worker is
E
³eV Mt ´ = d+ δEt ¡(1− σt+1)V Nt+1 + σt+1V Ut+1¢ , (5.39)
184This assumption also implies that an increase in wages leads to a fall in employment. This employment
eﬀect can of course also be generated when incumbent workers and entrants have diﬀerent wages. For example,
Lindbeck and Snower (2001) provide a variety of reasons why entrants do not receive their reservation wage
and thus a rise in incumbent workers’ wages is not met a counterveiling fall in entrant wages, and thus a rise in
incumbent workers’ wage lead to a fall in employment. In the context of a Markov model, Diaz-Vazquez and
Snower (2003) show that incumbent workers’ wages are inversely related to aggregate employment even when
entrants receive their reservation wages.
185Wages would depend on the time path of employment, while employment depends on the time path of
wages.
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and the present value of profit under disagreement for the firm is
E
³eΠMt ´ = −z + δEt ¡(1− σt+1)ΠNt − φt+1f¢ . (5.40)
The incumbent worker’s bargaining surplus is
Et
¡
V Mt
¢
−Et
³eV Mt ´ = wt − eM + δEt ¡(1− σt+1)V Nt+1 + σt+1V Ut+1¢
− d− δEt
¡
(1− σt+1)V Nt+1 + σt+1V Ut+1
¢
= wt − d− eM , (5.41)
and the firm’s surplus is
Et
¡
ΠMt
¢
− Et
³eΠMt ´ = ¡a− wt − εM ¢+ δEt ¡(1− σt+1)ΠNt − φt+1f¢−
Et
¡
−z + δ
¡
(1− σt+1)ΠNt − φt+1f
¢¢
= at − wt − εM + z. (5.42)
The negotiated wage maximizes the Nash product (Λ):
Λ =
¡
wt − eM − d
¢γ ¡at − wt + z − εM ¢1−γ . (5.43)
Thus the negotiated wage is
wt = γ
¡
at + z − εM
¢
+ (1− γ)
¡
eM + d
¢
, (5.44)
where γ represents the bargaining strength of the incumbent worker relative to the firm.
5.4.5 The labour Market Equilibrium
The labour market equilibrium is the solution of the system comprising the following equations:
• Incentives: the incumbent worker retention incentive νIt (eq. 5.22), the job oﬀer incentive
νEt (eq. 5.25), the work incentive ιt (eq. 5.30).
• Employment decisions: the firing rate φt (eq. 5.23), and the job oﬀer rate ηt (eq. 5.26).
• Work decisions: the job acceptance rate αt (eq. 5.31) and the quit rate χt (eq. 5.32).
• Match and separation probabilities: the match probability μt (eq. 5.33) and the separation
probability σt (eq. 5.34).
• Employment and wage determination: the employment level Nt (eq. 5.35) and the nego-
tiated wage wt (eq. 5.44).
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5.5 Calibration
We now calibrate our incentive model for the US economy. The calibration is done on a monthly
basis. The simulation results are aggregated to quarterly frequency to make them comparable
to the empirical data, as for example in Shimer (2005). For the discount factor δ = 1
1+r we
apply the real interest rate r = 1.041/12−1.We normalize the average productivity (a) to 1. As
in Hall (2005) and Shimer (2005), we set b by applying a replacement rate of β = 40% of the
wage. For simplicity, we set d = b. As commonly found in the literature we adopt a bargaining
power parameter γ of 0.5.
Vacancy posting costs are usually set to around 30 percent of the quarterly productivity
in the conventional matching model calibrations. To make our calibration as comparable as
possible to conventional ones, we divide this number by the typical quarterly worker job finding
rate of 0.7 (see, e.g., Krause and Lubik, 2007 and den Haan et al., 2000) to obtain the hiring
costs, h. This gives us a value of 43 percent of the quarterly productivity or roughly 130 percent
of the monthly productivity.
The literature does not provide reliable direct estimates of the magnitude of US firing costs.
Thus we assess these costs indirectly. For this purpose, note that Belot et al. (2007) provide
index measures of employment protection for regular jobs in the US and UK, and that Bentolila
and Bertola (1990) provide estimates of the average magnitude of UK firing costs on a yearly
basis.186 Assuming that the index measures of employment protection are proportional to the
estimates of the magnitude of firing costs, we multiply the magnitude of the UK firing costs by
the ratio of the US to the UK employment protection indeces to derive a rough estimate of the
magnitude of US firing costs. Accordingly, the magnitude of monthly US firing costs, relative
to productivity, is 0.08. The same exercise based on other industrialized countries (France,
Germany and Italy), however, yields higher estimates of US firing costs. Thus we choose a
value of 0.1 for our baseline calibration, but provide a robustness analysis for other values in
Appendix 5.A.2.187 For simplicity, we set the firm’s fallback profit −z equal to−f .188
We assume that the random profitability term ε and the utility shock e have cumulative
distributions given by logistic functions with scale factors sε and se and expected values ε¯ and
e¯, respectively.189 We calibrate our model such that it replicates the stylized fact that wages
are as volatile as productivity.190 This is achieved by setting e¯ = 0.19. Thereby our calibration
excludes the possibility that our results are driven by real wage rigidity. We assign values to the
remaining free parameters of the model (ε¯, se, sε) so as to replicate the following steady state
values (summarized in Table 5.1):191 The match probability μ, which is the probability for a
186We take averages over the time periods provided by these authors.
187Specifically, we provide simulation results for firing costs calculated relative to the UK, f = 0.08 , and as
an upper bound we choose f = 0.2.
188Here we implicitly assume that during disagreement the incumbent worker imposes the maximal cost on
the firm short of inducing dismissal.
189The cumulative logistic distribution is very close to the cumulative normal distribution.
190See Hornstein et al. (2005).
191Specifically, the three parameters set α, η, and φ. From these latter flow rates, the remaining rates can be
derived.
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worker to find a new job within one period, is calibrated to 45%192, as in Shimer (2005) and
Hagedorn and Manvoskii (2008). The unemployment rate u is calibrated to 12%.193 According
to our employment dynamics equation (5.12) steady state unemployment is u = μμ+σ which
implies a separation rate of 6.14%. Based on Hall (2006), who shows that fires and quits
have approximately the same share in separation, we assume firings to account for 50% of the
separations, namely φ = 3.1%. Eq. (5.34) then yields the quit rate of χ = 3.2%. Since α is
equal to 1−χ, the job acceptance rate is set at 96.8%. Recalling that μ = αη, we find that the
resulting job oﬀer rate η is 46.5%.
We normalize the autocorrelation (ρa) of the aggregate productivity shock and normalize
the standard error such that we obtain the empirical values for the autocorrelation and the
volatility of productivity in the model simulation below. Table 5.2 summarizes our calibrated
parameter values.
Variable In Words Steady State Value
u unemployment rate 0.120
μ match probability 0.450
η hiring/job oﬀer rate 0.465
σ separation rate 0.061
φ firing rate 0.031
χ = 1− α job quit rate 0.032
Table 5.1: Steady state values.
Parameter In Words Value
a productivity 1
β replacement rate bw ,
d
w 0.4
f firing cost 0.1
h hiring cost 1.3
γ workers’ bargaining strength 0.5
r discount factor 0.997
−z firm’s fallback profit −0.1
e¯ average value of leisure 0.17
ε¯ average operating costs 0.465
sε scale factor of the cumulative distribution of εt 0.390
se scale factor of the cumulative distribution of et 0.078
ρa autocorrelation of the aggregate productivity shock 0.975
'a standard error of the aggregate productivity shock 0.007
Table 5.2: Parameter values (rounded to the third decimal)
192Note: in our model the worker finding rate (i.e., the probability of a firm to find a new worker) and the job
finding rate (i.e., the probability of a worker to find a new) are the same.
193This value also considers potential participants in the labor market such as discouraged workers and workers
loosely attached to the labor force, see Krause and Lubik (2007) and den Haan et al. (2000).
95
5.6 Description of Results
5.6.1 Labour Market Volatilies
Costain and Reiter (2007) and Shimer (2005) show that the conventional calibration of the
matching model is unable to replicate the volatility of the job finding rate, the unemployment
rate, and other labour market variables in response to productivity shocks. Table 5.3 shows that
the empirical volatilities for the United States (from 1951-2003, HP filtered data with smoothing
parameter 100,000, as calculated by Shimer) are far greater than the corresponding volatilities
in response to productivity shocks, as generated by the simulation of the conventional matching
model (in its standard calibration, as calculated by Shimer).
U. Rate Match. Rate Sep. Rate Product.
Empirical Volatilities by Shimer (2005), from 1951-2003
Standard deviation 0.19 0.12 0.08 0.02
Relative to productivity 9.5 5.9 3.8 1
Quarterly autocorrelation 0.94 0.91 0.73 0.88
Volatilities by Shimer’s (2005) Search and Matching Model
Standard deviation 0.01 0.01 - 0.02
Relative to productivity 0.5 0.5 - 1
Quarterly autocorrelation 0.94 0.88 - 0.88
Table 5.3: Empirical volatilities and volatilities generated by the search and matching model
from Shimer (2005).
To compare our model with the conventional matching theory, we use our baseline calibra-
tion (with robustness checks in the Appendix 5.A.2) to simulate our model for 200 quarters (i.e.
600 months). We repeat this exercise 10,000 times and report the average of the macroeconomic
volatilities (HP filtered simulated data with smoothing parameter 100,000) in Table 5.4.
U. Rate Match. Rate Sep. Rate Product.
Standard Calibration
Standard deviation 0.19 0.13 0.07 0.02
Relative to productivity 8.8 6.0 3.5 1
Quarterly autocorrelation 0.90 0.88 0.88 0.88
Table 5.4: Volatilities generated by the incentive model of matching.
The diﬀerences between our model and the conventional matching model are striking. Our
model can generate the high macroeconomic volatilities found in the data. Our results are all
the more remarkable, as we do not neither have to resort to Hall’s (2005) real wage rigidity
assumption nor to Hagedorn and Manovskii’s (2008) small surplus calibration.
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Specifically, the more rigid the wage in the conventional matching model (Hall, 2005), the
greater the share of productivity variations that is captured by the firm and thus the greater
the volatility of vacancies. However, there is evidence against the rigid-wage hypothesis both
from the microeconometric and the macro perspective. Haefke et al. (2008) infer that wages
for newly created jobs (i.e., those modeled in the matching model) are completely flexible on
a microeconomic level. Hornstein et al. (2005) show that wages are roughly as volatile as the
labour productivity on a macroeconomic level. By contrast, our model generates high labour
market volatilities, even though it replicates the stylized fact that wages are as volatile as
productivity.
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) choose a small-surplus calibration to resolve the volatility
puzzle of the matching model. Under this calibration, aggregate profits are only a very small
share of the overall production in the steady state, so that a positive productivity shock sharply
increases the relative profits. This gives a large incentive to firms to post more vacancies (due
to the free entry condition). Consequently all labour market variables become volatile. This
type of calibration has several shortcomings. Besides the unrealistically low profit share, the
utility value of unemployment is extremely high and workers’ bargaining power is very low in
the calibration. Therefore workers are almost indiﬀerent between working and not working.
We do not need to rely on any of these mechanisms in our calibration. As noted, we assume
that worker’s bargaining power is 50 percent. The labour income divided by overall production
is roughly 80 percent in our model. Furthermore, the average worker’s disutility of labour and
unemployment benefits make up only 80 percent of the current wage. As a consequence, the
average worker is not indiﬀerent between unemployment and employment.
5.6.2 Correlations
Our model features several additional advantages compared to the conventional matching frame-
work. Krause and Lubik (2007) show that the matching framework with endogenous job de-
struction and flexible wages cannot generate a strong negative correlation between the job
finding rate and the unemployment. In all of our model simulations, the correlation between
these two variables is very strongly negative, in magnitude between -0.95 and -0.99, i.e., slightly
higher than in the US data (-0.95, see Shimer, 2005).
Further, Krause and Lubik (2007) show that the matching model with endogenous job de-
struction and flexible wages cannot account for the negative correlation between job destruction
and job creation. In our model, the correlation between these two variables is always negative
and close to -1.194
194The job finding rate and the job destruction rate are both driven by the same underlying shock, resulting
in this strong negative correlation. We could get a lower correlation if we introduced another shock to drive a
wedge between the shocks underlying job destruction and those underlying job creation. However, for simplicity
we do not choose this option.
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5.7 Conclusion
This chapter has presented a choice-theoretic theory of labour market matching in the pres-
ence of frictions, heterogeneous jobs and heterogeneous workers. This theory does not rely on
a matching function. We have presented simple analytical models that derive labour market
matches and separations from the optimizing behaviour of workers and firms. Since the match-
ing function is meant to encapsulate frictions and heterogeneities, we have examined whether
it can replicate the optimizing behaviour above. Our analysis indicates that the matching
function is vulnerable to the Lucas critique, since it is not stable with respect to changes in
policy and macroeconomic variables. Thus its use for policy analysis and prediction becomes
problematic.
The general intuition is straightforward. Although it is often claimed that the matching
function is analogous to a production function, an important diﬀerence stands out. A firm’s
production function captures the portfolio of available technologies, and these are often invari-
ant with respect to many government policies and macroeconomic variations. By contrast, a
matching function summarizes the upshot of the many individual decisions by firms and work-
ers, responding to their individual incentives to oﬀer, accept, quit and destroy jobs, and these
incentives are in general aﬀected by policies and macroeconomic shocks. In this respect, the
matching function appears to face diﬃculty analogous to the adaptive expectations hypothesis,
which sought to predict expectations without reference to the actual stochastic processes in the
economy. Just as predictable changes in policies and and macroeconomic variables could be
expected to influence agents’ expectations, so these changes can also be expected to influence
agents’ incentives to generate labour market matches.
Our incentive theory provides a diﬀerent view of the matching process than that presented
by a matching function. Whereas the matching function depicts matches as the output of
a “matching technology” that mechanically pairs unemployed workers and vacant firms, the
incentive theory explains the matching probability in terms of the firm’s job oﬀer incentive
and the worker’s job acceptance incentive. Similarly, the separation probability is explained in
terms of the firm’s firing incentive and the worker’s quit incentive. These incentives depend on
all the parameters of the model, including policy and macro parameters.
To keep our formal analysis as simple as possible, we have made some radically simplifying
assumptions, such as those concerning wage determination, the depiction of heterogeneities in
terms of only two additive shocks ε and e, and the depiction of adjustment costs in terms
of only two additive costs h and f . Whereas these simplifying assumptions naturally aﬀect
the quantitative predictions of our model, they are not essential to basic idea that motivates
this chapter: namely, that the matching and separation probabilities can be understood in
terms of job oﬀer, job acceptance, firing, and quit probabilities, which may be derived from
the optimizing decisions of firms and workers. These optimizing decisions - in the presence of
heterogeneous workers and jobs, as well as costs of adjustment - explain why some job-seeking
workers remain unemployed and some vacant jobs remain unfilled.
Needless to say, the incentive models presented above are merely a first step towards a
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choice-theoretic understanding of the matching process. Much research remains to be done.
Although relaxing our simplifying assumptions regarding wage determination, heterogeneities
and adjustment costs will not aﬀect the basic idea above, it will help us refine the quantitative
predictive properties of the incentive model.
Nevertheless, we have shown that even on the basis of our radically simplifying assumptions,
our calibrated incentive model can account for various important empirical regularities that have
eluded the conventional matching models. In particular, our model comes close to generating
the empirically observed volatilities of the unemployment rate, the job finding rate and the
separation rate. Furthermore, our model can also account for the observed strong negative
correlations between the job finding rate and the unemployment rate, and between job creation
and job destruction.
5.A Appendix
5.A.1 Vacancies
The purpose of this appendix is to incorporate vacancies in the incentive model above and
derive the associated equivalence condition. The firm has two costs of employing new entrants:
a vacancy posting cost κ and a hiring cost h. The vacancy posting cost is expended regardless
of whether a worker is hired. The hiring cost, by contrast, is expended only once a worker
is hired. The vacancy posting cost κ is assumed constant per vacancy and the hiring cost h
is assumed constant per worker hired. Thus the profit generated by a new entrant is πE =
a − ε − w − h − ' κq(θ) where ε is positive and iid across workers (as above), κ/q (θ) is the
vacancy cost per worker hired and ' is the proportion of jobs that require vacancy postings
before they are filled, where 0 ≤ ' ≤ 1. (If the vacancy posting cost is dwarfed by the hiring
cost and 'κ is negligible, this general model reduces to the model above.)
Let the number of job applicants be A = x (V,mU), where m is the number of search
actions per worker and the function x exhibits constant returns to scale. Then the number of
committed applicants (i.e. applicants who do not defect to other jobs) is A/m = x (V/m,U) .
Then the number of committed applicants per vacancy is q (θ) = AmV = x
¡
1
m ,
U
V
¢
. Thus the
expected profit from an entrant is
πE = a− ε− w − h− 'κ
x
¡
1
m ,
U
V
¢
where the number of vacancies V and the number of unemployed U are both exogenous to the
firm when it makes its hiring decision.
We assume that vacancies are set before the random variable ε is known. Thus the number
of vacancies is determined by the following zero expected profit condition: E
¡
πE
¢
= a−E (ε)−
w − h− 'κ
x( 1m ,
U
V )
= 0, where E (ε) = 0. Thus the equilibrium number of vacancies satisfies
x
µ
1
m
,
u
v∗
¶
=
'κ
a− w − h (5.45)
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where u is the unemployment rate (U/L) and v is the vacancy rate (V/L) .
Furthermore, we assume that the number of search actions per worker is set before the
random variable e is known. Let the utility of a currently unemployed worker be E (V ) =
(ηm)w+(1− ηm) b− ηmE (e)−ψ (m), where ψ (m) is the cost of search actions. The utility-
maximizing number of search actions m∗ satisfies ∂E(V )∂m = η (w − b− E (e)) − ψ
0 (m) = 0, so
that
m∗ = k (η (w − b−E (e))) (5.46)
where k = (ψ0)−1.
Since a worker is hired iﬀ πE > 0, the job oﬀer rate is
η = Cε
Ã
a− w − h− 'κ
x
¡
1
m ,
u
v
¢! . (5.47)
Thus the match probability is
μ = ηα = Cε
Ã
a− w − h− 'κ
x
¡
1
m ,
u
v
¢!Ce (w − b) (5.48)
The firing rate φ is given by equation (5.5), the job acceptance rate α by (5.7), and the quit
rate χ by (5.32). Thus the separation probability is given by equation (5.34).
The change in employment is
∆N = μx (V−1,mU−1)− σN−1
Thus the employment dynamics equation satisfies
n = μx (v−1,m (1− n−1)) + (1− σ)n−1 (5.49)
The equilibrium vacancies rate, unemployment rate, search actions are the solutions of the
equation system (5.46), (5.45) , (5.47) , (5.48) and (5.49).
We now examine whether the optimized matching behaviour above can be mimiced through
the mainstream matching model, namely, a model based on a stable matching function and the
assumption that all jobs require prior posting of vacancies. This stable matching function is
of course not identical with that above, since it is required to mimic not only the standard
matching of homogeneous workers and jobs, but also the matching of heterogeneous workers
and jobs, as described above. In order to provide maximal flexibility in finding such a stable
matching function, we have specified it as a general functional form: x = x (u, v).
The corresponding employment dynamics equation is (5.14) and the zero-profit condition is
(5.15).
The employment dynamics equations for the two models, (5.12) and (5.14), are identical
when the following equivalence condition holds:
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κ
a− wg
µ
κ
a− w
¶
= Cε
Ã
a− w − h− 'κ
x
¡
1
m ,
u
v
¢!Ce (w − b) (5.50)
Diﬀerentiating this condition with respect to κ, we obtain
1
a− w
µ
κ
a− wg
0 + g
¶
= −C 0εCe
Ã
'
x
¡
1
m ,
u
v
¢ + κ∂ 'x( 1m ,uv )
∂κ
!
(5.51)
and diﬀerentiating the equivalence condition with respect to a, we get
− κ
(a− w)2
µ
κ
a− wg
0 + g
¶
= C 0εCe
Ã
1−
∂ 'κ
x( 1m ,
u
v )
∂a
!
. (5.52)
Rewriting equation (5.19),
1
a− w
µ
κ
a− wg
0 + g
¶
= −a− w
κ
C 0εCe
Ã
1−
∂ 'κ
x( 1m ,
u
v )
∂a
!
Substituting this into (5.51),Ã
'
x
¡
1
m ,
u
v
¢ + κ∂ 'x( 1m ,uv )
∂κ
!
=
a− w
κ
Ã
1−
∂ 'κ
x( 1m ,
u
v )
∂a
!
It is clear by inspection that this equation does not hold for all values of the parameters ', κ,
a, and so on.
5.A.2 Robustness
Table 5.5 provides a robustness analysis of the labour market volatilities implied by our model
for values of the firing cost f = 0.08 and f = 0.20.
U. Rate Match. Rate Sep. Rate Product.
Volatilities for f= 0.08
Standard deviation 0.23 0.14 0.09 0.02
Relative to productivity 10.7 6.6 4.4 1
Quarterly autocorrelation 0.90 0.88 0.88 0.88
Volatilities for f= 0.2
Standard deviation 0.11 0.09 0.03 0.02
Relative to productivity 5.2 4.5 1.5 1
Quarterly autocorrelation 0.91 0.88 0.88 0.88
Table 5.5: Robustness analysis of the labour market volatilities implied by our model for values
of the firing cost f=0.08 and f=0.20.
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6 Conclusion
Globalization has entered a new stage, with new and varying constellations of winners and
losers and thus, calls for a new policy paradigm. In contrast to the traditional way of thinking
- the welfare state redistributes purchasing power to the disadvantaged to support them in the
event of adverse shocks - now workers must be made more adaptable and be encouraged to
stabilize themselves if hurt from globalization.
This dissertation has examined several labour market policies with various incentive models
of the labour market, which explain the microeconomic decisions relevant to the transitions in
the labour market in terms of the incentives that economic agents face. To fulfil its new role
the following three reform policies for the welfare state have been proposed.
Unemployment accounts, which could be structured to reproduce all the main regulations
and provisions of the existing system,195 introduce a more eﬃcient redistributive scheme and an
incentive instrument for rewarding good risks, which gives people some property rights in this
welfare service. Thereby unemployment accounts do not only improve employment incentives
by reducing negative externalities, but also promote adaptability in the labour market, since
the accumulation of positive account balances, in the current stage of globalization, would
increasingly require workers to adapt to the rapidly changing environment. The quantitative
evaluation in Chapter 2 has shown that the incentive eﬀects of this reform would be more
than suﬃcient for unemployment accounts to be self-financing and the resulting reductions in
unemployment could be substantial.196
Chapter 3 has concluded that employment subsidies should be targeted as hiring vouchers at
the duration of unemployment, specifically at the long-term unemployed.197 Redirecting funds
from passive unemployment support towards hiring vouchers, which redistribute incentives in
favour of the disadvantaged, equalizes workers’ employment opportunities. Hiring vouchers
enable previously unemployed workers to become productive by adapting to their changed
circumstances and thereby, avoid further depreciation of skills. The quantitative analysis has
illustrated that hiring vouchers for long-term unemployed are “approximately welfare eﬃcient,”
i.e., they improve aggregate employment and welfare, do not increase earnings inequality and
are self-financing.
The Danish flexicurity concept shifts the focus of social security from job and income security
towards employment security. By increasing flexibility in the labour market and increasing
the employment incentives this policy package makes the labour market more adaptable. In
Chapter 4 the experiment of introducing the Danish flexicurity set of policies in Germany has
revealed the strong complementarities of this set of policies, which ensure its viability and
195Such that the unemployed would not be worse oﬀ than they are in the existing system.
196How unemployment accounts could work in the UK is discussed in Snower and Brown (2009). Boss et al.
(2008) present a concrete proposal how unemployment accounts could be integrated in Germany.
197Brown et al. (2007b) and Boss et al. (2007) show how hiring vouchers could be implemented in Germany.
The size of the hiring voucher rises with the duration of unemployment and falls with the duration of subsequent
employment. Unskilled workers receive higher vouchers than their skilled counterparts, because the present value
of the vouchers is tied to the expected present value of unemployment benefits that would have been received
and unskilled workers have higher unemployment rates.
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generate strong reductions in unemployment and inequality. These findings also emphasize the
need for a more holistic approach to labour market reforms, which enables not only to exploit
substantial economic complementarities but by addressing distributional concerns generates
political complementarities thus, potentially facilitating implementation.
Furthermore, it is straightforward to combine these policy proposals, e.g. workers could
use their unemployment account balances to purchase hiring vouchers and additionally, the
government could provide subsidies for the long-term unemployed to use their unemployment
account to purchase hiring vouchers.
This dissertation has provided simple micro-founded analytical frameworks that derive
labour market transitions from the optimizing behaviour of workers and firms without rely-
ing on a matching function. By exposing that the matching function is unstable with respect
to labour market policies and macroeconomic shocks Chapter 5 has indicated that the matching
function runs afouls of the Lucas critique. A new modelling strategy of two-sided search with
frictions and heterogeneities, which is able to account for empirical stylized facts, has been
proposed for future policy analysis and prediction. This analytical framework is seen as a first
step towards a new approach in labour market modelling and policy analysis, obiviating the
need for a matching function.
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Kiel, November 2nd, 2009 
Ich erkläre hiermit an Eides Statt, dass ich meine Doktorarbeit „Incentive Models of the
Labour Market" selbstständig angefertigt habe und dass ich alle von anderen Autoren wörtlich
übernommenen Stellen, wie auch die sich an die Gedanken anderer Autoren eng anlehnenden
Ausführungen meiner Arbeit, besonders gekennzeichnet und die Quellen zitiert habe.
Kiel, Juni 2009
